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Ever since its hurried enactment six weeks after the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, the USA PATRIOT Act' has generated confusion and
controversy. One thing about the Act upon which most people agree
however, is that it expanded government power to combat terrorism.
In particular, the Act supposedly tore down "the wall" between
United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
[hereinafter Patriot Act].
2 See, e.g., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 394 (2004) [hereinafter
9/11 COMM'N REPORT) ("[T]he Patriot Act ... vested substantial new powers in the
investigative agencies of the government.").
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foreign intelligence and criminal law enforcement. 3 According to a
recent federal court decision, however, the Patriot Act did not raze the
wall; to the contrary, the Act raised, for the first time, a statutory basis
for the wall. 4 On that view, the Patriot Act restricts, rather than
expands, the government's power to fight terrorism.5 This article
argues that the court interpreted the Patriot Act incorrectly; but so did
the federal courts that interpreted prior legislation to create the wall in
the first place. The article urges Congress to clarify the matter-and
truly tear down the wall-when it reauthorizes the Patriot Act.
This article focuses on "one of the most important" 6 and "perhaps
the most controversial"'7 provision in the Patriot Act. That provision
amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (the
FISA).8 The FISA was enacted to regulate the executive branch's use
of electronic surveillance to get foreign intelligence information. 9 The
3 See e.g., id. at 328 (stating that "[a] central provision" of the Administration proposal
that became the Patriot Act "was the removal of 'the wall' on information sharing between
the intelligence and law enforcement communities. ... ); U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, The Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence and Other Information, Audit Report 04-10,
at 2 (Dec. 2003) ("The Patriot Act lifted legal barriers to the sharing of foreign intelligence
information between the federal intelligence community and the federal law enforcement
community."); Robert S. Mueller Ill, Prepared Statement Before the 9/11 Commission 2
(Apr. 14, 2004) (transcript available at
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress04/mueller041404.htm) ("The PATRIOT Act, the
Attorney General's intelligence sharing procedures and the opinion from the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review tore down the legal impediments to
coordination and information-sharing between criminal investigators and intelligence
agents."); Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DuQ. L. REV.
663, 688 (2004) (provisions in Patriot Act "tear down th[e] wall"); Kim Lane Scheppele,
Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1001, 1038 (2004) (stating that, after Patriot Act's enactment, "it was only a
matter of time before the wall collapsed"); Peter Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1327 (2004) (describing "the breaking
down of the 'wall' between foreign intelligence and law enforcement activities" as
"perhaps the most controversial change in FISA in the Patriot Act"). See generally THE
9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 78-80 (summarizing development of "the wall");
Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement for Hearing on the Intelligence
Community's Response to Past Terrorist Attacks Against the United States from February
1993 to September 2001 21-26 (Oct. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Joint Inquiry Staff Statement],
available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/02I0hrg/021008/hill.pdf.
4 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002); see also infra
notes 346-413 (discussing this case).
5 See infra notes 418-19 & 649-52 and accompanying text.
6 Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties: Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model to
Domestic Law Enforcement, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1619, 1626 (2004).
7 Swire, supra note 3, at 1327.
8 Patriot Act, § 218, 115 Stat. 291 (amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B) and
1823(a)(7)(B)). The FISA is codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862.
9 See infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text (discussing forces leading to FISA's
enactment).
The Patriot Act
FISA generally requires the government to have advance judicial
approval for such surveillance. To get judicial approval for electronic
surveillance under the original FISA, a high-ranking government
official with intelligence responsibilities had to certify to a court that
"the purpose of the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence
information." 10 Some lower federal courts interpreted this provision
to mean that the "primary purpose" of the proposed surveillance had
to be gathering foreign intelligence, rather than gathering evidence for
a criminal prosecution." This "primary purpose" test assumed
incompatibility between the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence
and the purpose of gathering evidence for a prosecution. To satisfy
the primary purpose test, the Department of Justice accordingly
adopted procedures limiting contact between foreign intelligence
agents in the FBI and federal prosecutors. Those procedures came to
be interpreted restrictively by the Justice Department and the court
responsible for issuing FISA surveillance orders, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISA Trial Court"). The restrictive
interpretation produced what the public came to call "the wall.'" 12 The
wall thus was mainly the result of (1) lower courts' interpretation of
the original FISA's "purpose" provision; (2) the Justice Department's
procedures for implementing the lower courts' interpretation; and (3)
the restrictive interpretation of those procedures by Department
officials and the FISA Trial Court.
13
The wall caused trouble before 9/11 but did not attract public or
congressional attention until afterwards. 14 For example, the wall hurt
'050 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (1980).
" See infra notes 210-23 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 227-86 and accompanying text.
13 "The wall" originally referred to restrictions on intelligence sharing internal to the
U.S. Department of Justice. See, e.g., 9/11 Comm'n Staff Statement No. 9, at 4-5
(available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff statements/ staff statement 9.pdf)
(stating that internal Justice Department procedures to separate foreign intelligence
functions from law enforcement functions "became known as the 'wall"'); see also infra
notes 227-86 and accompanying text. The phrase came to be used in a broader sense to
mean "a series of restrictions" between foreign intelligence and law enforcement that
existed "between and within" various federal agencies and that was "constructed over
sixty years as a result of legal, policy, institutional, and personal factors." HOUSE
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE TERRORIST
ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11,2001, S. REP. NO. 107-351 & H.R. REP. No. 107-792, at 363
(Dec. 2002) (pagination from unclassified version of report) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE
JOINT INQUIRY]; see also Hill, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, supra note 3, at 21-26
(referring to "the many 'walls' that have been built between the agencies over the past
sixty years").
14 See, e.g., Hill, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, supra note 3, at 14 ("The walls that had
developed to separate intelligence and law enforcement often hindered efforts to
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the investigation of whether Wen Ho Lee stole classified information
from the Los Alamos National Laboratory. 15 It was the 9/11 attacks,
however, that made the general public aware of the wall, because of
its apparent role in the government's failure to prevent the 9/11
attacks. 16 Right after 9/11, the Justice Department asked Congress to
amend the "purpose" provision of the original FISA to eliminate the
primary purpose test. Under the Department's proposal, instead of
certifying that "the purpose" of proposed FISA surveillance was to
obtain foreign intelligence information, the government would have
to certify that obtaining foreign intelligence was "a purpose" of the
proposed surveillance. Rather than adopt that proposal, Congress
amended the original FISA in the Patriot Act to require the
government to show that obtaining foreign intelligence information is,, . ,, • 18
"a significant purpose" of the proposed surveillance. Congress thus
struck a compromise between the Department of Justice and
supporters of the primary purpose test.
The case on which this article focuses arose when the Justice
Department changed its procedures to implement the Patriot Act's
"significant purpose" amendment. The new procedures reflected the
Department's view that the Patriot Act eliminated the primary
purpose test. Thus, the Department's procedures allowed the
government to seek judicial orders approving electronic surveillance
under the FISA for the primary purpose of building a prosecution.
The Department sought approval of the new procedures by the FISA
Trial Court. The FISA Trial Court largely rejected them, however,
concluding that the Patriot Act did not eliminate the "primary
purpose" test. 19 The Department took its first-ever appeal to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review ("FISA Court of
Review" or "Court of Review"). In its first-ever decision, called In re
Sealed Case, the FISA Court of Review reversed the FISA Trial
Court. To begin with, the Court of Review held that the primary
purpose test misread the original FISA of 1978; the test was based on
investigate terrorist operations aggressively.").
15 See infra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 266-86 and accompanying text.
17See infra notes 287-91 and accompanying text.
1 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(b) (2002) (emphasis added). The Patriot Act also added a
provision to the FISA expressly authorizing coordination of law enforcement activities and
intelligence activities in investigations involving FISA surveillance. See 50 U.S.C. §
1806(k), discussed infra notes 30243 and accompanying text.
19 See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611,614-25 (2002) [hereinafter FISA Trial Court Opinion].
20 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
The Patriot Act
a "false dichotomy" between foreign intelligence and law
enforcement. 21 In a curious twist, however, the Court of Review
found that the Patriot Act amended the FISA to ratify that "false
dichotomy." "In short," the FISA Court of Review said, "even though
• . .the original FISA did not contemplate the 'false dichotomy'
[between foreign intelligence and law enforcement] the Patriot Act
actually did-which makes it no longer false." 22 Faced with this
"analytic conundrum," 23 the FISA Court of Review interpreted the
FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, to relax the restrictions
associated with the primary purpose test but not to eliminate them
altogether.
Specifically, the Court of Review interpreted the FISA, as amended
by the Patriot Act, to restrict the government's use of FISA
surveillance for law enforcement purposes in two ways. First, the
government cannot use FISA surveillance if its sole objective is to
prosecute foreign agents for past crimes, even for foreign intelligence
crimes such as espionage and international terrorism. 24 Under this
restriction, for example, after the 9/11 attacks the government could
not have gotten a FISA order solely to 2gather evidence of Jose
Padilla's past involvement in those attacks. The government would
need a future-oriented objective as well, such as the prevention of
future acts of terrorism. Second, the government cannot use FISA
surveillance if its primary (much less its sole) objective is to
prosecute foreign agents for "non-foreign intelligence crimes."
26
Thus, for example, the government could not use FISA surveillance
for the primary purpose of prosecuting a suspected terrorist of cocaine
dealing if the cocaine dealing served only to support the suspect's
own drug habit and not to fund her terrorist activity. This restriction
prevents the government from using FISA surveillance to take foreign
agents "off the street" by getting evidence to arrest and prosecute
them for ordinary crimes. The Court of Review admitted that its
21 Id. at 735.
22 id.
23 id.
24 Id. The court limited this holding to foreign agents who are "United States persons,"
a term that includes U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i)
(2002) (defining "United States person" for purposes of FISA).
25 See, e.g., Richard B. Schmitt, Government Says Padilla Plotted High-Rise Attacks;
Allegations Are Released as the Supreme Court Prepares to Rule on His Arrest and
Detention, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2004, at Al (reporting government's allegation that, "in
addition to wanting to plant a 'dirty bomb,' [Padilla] also plotted with Al Qaeda to blow
up high-rise apartment buildings in the United States").
26 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736.
Issue 2]
326 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Volume 28
restrictive reading of the FISA was "paradoxical," '27 because the
Patriot Act was meant to expand executive power, whereas the
original FISA was meant to restrict it.
The Court of Review made clear, however, that the Patriot Act
erects a lower wall than the one associated with the primary purpose
test. The Court of Review thus rejected the FISA Trial Court's
conclusion that, even as amended by the Patriot Act, the FISA
continues to impose the primary purpose test.28 The Court of Review
also rejected the argument of amici curiae on appeal that the Fourth
Amendment requires the government to meet the primary purpose test
to obtain a FISA surveillance order.29 Instead, the Court of Review
held as a matter of statutory interpretation and Fourth Amendment
law that the government can get a FISA surveillance order if its
primary purpose is to investigate and prosecute "foreign intelligence
crimes," as long as it also has a significant foreign intelligence
purpose other than prosecutorial use. (As mentioned above, however,
the court construed the FISA to prohibit the government from getting
a FISA order if its sole objective is to investigate and prosecute
foreign intelligence crimes; or if its primary (or sole) purpose is to
prosecute a "non-foreign intelligence crime.") Given the Court of
Review's rejection of the primary purpose test, the federal
government considered the court's decision a victory and did not seek
U.S. Supreme Court review.
While the FISA Court of Review's Fourth Amendment ruling has
generated much commentary, 30 its statutory rulings have attracted
27 Id. at 734.
28 Id. at 732-34.
29 1d. at 736-46.
30 See William C. Banks, And The Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret Surveillance
After the Terror, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1147, 1150 (2003) (arguing that dec'isions of FISA
Trial Court and FISA Court of Review contained both statutory and constitutional errors);
Rebecca A. Copeland, War on Terrorism or War on Constitutional Rights? Blurring the
Lines of Intelligence Gathering in Post-September 11 America, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 3
(2004) (focusing on effects of post-9/11 legal changes on constitutional freedoms);
Michael P. O'Connor & Celia Rumann, Going, Going, Gone: Sealing the Fate of the
Fourth Amendment, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1234, 1238 (2003) (focusing on how FISA
Court of Review's decision violates the Fourth Amendment); Scheppele, supra note 3, at
1043-47 (implying that, as implemented by Attorney General, Patriot Act's amendments
to FISA's "purpose" provision violate the Fourth Amendment); Ronald J. Sievert, War on
Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307, 336-37
& nn.158-59 (2003) (stating that "constitutional underpinnings" of FISA depend on its
being interpreted, even as amended by Patriot Act, "as an intelligence tool"); John C. Yoo,
Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 442-44 (2003)
(discussing case law and statutory provisions on "primary purpose" test in context of
exploring constitutional boundaries of judicial review of war powers); Nola K. Breglio,
Note, Leaving FISA Behind: The Need to Return to Warrantless Foreign Intelligence
The Patriot Act
little. 3 1 This article seeks to fill the gap by addressing the statutory
rulings, and, in the process, takes a position contrary to that taken in
the scant commentary on those rulings that does exist. 32 The court's
statutory rulings deserve attention for three reasons. First, issues of
statutory interpretation affect the existence and nature of the Fourth
Amendment issues posed by FISA surveillance. Most fundamentally,
the question whether FISA surveillance satisfies the Fourth
Amendment depends on what the FISA means. Second, the court's
statutory rulings restrict the government's ability to fight international
terrorism right now. The restrictions are less severe than those
associated with the primary purpose test, and they may be wise
policy, but they could still have grave results.
Surveillance, 113 YALE L.J. 179, 180 (2003) (arguing that Patriot Act, as interpreted by
FISA Court of Review, causes FISA procedures "no longer" to "provide constitutionally
adequate protection"); David Hardin, Note, The Fuss Over Two Small Words: The
Unconstitutionality of the USA PATRIOT Act's Amendments to FISA Under the Fourth
Amendment, 71 GEO. WASH L. REV. 291 (2003) (discussing constitutional analysis); Heath
H. Galloway, Note, Don 't Forget What We're Fighting For: Will the Fourth Amendment
Be a Casualty of the War on Terror?, 59 WASH & LEE L. REV. 921 (2003) (discussing
Patriot Act's effect on civil liberties); Grayson A. Hoffman, Note, Litigating Terrorism:
The New FISA Regime, the Wall, and the Fourth Amendment, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1655,
.1659 (2003) (arguing that FISA Court of Review's Fourth Amendment analysis is
substantially correct); Stephanie Komblum, Note, Winning the Battle While Losing the
War: Ramifications of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review's First
Decision, 27 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 623, 648-56 (2003) (arguing that FISA Court of
Review's unnecessarily broad decision exposes FISA, as amended by Patriot Act to
constitutional challenges); George P. Varghese, Comment, A Sense of Purpose: The Role
of Law Enforcement in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 385, 386
(2003) ("call[ing] into question the constitutionality of the Patriot Act's 'significant
purpose' test").
3 Banks, supra note 30, at 1167-81 (arguing that FISA Trial Court was correct to
prohibit Criminal Division control of FISA surveillance and that FISA Court of Review's
reversal of FISA Trial Court rested on misunderstanding of FISA); John E. Branch III,
Recent Development, Statutory Misinterpretation: The Foreign Intelligence Court of
Review's Interpretation of the 'Significant Purpose' Requirement of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 81 N.C. L. REV. 2075, 2076 (2003) (arguing that FISA
Court of Review's opinion "goes too far in eroding restrictions on the government's use of
FISA searches to the extent that it invites abuse of those searches"); cf Daniel Richman,
Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749,
822-24 (2003) (explaining that "there may be countervailing benefits from relaxation of
strictures," such as the Patriot Act's relaxation of the "primary purpose" test);
Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 686-91 (discussing the wall and defending Patriot Act's
modification of it primarily on policy grounds).
32 See Banks, supra note 30, at 1174-81 (statutory analysis concluding that overall FISA
Trial Court's opinion was faithful to "the very core objective of FISA, even as amended by
the Patriot Act" and that FISA Court of Review reversed trial court based on misreading of
statute); Branch, supra note 3 1, at 2078-79 (summarizing argument that the FISA Court of
Review's interpretation makes it too easy for government to use FISA surveillance for
prosecutorial purposes); Swire, supra note 3, at 49-51 (brief statutory analysis concluding
that FISA Trial Court correctly interpreted original FISA but not FISA as amended by
Patriot Act; and that FISA Court of Review interpreted FISA, as amended by Patriot Act,
to make it too easy for government to use FISA surveillance for prosecutorial purposes).
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Third, the statutory rulings will need Congress's attention when it
debates reauthorization of the Patriot Act. The provision in the Patriot
Act amending the "purpose" provision of the original FISA sunsets in
December 2005. 3 Congress has the options of (1) allowing the sunset
to occur, in which case the original version of FISA's purpose
provision comes back into force; (2) reauthorizing the current Patriot
Act provision that amends the original FISA's purpose provision; or
(3) clarifying or substantively changing the statutory law on the
permissible purposes of FISA surveillance. If Congress chooses the
first option and the original FISA comes back into force, its meaning
will immediately be the subject of a conflict between the FISA Court
of Review and the circuits that construed the original FISA to impose
the "primary purpose" test. If Congress elects the second option and
simply reauthorizes the Patriot Act provisions that alter the primary
purpose test, a conflict among the federal courts about the meaning
and constitutionality of those provisions is likely to develop. If
Congress takes the third option by considering statutory changes, it
must address the important issue of the proper degree of separation
between law enforcement agents and intelligence agents. 34 A proper
choice among these options depends on a "full and informed
debate." 35 This article seeks to inform the debate, as well as to guide
courts in pending and future prosecutions in which the government
seeks to use evidence obtained through surveillance under the current
version of the FISA.
The article addresses the statutory foundation for "the wall" in four
steps. Part I describes the origin of the primary purpose test and the
wall associated with that test. In addition to providing necessary
background, Part I lays the groundwork for statutory analysis by
closely examining the text of the relevant statutory provisions. Part II
describes the events leading to In re Sealed Case and the decisions in
the case. Part II's description of the FISA Court of Review's decision
33 Patriot Act, § 224(a), 115 Stat. 295 (2001) (providing that, with certain exceptions,
provisions including § 218 of Patriot Act, which amended 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) to
replace "the purpose" with "a significant purpose," expire on December 31, 2005),
reproduced as note after 50 U.S.C. § 1802.
34 This issue extends beyond the proper scope of the government's authority to get
approval for electronic surveillance under the FISA. The divide between law enforcement
and foreign intelligence has deep roots. One major example of the division is reflected in,
and effected by, the statute that bars the CIA from exercising domestic law enforcement
powers. See National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, § 102(d)(3), Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61
Stat. 495 (1947), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(1) ("[T]he Agency shall have no police,
subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions.").
35 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 394.
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identifies some of the relevant legislative history. This aspect of Part
II, like Part I's examination of statutory text, lays groundwork for the
statutory analysis in Part III. Part III explains the importance of the
statutory issues and then analyzes them, building on Parts I and II.
Part III concludes that the FISA Court of Review misread both the
original FISA and the Patriot Act. The FISA Court of Review
correctly concluded that the original FISA did not compel the primary
purpose test. The Court of Review failed to recognize, however, that
the original FISA did limit the government's use of foreign
intelligence information for law enforcement purposes. Properly read,
the original FISA prohibited the government from using FISA
surveillance to get information for a prosecution, unless the
government intended the prosecution to serve one or more of the five
foreign intelligence purposes prescribed in the FISA. In short, the
original FISA restricted government surveillance more than the FISA
Court of Review believed, but less than those courts adopting the
primary purpose test believed.
As amended by the Patriot Act, the FISA does not impose either
the primary purpose test or the lesser restrictions discerned by the
Court of Review. Like the original FISA, the FISA as amended by the
Patriot Act allows the government to conduct FISA surveillance for
the primary - or even the sole - purpose of getting evidence for a
prosecution. Moreover, the anticipated prosecution can involve any
type of crime, not just "foreign intelligence crimes." This
prosecutorial objective for conducting FISA surveillance remains
subject to an important restriction. The government must intend the
anticipated prosecution to serve one or more of the five foreign
intelligence purposes identified in the FISA.
In sum, Parts I through III stake out the position that all of the
significant case law is wrong. The FISA Court of Review, as well as
the FISA Trial Court, misinterpreted both the original FISA and the
Patriot Act; pre-Patriot Act case law establishing the "primary
purpose" test is also wrong. Recognizing that the statutory issues are
debatable and highly unsettled, however, Part IV of the article
proposes an amendment to the FISA that (assuming one accepts the
article's statutory interpretation) clarifies its meaning.
I. LEGENDS OF THE WALL
According to legend, the Roman Emperor Caligula "wrote his laws
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in a very small character, and hung them up upon high pillars, the
more effectually to ensnare the people." 36 The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) is caligulan in its inaccessibility, which
prompts the detailed attempt in this Part to separate legend from
reality. After a brief historical discussion in Section A, Section B
examines the FISA's text closely. That examination lays groundwork
for understanding the cases and the Department of Justice actions,
described respectively in Sections C and D, that built "the wall" on
top of the original FISA. Section E describes the Patriot Act's
supposed demolition of the wall.
A. Pre-FISA
Before Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
("FISA") in 1978, presidents beginning with Franklin Roosevelt
authorized warrantless electronic surveillance in the name of national
security. They claimed the "inherent power" to do so.37 The power
supposedly inhered in the "President's constitutional duty to act for
the United States in the field of foreign affairs ...[and] to protect
national security."
3 8
In 1968, Congress enacted legislation regulating the executive
branch's use of electronic surveillance to investigate crime, but not its
use for national security purposes. 39 The 1968 legislation, Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act ("Title III"),
generally required the government to get advance Judicial approval
for electronic surveillance to investigate crime. Title III also,
however, contained a two-sentence proviso disclaiming an intention
to address the President's power to use electronic surveillance for
national security. The proviso's first sentence covered the President's
power to deal with foreign threats to national security:
Nothing contained in this chapter ... shall limit the constitutional
power of the President [1] to take such measures as he deems
necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or
36 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46.
37 United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407
U.S. 297, 310-11 n.10 (1972); S. REP. No. 95-604, at 7 (1978) ("[E]very President since
Franklin D. Roosevelt asserted the authority to authorize warrantless electronic
surveillance and exercised that authority."); id. at 10-12 (detailing this history); see also
H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, Pt. I, at 15-16 (1978) (discussing history of warrantless electronic
surveillance by executive branch).
38 United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973).
39 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. Ill
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2522 (2000)).
40 18 U.S.C. § 2518.
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other hostile acts of a foreign power, [2] to obtain foreign
intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the
United States, or [3] to protect national security information
againstforeign intelligence activities.
The proviso's next sentence was meant to cover the President's power
to deal with domestic threats to national security:
Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the
constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he
deems necessary to protect the United States [4] against the
overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or
[5] against any other clear aql present danger to the structure or
existence of the Government.
As the U.S. Supreme Court would conclude, this proviso evinced
Congress's "neutrality" on the existence and scope of the President's
inherent power to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance for
national security purposes. 43 Even so, Title III has significance: By
addressing surveillance for criminal law enforcement purposes while
not addressing surveillance for national security purposes, Title III
implies that the two sets of purposes differ.44 Title III's proviso is also
significant for its separation of foreign threats to national security
from domestic threats.
In the face of Congress's agnosticism on the President's power to
conduct electronic surveillance for national security purposes, the
Court addressed the matter in United States v. United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, known as the Keith case.
45
4 Title III, § 802, 82 Stat. 214 (1968) (bracketed numerals and italics added), repealed
by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 201(c), 92 Stat.
1797.
42 Id. (bracketed numerals added); see also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of the
Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 266 (1978) (reproducing findings of
Church Committee, Final Report, Book II, at 188) (describing second sentence of Title III
proviso as "deal[ing] with domestic intelligence interests," whereas first sentence of
proviso "related to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence matters") [hereinafter
Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA].
43 United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407
U.S. 297, 308 (1972); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 n.23 (1967)
(reserving the issue, in a case involving electronic surveillance of domestic crime,
"[w]hether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the
Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security").
44 See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 94 (1968) (recognizing "a distinction between the
administration of domestic criminal legislation... and the conduct of foreign affairs").
4' 407 U.S. 297 (1972). Damon J. Keith was the judge who decided the case in the
federal district court. Id. at 298. After he ordered the government to disclose information
gathered by electronic surveillance, the government sued him for a writ of mandamus in
the court of appeals. Id. at 301. This procedural history and the case's generic official title
probably explain why it is known as the Keith case.
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The Keith Court ended up dealing only with the President's power to
conduct electronic surveillance of domestic, not foreign, threats to
national security. Specifically, the Court held in Keith that the Fourth
Amendment generally requires the government to get judicial
approval before it can conduct electronic surveillance of a domestic
threat to national security. 46  (Keith involved a domestic
organization's plan to bomb a CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 4 7)
The Court emphasized, however, that although the Fourth
Amendment generally requires prior judicial approval for electronic
surveillance of domestic threats to national security, the Fourth
Amendment might otherwise require less stringent procedures and
standards for that kind of surveillance than Title III required for
surveillance of "ordinary crime." 4 8  Thus, the Keith Court
distinguished between surveillance for information related to
domestic threats to national security and surveillance for information
of ordinary crime. The Keith Court drew a further distinction-one
between surveillance related to domestic threats to national security
and surveillance related to foreign threats to national security. The
Court drew this latter distinction to limit its holding. The Court said,
"We have not addressed, and express no opinion as to, the issues
which may be involved with respect to the activities of foreign
powers or their agents.",49 Despite - indeed, partly because of - that
disclaimer, the Keith opinion suggests that the Fourth Amendment
varies in stringency, requiring the most strict procedures and
standards for electronic surveillance of "ordinary crime" (the subject
of Title III); less strict procedures and standards - which nonetheless
generally include prior judicial approval - for electronic surveillance
for information related to domestic threats to national security (the
subject of Keith itself); and the least strict procedures and standards
for electronic surveillance for foreign threats to national security (the
context as to which the Keith Court expressly reserved decision).
The D.C. Circuit extended Keith, thereby restricting the
government's power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance in
the name of national security, in Zweibon v. Mitchell. Zweibon arose
46 1d. at 314-21.
4
1id. at 299-300.
48 Id. at 322; see also id. at 323 (stating that Congress could prescribe procedures for
electronic surveillance of domestic security threats as long as "they are reasonable both in
relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the
protected rights of our citizens").
49 Id. at 321-22.
5 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc).
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from the government's warrantless electronic surveillance of the
Jewish Defense League (JDL). 5 1 The surveillance had been prompted
by JDL activities, both peaceful and violent, against the Soviet
Union's diplomatic and cultural installations in the United States.
52
The government asserted that those activities threatened Soviet-U.S.
relations and could lead to Soviet retaliation against U.S. citizens in
the Soviet Union.53  Therefore, the government argued, the
warrantless surveillance was a reasonable measure to address threats
posed to the United States by a foreign power (the Soviet Union). The
en banc D.C. Circuit rejected this argument. 54 A majority held that the
surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment. Two members of the
majority (Judges Wilkey and MacKinnon), each writing separately,
concluded that, even if the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
has a "'foreign affairs' exemption," the exemption "encompass[es]
only surveillances on foreign agents and those in criminal
collaboration with a foreign power," and JDL did not fall into either
category. 55 A plurality of four judges went further, stating in dicta
that, "absent exigent circumstances, all warrantless electronic
surveillance is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional."'56 Thus,
the Zweibon court held that the warrantless surveillance in that case
violated the Fourth Amendment, even though it related to "the
activities of foreign powers or their agents," 57 because the targets of
" Id. at 605-06.
52 Id. at 607-09.
53 Id.
54 Eight judges constituted the en banc court in Zweibon. Four judges-in an opinion by
Judge Skelly Wright for himself and Chief Judge Bazelon and Judges Leventhal and
Spottswood Robinson-held that the surveillance violated both the Fourth Amendment
and Title III. See id at 615-70. Two judges, Judges McGowan and Robb, concluded that
the surveillance violated Title 1II, without reaching the constitutional issue. Id. at 681-89.
Two other judges, Judges Wilkey and MacKinnon, concluded that the surveillance
violated the Fourth Amendment but not Title III. Id. at 689-707.
" Id. at 700 (Wilkey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 706
(MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("At least in the case of
collaborators or agents of a foreign power, I believe the national interest requires that the
President be free to engage in his information gathering functions without the burden of
obtaining prior judicial approval.").
56 Id. at 614 (emphasis added); see also id. at 651 ("[O]ur analysis would suggest that,
absent exigent circumstances, no wiretapping in the area of foreign affairs should be
exempt from prior judicial scrutiny, irrespective of the justification for the surveillance or
the importance of the information sought."). The plurality hesitantly agreed with the two
other judges who made up the majority that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for
electronic surveillance "at least in situations where the subject of the surveillance is a
domestic organization that is not the agent of or acting in collaboration with a foreign
power." Id. at 614. But cf id. at 654 ("[W]e doubt that an exception to the warrant
requirement should be created even for the activities of foreign agents or collaborators.").
7 United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407
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the surveillance were not themselves foreign powers or foreign
agents.
Zweibon influenced the enactment of the FISA.5 8 Zweibon led the
Department of Justice to fear that the D.C. Circuit would invalidate
all warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
information.59 This fear, in turn, led the Department to collaborate
with Congress on drafting legislation to authorize electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence information.
Additional pressure for legislation arose from public revelations of
the government's ongoing, widespread surveillance of U.S. citizens
and organizations in the name of national security. Many abuses
became public through the Watergate scandal and the Church
Committee reports. 6 1 The abuses included two forms particularly
U.S. 297, 321-22 (1972).
58 See, e.g., Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (and Wires) Have Ears: The
Background and First Ten Years of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 137
U. PA. L. REv. 793, 805 (1989).
59 See E-Mail from William F. Funk, Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School, to
Richard H. Seamon (Oct. 2, 2004) (describing Zweibon as a "critical development"
because it "in effect signaled that the D.C. circuit would hold surveillances even of foreign
powers unconstitutional absent a judicial warrant") (on file with author); see also
Electronic Surveillance Within the United States for Foreign Intelligence Purposes:
Hearing on S. 3197 before the Subcomm. on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of
the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1976) (testimony of
Attorney General Edward Levi) (citing Zweibon as evidence of need for legislation "to
achieve a coherence, stability and clarity in the law and practice that alone can assure
necessary protection of the Nation's safety and of individual rights"). As discussed below,
other courts-both before and after Zweibon-concluded that the Fourth Amendment
allows the government to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance for the purpose of
obtaining foreign intelligence information. See infra notes 174-209. The D.C. Circuit's
decision nonetheless carried great weight because those challenging the surveillance
would often be able to sue in the District of Columbia. For example, Zweibon was a civil
action by members of the JDL against the Attorney General John Mitchell "and various
former subordinates of his" in the FBI. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d at 675
(Bazelon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-604, at 7 (1978) (referring to revelations of abuses in
electronic surveillance); H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, Pt. I, at 21 (1978) ("In the past several
years, abuses of domestic national security surveillances have been disclosed."); id. at Il1
(dissenting views on H.R. 7308) ("No one can deny that abuses of electronic surveillance
have taken place in the past under the claim of 'national security."').
61 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-604, at 7 (1978) (stating that abuses in electronic
surveillance "were initially illuminated in 1973 during the investigation of the Watergate
break-in" and that additional abuses had been brought to light by the Church Committee);
S. REP. No. 95-701, at 9 (1978) (stating that Church Committee report "provided firm
evidence that foreign intelligence electronic surveillance involved abuses and that checks
upon the exercise of those clandestine methods were clearly necessary"); Senate
Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 42, at 9 (reproducing Additional Views of Sen.
Biden on S. 3197, 94th Cong. (1977)) ("Congress is on notice of the myriad of
[surveillance] abuses . . . in the course of the Watergate matter."); id. at I 10 (prepared
statement of John Shattuck and Jerry Berman, ACLU):
This legislation has been proposed for the same reasons that this new Intelligence
Committee was constituted: *the recognition, in the wake of Watergate and
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relevant to the FISA. One form concerned the collection of
information; the other concerned the use of the information that had
been collected. As to the first type of abuse, the government collected
"enormous amounts of personal and political information serving no
legitimate governmental interest." 62 It collected such personal and
political information from, among others, civil rights leaders such as
Martin Luther King, Jr., and domestic 6political organizations such as
the Women's Liberation Movement. The second form of abuse
concerned the use to which the information was put. Not only the
political and personal information collected, but also even the
information that potentially had a valid use for national security
purposes, was used by the FBI and government officials for stifling
domestic dissent, giving the incumbent Presidents politically useful
information about their opponents, and enhancing the FBI's power
and position in the bureaucracy.64  For example, the FBI peddled
surveillance information to Presidents and members of Congress
revelations of massive illegal programs conducted by the FBI, CIA, NSA and
other U.S. intelligence agencies, that the Congress must ... enact legislation...
which insure[s] that intelligence activities will no longer violate the civil and
constitutional rights of Americans.
Id. The Church Committee was chaired by Senator Church of Idaho. The House of
Representatives also held hearings chaired by Representative Otis Pike, though its final
report was not officially published. See James R. Coben, Gollum, Meet Smdagol: a
Schizophrenic Rumination on Mediator Values Beyond Self-determination and Neutrality,
5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 65, 65 (2004) (stating that Pike report never official
published).
62 Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 42, at 261 (reproducing "Major
Finding" of Church Committee, Final Report, book II, at 183); see also S. REP. No. 95-
604, at 8 (1978) (quoting Church Committee Report of electronic surveillance under
"vague and elastic standards" that had produced "vast amounts of information-unrelated
to any legitimate government interest-about the personal and political lives of American
citizens").
63 Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 42, at 271, 277 (1978) (reproducing
Church Committee, Final Report, book II, at 193, 199); see also S. REP. No. 95-604, at 29
(1978) (discussing investigation of Dr. King).
64 See, e.g., Intelligence Activities: Hearings before the Senate Select Comm. to Study
Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, Volume 6, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (1975) (describing FBI surveillance of
Republican leader Anna Chennault that was apparently requested by President Johnson for
political purposes but that also reflected suspicion of activities that might have violated
Foreign Agents Registration Act and Neutrality Act) [hereinafter cited as Church
Committee Hearing on the FBI]; Intelligence Activities and the Rights ofAmericans, book
I, S. REP. No. 94-755, at 64-65, 200 n.85, 233-34 (1976) (describing FBI surveillance
requested by President Kennedy of possibly illegal foreign pressure on Congressional
sugar quota deliberations, which were "arguably related to 'foreign intelligence"' but also
"potentially useful to the Kennedy administration for purely political purposes")
[hereinafter cited as Church Committee Final Report]; id. at 119-20 (describing President
Johnson's political use of FBI surveillance of foreign officials); see also Senate
Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 42, at 100 (prepared statement of Prof.
Christopher Pyle) (summarizing political uses of wiretap evidence revealed in Church
Committee report).
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about political opponents to curry favor for FBI pet projects and
funding.6 5 In sum, the Church Committee Reports showed that, in the
name of national security, government officials were collecting
information that could not fall within the most generous definition of
"national security information" and using it, as well as potentially
legitimate national security information, for purposes unrelated to
national security.
Congress enacted the FISA to curb such abuses by regulating the
executive branch's use of electronic surveillance. 66 Congress did not
deny the President's inherent power to conduct electronic surveillance
for national security purposes.6 7 Instead, Congress took the position
that even if the President had such power, Congress could regulate
that power by prescribing reasonable procedures for its exercise.
68
Neither the Ford Administration nor the Carter Administration
65 Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 42, at 128 (testimony of Morton
Halperin, Center for National Security Studies) ("Presidents have asked the FBI what it
knew about the views of U.S. Senators, for example, on the Vietnam war."); id. at 289
(reproducing portion of Church Committee report describing instances when FBI
disseminated intelligence information "to entrench the Bureau's own position in the
political structure, regardless of which party was in power at the time"); id. at 289-90
("Presidents and White House aides have asked the FBI to provide political or personal
information on opponents and critics, including 'name checks' of Bureau files. They have
also asked the Bureau to conduct electronic surveillance ... of such persons.") (footnote
omitted); id. at 300-03 (describing other instances of FBI's use of surveillance information
to curry favor).
66 See, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. 10,887 (1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("The abuses
of recent history sanctioned in the name of national security and documented in detail in
the Church committee highlight the need for more effective statutory controls and
congressional oversight."); id. at 10889 (statement of Sen. Bayh) ("[T]his bill is required
absolutely, unqualified[ly], because of certain misconduct and abuse which are almost
unbelievable"); S. REP. No. 95-604, at 7 (1978) ("This legislation is in large measure a
response to the revelations that warrantless electronic surveillance in the name of national
security has been seriously abused."); Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 42,
at 4 (statement of Sen. Huddleston) ("The abuses which were discovered in the area of
warrantless wiretaps made clear the necessity for legislative action.").
67 The FISA repealed the Title III proviso that addressed the President's supposed
"inherent" power and that was discussed in Keith. Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 201(c), 92 Stat.
1797. The repeal was meant to dispel the misperception that the proviso ratified the
existence of such power. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-604, at 6 (1978).
68 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-604, at 16 (1977) ("The basis for this legislation is the
understanding-concurred in by the Attorney General-that even if the President has an
'inherent' constitutional power to authorize warrantless surveillance for foreign
intelligence purposes, Congress has the power to regulate the exercise of this authority by
legislating a reasonable warrant procedure governing foreign intelligence surveillance.");
H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, Pt. I, at 24 (1978) ("[E]ven if the President has the inherent
authority in the absence of legislation to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance for
foreign intelligence purposes, Congress has the power to regulate the conduct of such
surveillance by legislating a reasonable procedure, which then becomes the exclusive
means by which such surveillance may be conducted.").
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opposed congressional regulation of Executive power.69 Indeed,
representatives from both administrations supported the legislation,
despite awareness that it restricted executive power. 70 Executive
support seemed to reflect a desire, in the wake of Watergate and the
Church Committee reports, to regain credibility for national security
surveillance, and, in the wake of court decisions such as Zweibon, to
secure a constitutionally solid statutory foundation for such
surveillance. 7 1 The resulting legislation is discussed next.
B. FISA
Cognizant of Keith's delineation of surveillance involving "foreign
powers" and their "agents,"' 72 the 95th Congress used those very
terms in the FISA. 73 The FISA authorized the federal government,
69 See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 10,887 (1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (observing that
S. 1566, 95th Cong., had support of Ford and Carter administrations).
70 S. REP. No. 95-604, at 16 (1977) (Congress's assertion in the FISA of power to
regulate the President's authorization of electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
purposes was "concurred in by the Attorney General"); H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 24
(1978) (Congress's determination that it had power by legislation to regulate President's
use of electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes "has been supported by two
successive Attorneys General"); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977: Hearings
before the Senate Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. on the
Judiciary [hereinafter Senate Judiciary Hearing on FISA], at 56 (statement of Adm.
Stansfield Turner, Director of CIA) ("Clearly this bill will inhibit the collection of foreign
intelligence to some degree. However, in my view that is worth the increase in credibility
and increased assurance of the people of the United States in their intelligence operations
and in the protection of their rights."); id. at 98 (testimony of Morton Halperin) (stating
that under proposed legislation "there has been a substantial reduction in the Presidential
power"); Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Legislation of the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence [hereinafter House
Judiciary Hearing on FISA], at 38 (testimony of Attorney General Griffin Bell) ("[W]e
have had two President's [sic] in a row who are willing to cede power" to conduct
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence); Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, at
12 (prepared statement of Attorney General Griffin Bell) (expressing his awareness of "the
abuses of the past" and his support for bill); id. at 25 (testimony of Attorney General
Griffin Bell) ("While it may seem strange for me to be indicating that we want to give up
power that we now have, we do."); id. at 40 ("[W]e're willing to give up this power.").
71 See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 10,889 (1978) (statement of Sen Garn) (stating that
"uncertainty and ambiguity" in the law had caused there to be "very few authorizations for
electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens for foreign intelligence purposes during the last 5
years").
72 United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407
U.S. 297, 321- 22 (1972).
71 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978); FISA's enactment by the 95th Congress in
1978 followed several failed attempts to enact similar legislation in prior Congresses. See
124 CONG. REC. 10,887 (1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (referring to "the ongoing 10-
year debate to regulate foreign intelligence electronic surveillance"); S. REP. No. 95-604,
at 7 (1978) (citing prior bills regulating electronic surveillance and prior hearings on those
bills); H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 13 (1978) (reporting that bills requiring a warrant
for foreign intelligence electronic surveillance "had been introduced in the House and
Senate each year since 1973"). The FISA was based on S.1566, 95th Cong., a direct
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with prior judicial approval, to conduct electronic surveillance of
"foreign powers" and "agents of foreign powers" for "foreign
intelligence information." Three aspects of the FISA are especially
important for understanding the subject of this article - the extent to
which FISA surveillance can be used for prosecutorial purposes. The
relevant aspects are: (1) how the government applies under the FISA
for a judicial order authorizing electronic surveillance; (2) what a
court must find to issue such a FISA surveillance order; and (3) what
uses the government can make of the information obtained under the
order. This examination is necessarily detailed, as it lays groundwork
for this article's ultimate conclusion that all significant precedent has
misunderstood the extent to which FISA can be used for prosecutorial
purposes.
1. Applications for FISA Surveillance Orders
An application for a FISA surveillance order requires Attorney
General approval. 75 Once approved, the application goes to a court
created by the FISA called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court.76 That court consists of eleven federal district judges selected
by the Chief Justice for seven-year terms. 77 The court's proceedings
are ex parte.78 Since the government is the only party to the
proceeding, a court order granting the government's application
without modification is not subject to direct review.79 In contrast, a
forerunner of which was S. 3197, 94th Cong. (1976). See S. REP. No. 95-604, at 3 (1978).
The House version of S.1566 that was reported in the 95th Congress was H.R. 7308. See
generally H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1 (1978) (report on H.R. 7308).
74 As amended after 1978, the FISA was expanded to authorize judicial approval of
physical searches, see 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829 (2000), pen registers and trap-and-trace
devices, see id. §§ 1841-1846, and documents and other tangible things, see id. §§ 1861-
1862. This article focuses on electronic surveillance.
71 See id § 1804(a)(2); § 1805(a)(2).
76 See id. § 1803(a).
77 See id
78 See id. ("Upon an application made pursuant to section 1804 of this title, the judge
shall enter an ex parte order as requested or as modified approving the electronic
surveillance if' the judge makes the prescribed findings.); cf FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a) and
41(d), (g) & (h) (providing for exparte issuance of arrests warrants and search warrant and
for post-execution challenges to searches conducted under warrants).
79 An order granting a government application for an order approving electronic
surveillance may not conclusively establish the legality of the ensuing surveillance. If the
government obtains information that it seeks to use against someone in a later proceeding,
including a criminal proceeding, the person can challenge the legality of the surveillance.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b)-(g) (2000). If the evidence is not so used, however, the
surveillance order is, as a practical matter, conclusive of the surveillance's legality.
Indeed, the target of the surveillance may never find out the surveillance occurred. But cf
50 U.S.C. § 18060)(3) (2000) (providing for notice to target when court fails to approve
emergency electronic surveillance); id. § 1825(b) & (j) (2000) (providing for notice to
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court order denying the government's application in whole or in part
is subject to review, at the government's instance, by a second court
created by the FISA, the United States Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review. This article hereafter refers to the
two courts created by the FISA, individually, as the FISA Trial Court
and the FISA Court of Review (or simply "Court of Review") and,
collectively, as "the FISA courts."
The application must identify or describe "the target" of the• 81
proposed surveillance. The application must also include a
statement describing the basis for the applicant's belief that:
(A) the target . . . is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power; and
(B) each of the facilities or places at which the [proposed]
electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is "out to be
used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
Thus, FISA surveillance may cover only facilities or places used or to
be used by a "foreign power" or an "agent of a foreign power."8 3 This
makes the definitions of "foreign power" and "agent of a foreign
power" critical to the scope and permissible purposes of FISA
surveillance.
Of relevance in this post-9/11 era, the term "foreign power" covers
both official and unofficial foreign entities, including terrorist groups
like al Qaeda. "Foreign power" means:
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not
recognized by the United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially
composed of United States persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government
or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign
government or governments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in
preparation therefor;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially
composed of United States persons; or
target of physical searches authorized under FISA).
"'Id. § 1803(b).
" Id. § 1804(a)(3).
82 Id. § 1804(a)(4).
3 Id. § 1804(a)(4)(B).
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(6) an entity that is direted and controlled by a foreign
government or governments.
For our purposes, this definition of "foreign power" deserves attention
mostly because it controls the meaning of "agent of a foreign
power."
' 85
The definition of "agent of a foreign8ower" distinguishes "United
States persons" from everyone else. The term "United States
person" includes U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens.8 7 The88A
FISA specially protects the privacy interests of U.S. persons. A
"U.S. person" can be an "agent of a foreign power" only if he or she:
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering
activities for or on behalf of a foreign power, which activities
involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the
United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network
of a foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine
intelligence activities for or on behalf of such foreign power,
which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the
criminal statutes of the United States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or
activities that are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a
foreign power;
(D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudulent
identity for or on behalf of a foreign power or, while in the United
States, knowingly assumes a false or fraudulent identity for or on
behalf of a foreign power; or
(E) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities
described in ...(A), (B), or ) or knowingly conspires ...to
engage in [such] activities ....
Someone who is not a "United States person" can be an "agent of a
foreign power" under additional circumstances, which need not be
84 Id. § 1801(a); see, e.g., United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1310 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) (contending that Irish Republican Army was "foreign power").
" 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (defining "[a]gent of a foreign power" by references to actions
for or on behalf of a "foreign power").8
6 Compare id. § 1801 (b)(1) (defining "[a]gent of a foreign power" for "any person other
than a United States person") (emphasis added), with id. § 1801 (b)(2) (defining "[a]gent
of a foreign power" for "any person").
8 7 1d. § 1801(i).
8' See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-701, at 19 (1978) (providing rationale for this
discrimination).
'950 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2).
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detailed here. 90 In general, this article focuses on FISA surveillance of
foreign agents who are U.S. persons (who will sometimes be referred
to as "U.S. person-foreign agents"). U.S. persons are the ones whom
the wall was created to protect.
9'
In addition to explaining why the applicant believes that the
proposed surveillance will target facilities used or about to be used by
a foreign power or foreign aent, an application for FISA surveillance
must contain certifications. These certifications can be made only
by certain high-ranking executive branch officials involved in
national security or national defense.93 Of those officials, the Director
of the FBI is the one who usually makes the certifications in
applications for surveillance of U.S. persons. 94 The original FISA of
1978 required certifications by the FBI Director or other authorized
official:
(A) that the certifying official deems the information sought to be
foreign intelligence information;
(B) that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign
intelligence information;
(C) that such information cannot reasonably be obtained by normal
investigative techniques;
(D) that designates the type of foreign intelligence information
being sought according to the categories described in section
10 1(e); and
(E) including a statement of the basis for the certification that-
(i) the information sought is the type of foreign intelligence
information designated; and
90 1d. § 1801(b)(l).
91 See, e.g., FISA Trial Court Opinion, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 614 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct.
Rev. 2002) (defining "scope" of opinion as limited to U.S. persons); see also infra notes
227-62 and accompanying text (discussing development of internal Justice Department
procedures that came to be known as "the wall").
92 See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7) (Supp. 2001).
93 See id. (providing for certifications to be made by "the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs [i.e., the National Security Adviser] or an executive branch
official or officials designated by the President from among those executive officers
employed in the area of national security or defense and appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate"); see also Exec. Order No. 12,139, 3 C.F.R. 398
(1979), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1801 app. at 275 (2000) (designating officials authorized
to make FISA certifications).
94 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 723 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (noting
that certifications required by the FISA are "typically" made by the FBI Director); FISA
Trial Court Opinion, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 619-20 (describing FISA as requiring "that the
FBI Director certify" to certain things).
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(ii) such information canno 5reasonably be obtained by normal
investigative techniques ....
These certification requirements include the key provisions discussed
in this article. Most important is the second certification requirement,
about the "purpose" of the proposed surveillance, § 1804(a)(7)(B). As
discussed below, lower courts relied on this "purpose" provision in
adopting the "primary purpose" test.96 Furthermore, the Patriot Act
amended the purpose provision by changing the phrase "the purpose"
to "a significant purpose.,
9 7
The certification requirements just reproduced reflect that a third
key term - in addition to the terms "foreign power" and "agent of a
foreign power" - is "foreign intelligence information." The FISA
provides a two-part definition of "foreign intelligence information,"
reflecting two commonly accepted categories of such information:
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States
person is necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect
against-
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service
or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign
power; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory
that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is
necessary to-
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
98
Subsection (1) of this definition describes three types of what is
commonly called "counterintelligence" or "protective intelligence."
99
9' FISA § 104(a)(7) (1978).
96 See infra notes 210-23 and accompanying text.
97 See infra notes 287-301 and accompanying text.
98 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2000); see also 124 CONG. REC. 10,890 (1978) (statement of
Sen. Bayh) (describing two types of foreign intelligence information covered by FISA); S.
REP. No. 95-701, at 9 (1978) (stating that definition of foreign intelligence information
covers "two broad types of [government's] intelligence requirements").
99 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-701, at 9 (describing "counterintelligence" as designed "to
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This category of foreign intelligence information bears on protecting
the United States against-i.e., countering-foreign threats.
Subsection (2) of the definition identifies two types of what is
commonly called "positive" intelligence, "affirmative" intelligence,
"pure" intelligence, or just plain "intelligence."'' 00 This category tends
to be more diffuse-less event-specific-than the first type of foreign
intelligence information ("counter" or "protective" intelligence).
That is why it is usually FISA surveillance for counterintelligence-
rather than FISA surveillance for plain intelligence-that has the
potential for producing evidence of criminal activity and, hence, the
potential for breaching "the wall" between foreign intelligence and- . 102
law enforcement.
In addition to identifying the target and making certifications, the
government's application for a FISA surveillance order must include
"proposed minimization procedures." 0 3 The FISA provisions on
minimization procedures are discussed in more detail in a later
subsection.
2. Judicial Approval of FISA Surveillance Orders
An application for a FISA surveillance order is made to one of the
eleven federal district judges appointed by the Chief Justice to serve
on the FISA Trial Court. The judge must decide whether to grant
the application and issue an order approving electronic surveillance
0 5
protect" against certain foreign threats).
100 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 723 n.9 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review 2002); see also Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 211 (1981), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 401 app. at 61-62 (2000).
101 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-701, at 9:
The electronic surveillance authorized and regulated by this bill is designed to
satisfy two broad types of intelligence requirements. First, it provides a means
for the collection of 'positive' foreign intelligence to enable the Government to
understand and assess the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign
powers. Second, it supplies a technique for use in foreign counterintelligence
investigations to protect against clandestine intelligence activities, sabotage, and
terrorism by or on behalf of foreign powers.
Id
102 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 727 ("[T]he type of foreign intelligence with
which we are concerned is really counterintelligence ...."); Hill, Joint Inquiry Staff
Statement, supra note 3, at 23 ("As the 1980s began, the law enforcement and intelligence
communities worked together most often in the context of counterintelligence
investigations and counternarcotics programs."); see also 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra
note 2, at 424 ("Counterterrorism investigations in the United States very quickly become
matters that involve violations of criminal law and possible law enforcement action.").
103 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(5)(2000); see infra notes 139-59 (describing provisions on
minimization procedures).
104 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(Supp. 2001).
'°'Id. § 1805.
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based on five "necessary findings"106:
(1) the President has authorized the Attorney General to approve
applications for electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence
information;
(2) the application has been made by a Federal officer and
approved by the Attorney General;
(3) on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant there is
probable cause to believe that-
(A) the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power: Provided, That no United States person
may be considered a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power
solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment
to the Constitution of the United States; and
(B) each of the facilities or places at which the electronic
surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
(4) the proposed minimization procedures meet the definition of
minimization procedures under section 1804(h) of this title; and
(5) the application which has been filed contains all statements and
certifications required by section 1804 of this title and, if the target
is a United States person, the certification or certifications are not
clearly erroneous on the basis of the statement made under section
1804(a)(7)(E) of this title and other information furnished
under section 1804(d) of this title.
The first two "necessary findings" seldom cause much trouble. 108 The
rest need more attention.
The third necessary finding comes closest to traditional probable
cause and, in the process, makes FISA surveillance orders akin- if
not equivalent-to Fourth Amendment "warrants." To discuss them
out of order: Necessary finding 3(B)-probable cause that the
'06 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2000) (title of subsection (a) is "Necessary findings").
107 Id. § 1805(a). Section 1805(a)(5), which is quoted in the text accompanying this note,
refers to "information furnished under section 1804(d)." Section 1804(d) authorizes the
FISA judge to "require the applicant to furnish such other information as may be necessary
to make the determinations required by section 1805 of this title." Id. § 1804(d).
108 The President has authorized the Attorney General to approve FISA applications.
Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 212 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. at 62
(2000). The Attorney General, in turn, has authorized FISA applications to be prepared
and submitted under the supervision of the Counsel for Intelligence Policy in the Office of
Intelligence Policy and Review ("OIPR"). 28 C.F.R. § 0.33b (2004); see also United
States Attorneys' Manual, § 12.106 (stating that OIPR "prepares certifications and
applications" for FISA surveillance).
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surveilled facilities are used or will be used by the target-addresses
one of the particularity requirements in the Fourth Amendment.
10 9
The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to "particularly describ[e]
the place to be searched."1 10 The "place to be searched" by electronic
surveillance may be a physical place or a communications facility.
Necessary finding 3(A)-probable cause that the target is a foreign
power or agent of a foreign power III-can overlap with a finding of
criminal or potentially criminal conduct as applied to U.S. person-
foreign agents. That is because of the portion of the definition of
"agent of a foreign power" applicable to "United States persons." 1 12 It
was reproduced above.1 3 It classifies a U.S. person as a foreign agent
based on their "knowing" involvement, "for or on behalf of a foreign
power," in (1) "'clandestine intelligence gathering activities' [that]
involve or may involve violations of Federal criminal law"; 11" (2)
"other clandestine intelligence activities," "pursuant to the direction
of an intelligence service or network of a foreign power," "which...
involve or are about to involve a violation of the criminal statutes of
the United States"; (3) "sabotage or international terrorism [as defined
elsewhere in the FISA 115] . . . or activities that are in preparation
therefor"; (4) entering or remaining in the United States "under a false
or fraudulent identity"; or (5) aiding or abetting, or conspiring to
engage in, any of the first three categories of activities listed in this
sentence. Thus, to find probable cause that a U.S. person is an "agent
of a foreign power," the judge usually must find evidence of conduct
that is a crime or is likely to be a crime. This is not invariably true,
however, because the definition of "agent of a foreign power"
includes some conduct, such as entering or remaining in the United
States under a false or fraudulent identity, that is not always a crime,
even when done on behalf of a foreign power.116
'09 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 81 (1978) (tracing this finding to Fourth
Amendment's particularity requirement).
'10 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A).
11
2 Id. § 1801(b)(2).
113 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
114 See S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 21 (1978) ("It is anticipated that most of the persons under
surveillance under [the provision defining agent of a foreign power to include U.S. persons
involved in clandestine intelligence gathering] will be violating the criminal espionage
laws .... "); H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 38 (1978) ("It is anticipated that most
clandestine intelligence gathering activities will constitute a violation of the various
federal criminal laws aimed at espionage .... ").
.15 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (defining "[i]ntemational terrorism") and § 1801(d)
(defining "[s]abotage").
116 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 723 n. 10 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002). But
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The fourth "necessary finding" for issuance of a FISA surveillance
order ensures the adequacy of the minimization procedures proposed
in the application for the order. 117 Like necessary finding 3(B)
(probable cause that the facilities to be surveilled are used or are
about to be used by the target), the necessary finding about
minimization procedures reflects one of the particularity requirements
in the Fourth Amendment. 118 The Fourth Amendment requires a
warrant to "particularly describ[e] the.., things to be seized."] 19 This
requirement, as applied to physical searches, prohibits an official with
a warrant from indiscriminately rummaging through a person's
belongings. 12 As applied to electronic surveillance, it prohibits the
government from collecting and keeping every scrap of information
acquired through the surveillance, including irrelevant (but potentially
embarrassing or intimate) personal or political information. I
l
Minimization procedures aim to limit such indiscriminate
conduct.
The fifth "necessary finding" concerns the certifications and
statements that a high-level executive official with intelligence, .. 122
responsibilities must make in the application. The judge must
ensure that the application indeed contains those certifications and•123
statements. Furthermore, if the proposed target is a U.S. person, the
judge must determine that the certifications and statements are not
"clearly erroneous."' 124  For this article, the most important
certifications subject to judicial review under this standard are that:
(1) the information to be obtained is "foreign intelligence
information"; and (2) "the purpose" (under the original FISA) or "a
significant purpose" (under the FISA as amended by the Patriot Act)
of the proposed surveillance "is to obtain foreign intelligence
information."' 25 Also important are the requirements that the
certifying official designate the type of information sought, using the
typology of the FISA's definition of "foreign intelligence
cf id. at 736 (apparently amending definition of "foreign intelligence crime" to include
"ordinary crimes ... inextricably intertwined with foreign intelligence crimes").
"' See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(4).
..8 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 81 (1978) (tracing this finding to the Fourth
Amendment's particularity requirement).
119 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
120 See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976).
121 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57-59 (1967).
122 See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(5).
123 See id.
124 id.115 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(A) & 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B)(Supp. 2001).
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information,"' 126 and state the basis for his or her certification that the
information is the type of foreign intelligence information
designated. All of these add up to a requirement that the purpose
(or a significant purpose) of proposed surveillance of a foreign power
or its agent be to obtain one of the three types of counterintelligence
or one of the two types of (plain) intelligence identified in the FISA's
definition of "foreign intelligence" information. 128
As discussed above, the definition of "agent of a foreign power," as
applied to U.S. persons, causes FISA surveillance orders targeting
such persons often to be based on evidence of crime. Similarly, the
definition of "foreign intelligence information" can cause FISA
surveillance orders to be based on a likelihood that surveillance will
reveal evidence of crime, even if the target herself is not involved in
crime. For example, surveillance of a target may reveal information
that qualifies as "foreign intelligence information" because it is
evidence of a crime, such as international terrorism, by a third party,
but not by the target. 12 9 The bottom line is that the text of the FISA,
as concerns U.S. persons, defines key terms and prescribes "necessary
findings" in ways that can-but do not necessarily-lead to the
issuance of surveillance orders that are (1) based on evidence of
crime; and (2) likely to produce more evidence of crime.
3. The Government's Intended and Actual Use of FISA-Acquired
Information
Three sets of provisions bear on the government's intended and
actual use of information obtained under a FISA surveillance order.
Two of those groups have already been briefly introduced: the
provisions requiring a certification of the "purpose" of proposed
surveillance; and the provisions on minimization procedures.
1 3'
The third group is found in Section 1806 of the FISA, which is
entitled "Use of information." Each group is separately discussed
next.
126 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(D) (2000).
1
27 Id. § 1804(a)(7)(E)(i).
128 See supra note 98 and accompanying text (reproducing FISA definition of "foreign
intelligence information").
129 Cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 554-67 (1978) (holding that Fourth
Amendment does not require special showing for search of premises of people who are not
reasonably suspected of involvement in crime being investigated).
130 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 107, 117-21 and accompanying text.
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a. FISA Provisions Requiring a Certification About the Purpose of
Proposed Surveillance and Authorizing Limited Judicial Review of
That Certification
A high-ranking official with intelligence responsibilities must
certify that "the purpose" (under the original FISA) or "a significant
purpose" (under the FISA as amended by the Patriot Act) of the
surveillance proposed in the government's application "is to obtain
foreign intelligence information." 32 The FISA judge must determine
whether that certification is "clearly erroneous" if the target of the
proposed surveillance is a U.S. person. 133 Consideration of these
aspects of the FISA process will illuminate whether the government
can use FISA surveillance for prosecutorial purposes.
A certification about the type of thing I intend to obtain differs
from a certification about how I intend to use that thing. For example,
if I certify that "the purpose" of my borrowing $20,000 from you is to
buy a car, I am not certifying to how I will use that car. By the same
token, if a judge were authorized to determine whether my
certification was clearly erroneous, she would focus on determining
whether I intended to use the money to buy a car, rather than some
other pricey item. The judge would have no business reviewing my
purpose for wanting the car.
Accordingly, the "purpose" certification requirement in the FISA
and the provision authorizing limited review of that certification do
not, on their face, control the government's intended use of
information obtained under a proposed FISA surveillance order. The
government must certify that "a significant purpose" (formerly "the
purpose") of the proposed surveillance is "to obtain foreign
intelligence information."' 3 4 The FISA judge must determine, under a
clearly erroneous standard, whether the government does indeed
intend to conduct the surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence
information, rather than some other kind of information. 135 The
government does not, however, expressly certify to how it intends to
use the foreign intelligence information that it intends to obtain. It is
therefore not obvious that a judge should be able to review the
government's intended use of the information.
To explore that issue further, let us change the hypothetical loan
132 FISA § 104(a)(7); 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (Supp. 2001).
113 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(5) (2000).
134 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B); FISA § 1804(a)(7)(B).
131 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(5).
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described above. Suppose I certify that "the purpose" of my
borrowing $20,000 from you is "to buy the means of transportation
necessary for me to get to work." Now my certification describes the
thing I want to obtain instrumentally-as having a necessary
relationship to a further objective: getting to work. Considering this
instrumental description of the thing that (I certify) it is my purpose to
obtain, you could reasonably infer from my certification not only that
I will use the money to buy a car (or other means of transportation)
but also that I intend to use the car to get to work. That inference as to
my intended use of the car is reasonable even though, technically, my
certification did not cover my intended use of the car. Beyond what it
would be reasonable for you to infer, if you required me to make the
certification as a condition of lending me $20,000, you probably
wanted to require me to have the intention (i.e., the purpose) of using
the car to get to work. If you indeed wanted to impose such a
requirement as to my intended use of the car, you might accuse me of
dishonesty if-when I certified that I would use the money "to buy
the means of transportation necessary for me to get to work"-I
actually did not intend to use the car to get to work but, instead,
intended to use it only for weekend, recreational trips (and planned to
join a car pool to get to work). Alternatively or in addition, you could
accuse me of using the term "necessary" too broadly, since my actual
intention not to use the car to get to work disproved the car's
necessity for that objective. In either event, a certification that one's
purpose is to obtain a thing that is, by definition, "necessary to"
achieving a specified objective implies that one intends to use the
thing to attain that objective. And the requirement that one make such
a certification may reflect that the party requiring the certification
wants to control the certifier's intended use of the thing-specifically,
wants the certifier to intend to use the thing to attain the specified
objective.
The last paragraph showed that, if I certify that the purpose of my
borrowing money from you is to buy the means of transportation
"necessary" to get to work, you can reasonably infer-and, indeed,
could be implicitly requiring-that I intend to use the car I buy with
your money to get to work. Now a new point: You cannot necessarily
infer that my primary purpose in buying the car is to get to work. I
might be able honestly to assert that (1) the purpose of my loan is to
buy a car; and (2) the car is necessary for me to get to work-even
though my primary purpose for getting the car is for recreational road
trips on the weekend. Indeed, teenagers routinely-and no doubt
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sincerely and accurately-ask their parents for loans "the purpose" of
which is to get the car that is "necessary" to fulfill their school and
work obligations, even though use of the car for those ends is not their
primary purpose for getting the car or seeking the loan. The point is
that a person can certify that his or her purpose is to obtain a thing
that is necessary to achieving a second goal without necessarily
implying that his or her primary purpose for obtaining the thing is to
achieve that second goal.
One final variation of the hypothetical loan will fully illuminate the
"primary purpose" issue. The last paragraph showed that making two
certifications-i.e., that (1) one's purpose is to obtain a thing; and (2)
that thing is necessary to a specified objective-does not necessarily
imply that one's "primary purpose" for obtaining the thing is to
achieve the specified objective. Even so, the identity of the person
who makes the certification may support a permissible inference
about primary purpose. Suppose the certifier is the director of
information technology for a large company. Now suppose she
certifies to the company's chief financial officer that (1) she needs $2
million to upgrade the company's computers; and (2) the upgrade is
necessary to protect the company's computer system from viruses and
computer hackers. Surely it is permissible to infer that the director's
"primary purpose" for seeking the money is to protect the company's
computers from the specified threat. That inference is permissible-if
not compelled- because of the link between (a) the official's duties
and (b) the objective to which the thing to be obtained is necessary.
Let us return to the FISA. The original FISA required a high-
ranking official with intelligence responsibilities to certify that "the
purpose" of proposed surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence
information. When proposed surveillance concerned a U.S. person,
the original FISA defined "foreign intelligence information" to mean
information "necessary to" the United States' achievement of five
purposes. The information had to be:
(1) . . . necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect
against-
(A)[1] actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a
foreign power;
(B)[2] sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power; or
(C)[3] clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service
or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
The Patriot Act
(2) ... necessary to-
(A)[4] the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B)[5] the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
136
By defining "foreign intelligence information" in terms of its
necessary relationship to achieving these five foreign intelligence
purposes, and requiring the government to certify that its purpose was
to obtain "foreign intelligence information," Congress probably meant
to require the government to intend to use the information for one of
these five foreign intelligence purposes. (Hereafter, this article will
use the term "foreign intelligence purpose" to mean one of these five
purposes.) That is particularly likely considering that Congress also
required the certification to be made by a high-ranking official with
intelligence responsibilities (rather than, say, a law enforcement
official, even one as high ranking as the Attorney General).
137
Congress presumably would have considered it dishonest, at least, for
a high-ranking intelligence official to certify that "the purpose" of
proposed surveillance was to obtain information "necessary to"
achieving a foreign intelligence goal, if the official had no intention of
using the information for that goal. To be sure, as long as the official
did intend to use the information for a foreign intelligence purpose,
the official could honestly certify that (1) "the purpose" (or, for that
matter, "a significant purpose") of the proposed surveillance was to
obtain the information; and (2) the information was necessary to
achieving a foreign intelligence purpose--even if the government's
"primary purpose" for seeking approval of the proposed surveillance
was not to use the information for a foreign intelligence purpose but,
instead, for a different purpose. Given the link between the certifying
official's duties and foreign intelligence purposes, however, it would
be reasonable to presume from the required certifications that the
government's primary purpose for seeking the information was
indeed to achieve a foreign intelligence purpose.
In short, the original FISA's "purpose" certification requirement
and provision for judicial review of that certification directly address
136 Id. § 1801 (e) (bracketed numerals added).
131 S. REP. No. 95-604, at 45 (1978) ("The requirement that the information sought be
'foreign intelligence information' is designed to insure that a high-level official with
responsibility in the area of national security, will review and ... explain the Executive
Branch determination that the information sought is in fact foreign intelligence
information."); S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 51 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 76
(1978).
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only the type of information that the government intends to obtain.
These provisions can be interpreted, however, indirectly to address
the government's intended use of-i.e., its purpose for seeking-that
information. Specifically, the provisions imply that the government
must intend to use the information for one of the five foreign
intelligence purposes identified in the FISA's definition of "foreign
intelligence information." The provisions do not compel-but they
reasonably can be read to support-the further conclusion that the
achievement of a foreign intelligence purpose must be the
government's "primary purpose" for seeking the information.
An important but separate question, explored below, is whether the
government can meet such a primary purpose requirement if its
primary purpose for FISA surveillance is to get evidence for a
prosecution that is intended to advance a foreign intelligence138
purpose. The analysis so far nonetheless lays part of the
groundwork for analysis in Part III of: the lower federal courts'
interpretation of the original FISA as imposing a "primary purpose"
test; Congress's amendment of the original FISA's purpose provision;
and the FISA courts' interpretation of the original FISA and the FISA
as amended by the Patriot Act.
b. Minimization Procedures
The application for a FISA surveillance order must propose
minimization procedures.13 9 The judge reviewing the application
must ensure that those proposed minimization procedures satisfy the, 140
statutory definition of minimization procedures. Finally, the
judge's order granting an application must "direct . . . that the
minimization procedures be followed.' 14 1 These provisions play an
important role in the issue of whether the government can use FISA
surveillance for prosecutorial purposes. They were the basis for the
FISA Trial Court's conclusion in In re Sealed Case that the
government cannot use FISA surveillance for the primary purpose of.- 142
building a prosecution.
The FISA defines "minimization procedures" to mean:
(1) specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney
138 See infra notes 492-516 & 559-61 and accompanying text.
139 See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(5).
140 See id. § 1805(a)(4).
141 Id. § 1805(c)(2).
142 FISA Trial Court Opinion, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 616-25 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev.
2002); see infra notes 335-340 and accompanying text.
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General, that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose and
technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize the
acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of
nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United
States persons consistent with the need of the United States to
obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information;
(2) procedures that require that nonpublicly available information,
which is not foreign intelligence information, as defined in
subsection (e) (1) of this section, shall not be disseminated in a
manner that identifies any United States person, without such
person's consent, unless such person's identity is necessary to
understand foreign intelligence information or assess its
importance;
(3) notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), procedures that allow
for the retention and dissemination of information that is evidence
of a crime which has been, is being, or is about to be committed
and that is to be retained or disseminated for law enforcement
purposes; and
(4) notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), with respect to
any electronic surveillance approved pursuant to section 1802(a) of
this title, procedures that require that no contents of any
communication to which a United States person is a party shall be
disclosed, disseminated, or used for any purpose or retained for
longer than 72 hours unless a court order under section 1805 of this
title is obtained or unless the Attorney General determines that the
informationI dicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to
any person.
The first two parts of the definition of "minimization procedures" aim
to protect the privacy interests of U.S. persons. The third part aims to
protect the government's interest in law enforcement. The fourth part
of the definition has a fairly narrow application and is (at best
modestly) relevant here only as further evidence of the FISA's
solicitude for the privacy of U.S. persons. 144 We will therefore focus
on the first three parts of the definition, the first two of which
prescribes procedures protective of individual privacy, the third of
which prescribes minimization procedures protective of law
enforcement interests.
14' 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h).
144The fourth part of the definition of minimization procedures, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(4),
addresses information acquired in FISA surveillance authorized under § 1802(a). Section
1802(a) empowers the Attorney General to authorize electronic surveillance without a
court order if "there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the
contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party" and other
conditions are met. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(l)(B).
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The first part of the definition prescribes the general standard and
requirements for the processes of acquiring, retaining, and
disseminating nonpublicly available information about unconsenting
U.S. persons ("U.S. person information"). 145 That standard requires
procedures that minimize the acquisition and retention-and prohibit
the dissemination-of U.S. person information only to the extent that
this minimization and prohibition can be "consistent with the need...
to obtain, 1Troduce, and disseminate foreign intelligence
information." The procedures must only "minimize" acuisition
and retention, whereas they must "prohibit" dissemination. 47 This
reflects that sometimes the government must acquire and temporarily
retain information to evaluate its usefulness but in that case the
government should ultimately destroy, rather than disseminate, the
information if it turns out to be extraneous.148 The "consistent with"
standard differs from one that would require the government to
minimize the acquisition and retention, or prohibit the dissemination,
of all information that is not "foreign intelligence information." It
might be "consistent with" the government's need to obtain, produce,
and disseminate information for the government at least temporarily
to collect, retain, and disseminate U.S. person information on a
limited basis, even though that information is not "necessary to" one
of the five foreign intelligence purposes identified in the FISA's
definition of "foreign intelligence information."
14 9
14' 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1); see FISA Trial Court Opinion, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 623-25
(treating first portion of definition of "minimization procedures" as prescribing general
standard); Banks, supra note 30, at 1177 (describing first portion of definition of
"minimization procedures" as "generic").
'46 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1).
147 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-1720, at 23 (1978) (modifying version of bill passed by
House to differentiate between acquisition and retention, on the one hand, and
dissemination, on the other hand, reflecting conference committee's judgment that "the
standard for dissemination should be higher than for acquisition and retention").
141 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-701, at 39 (1978) ("It is . . . obvious that no electronic
surveillance can be so conducted that innocent conversations can be totally eliminated")
(internal quotation marks and footnote omitted); H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 56
(stating that extraneous information gathered by electronic surveillance "might be retained
for a reasonable period in order to determine whether it did indeed relate to one of the
approved purposes" for retaining information in longer term).
149 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 58:
[T]he definition of "minimization procedures" does not state that only 'foreign
intelligence information' can be acquired, retained, or disseminated. The
committee recognizes full well that bits and pieces of information, which taken
separately could not possibly be considered "necessary," may together or over
time take on significance and become "necessary." Nothing in this definition is
intended to forbid the retention or even limited dissemination of such bits and
pieces before their full significance becomes apparent.
Id.; see also id. at 58-59 (explaining that government may need to retain information
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One such situation is identified in the second part of the definition
of "minimization procedures."15 0  Sometimes information that
identifies a U.S. person and that is not itself foreign intelligence
information must be disseminated to enable the government to
understand or assess the importance of other information that is
foreign intelligence information. This identifying information "is not
foreign intelligence information"; 15  i.e., it is not "necessary to" any
of the five foreign intelligence purposes identified in the definition of
"foreign intelligence information." 52  Though not meeting that
"necessity" standard, its dissemination would be "consistent with" the
government's need to "produce" and "disseminate"-i.e., to evaluate
and distribute to appropriate officials-foreign intelligence
information, if its dissemination is "necessary to" understanding or
assessing the importance of that foreign intelligence information.1
53
This identifying information occupies a middle ground: It does not
meet the strict "necessity" standard for foreign intelligence
information but it also is not entirely extraneous, because it facilitates
the gathering and processing of foreign intelligence information.
Information that identifies a U.S. person is not the only type of
non-foreign intelligence information that can facilitate the gathering
and processing of foreign intelligence information and that can
accordingly be acquired, retained, and disseminated "consistent[ly]
with" the government's need to gather and process foreign
intelligence information. Identifying information is nonetheless dealt
with specially in two ways: It is the subject of a separate subsection in
the definition of "minimization procedures," and that subsection
about known spy's contacts and acquaintances even though most of them may turn out to
be innocent; others who appear innocent "may merely be very sophisticated and well-
versed in their espionage tradecraft").
ISo See H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 58 (citing situation fitting that described in §
1801(h)(2) as "[a]n example" of why § 1801(h)(1) uses the "consistent with" standard for
minimization procedures, rather than requiring minimization of all non-foreign
intelligence information).
1s5 50 U.S.C. § 180 1(h)(2).
152 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e); see also supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text
(explaining that definition of "foreign intelligence information" identifies five foreign
intelligence purposes to which information must, if it concerns U.S. persons, necessarily
relate).
153 See Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 42, at 207 (describing
committee amendment to provision defining "minimization procedures" and explaining
that amendment authorizes dissemination of information that identifies a U.S. person when
necessary to understand or assess importance of foreign intelligence information, rather
than requiring information to meet "necessity" standards prescribed in definition of foreign
intelligence information, because "it would be hard" for identifying information to meet
latter standards, even though "it is useful information that would be entirely proper to
disseminate").
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prescribes an especially high standard for its dissemination (i.e., it
must be "necessary" to understanding or evaluating the importance of
foreign intelligence information). 154 This special treatment reflects
that being associated with a foreign intelligence investigation is like
being indicted: it can ruin one's life.' 55 The FISA recognized that
information identifying U.S. persons, as well as other types of non-
foreign intelligence information, could be vital to processing foreign
intelligence information-even though not itself foreign intelligence
information-but wanted the dissemination of identifying information. 156
to be dealt with by specific procedures.
Unlike the first and second parts of the FISA's definition of
"minimization procedures," the third part does not use the term
"foreign intelligence information." 1 Instead, it addresses
"information that is evidence of a crime." 158 Obviously, a piece of
information can be "evidence of a crime" without being either (1)
"foreign intelligence information," or (2) information that must be
temporarily retained for the purpose of analyzing whether that
information or other information is foreign intelligence
information. Thus, by authorizing information that is "evidence of
crime" to be "retained or disseminated for law enforcement
purposes," the third part allows the retention and dissemination of
information whether or not it is foreign intelligence information or
facilitates the gathering and processing of foreign intelligence
information.
This discussion of the FISA definition of minimization procedures
ends by emphasizing two things about that definition. First, it reflects
that electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence information cannot
identify that information perfectly and instantaneously. Inevitably the
surveillance will include non-foreign intelligence information. Thus,
the definition does not demand the impossible; it does not forbid the
collection of non-foreign intelligence information. Instead, it limits
the use of such information. Second, the provisions reflect that
114 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 61 (describing § 1801(h)(2) as setting "special
dissemination standard").
'55 See Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 42, at 115 (prepared statement
of John Shattuck and Jerry Berman, ACLU) (quoting testimony of Sen. Mondale on S.
3197, 94th Cong. (1976), in which Mondale said, "[T]he fact is that if you get the right of
Government to investigate Americans for things that are not crimes, there are ways of
destroying persons without ever appearing in the court room.").
156 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 61-62.
157 50 U.S.C. § 180 1(h)(3), reproduced supra in text accompanying note 143.
158 Id.
59 See id. § 1801(h)(1).
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surveillance for foreign intelligence can produce evidence of crime.
c. Section 1806 of the FISA
Section 1806 of the FISA addresses the "Use of information"
obtained under a FISA surveillance order. 16 Two portions of Section
1806 deserve our attention: the first sentence of Section 1806(a) and
portions of Section 1806(b).
i. Section 1806(a)
The first sentence of Section 1806(a) makes the minimization
procedures operate. It says:
Information acquired from an electronic surveillance conducted
pursuant to this subchapter concerning any United States person
may be used and disclosed by Federal officers and employees
without the consent of the United States person only in accorqdce
with the minimization procedures required by this subchapter.
The definition of "minimization procedures," which was discussed
above, is just a definition. The definition becomes a statutory mandate
because of its incorporation into Section 1806(a). The FISA judge can
ensure compliance with this mandate "[a]t or before the end of the
period of time for which electronic surveillance is approved by an
order or an extension."
162
ii. Section 1806(b)
The definition of "minimization procedures," as made operative by
the first sentence of § 1806(a), authorizes information acquired under
the FISA "that is evidence of a crime" to be "retained or disseminated
for law enforcement purposes." 163 The use of FISA-acquired
information for "law enforcement purposes" is further addressed in
Section 1806(b), which states:
No information acquired pursuant to this subchapter shall be
disclosed for law enforcement purposes unless such disclosure is
accompanied by a statement that such information, or any
information derived therefrom, may only be used in a criminal
proceedipv with the advance authorization of the Attorney
General.
160Id. § 1806.
161 Id. § 1806(a).
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Section 1806(b) thus puts a condition on the "disclos[ure]" of FISA-
acquired information "for law enforcement purposes."' 165  The
information can be disclosed "for law enforcement purposes" only if
disclosure is accompanied by the prescribed statement. In addition to
requiring the prescribed statement, Section 1806(b) creates a further
requirement: FISA-acquired information can be used "in a criminal
proceeding" only with the Attorney General's approval. 166 These
requirements ensure that prosecutors get Attorney General approval
before using FISA acquired information in a criminal proceeding.
167
The purpose of requiring Attorney General approval seems to be to
ensure that the use of FISA-acquired information for law enforcement
purposes can be balanced against any intelligence concerns that might
weigh against such use.168
The need for advance Attorney General approval at two separate
stages-(1) before submission of the application for a FISA
surveillance order; and (2) before information obtained under the
order is used in a criminal proceeding-suggests that Congress did
not contemplate evidence obtained under an order being used in
criminal proceedings routinely. That suggestion relates to, though it
does not resolve, the issue whether the government can obtain a FISA
surveillance order for prosecutorial purposes.169
C. The "Primary Purpose" Test
Now we turn to a development in the case law that occurred as
Congress was attempting to enact legislation regulating the
government's use of electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence





167 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-701, at 61 (1978) ("This provision is designed to eliminate
circumstances in which a local prosecutor has no knowledge that evidence was obtained
through foreign intelligence electronic surveillance.").
168 See S. REP. No. 95-604, at 54 (1977) ("For example, the Department of Justice may
decline to prosecute rather than disclose the names of important witnesses and key
informants."); S. REP. No. 95-701, at 61 (1978) (same). An early version of the bill that
became the FISA said that FISA-acquired information could be used for law enforcement
of criminal law only if such use "outweigh[ed] the possible harm to the national security."
S. 1566, 95th Cong. § 2526(a) (1977), reprinted in Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA,
supra note 42, at 151. That requirement was removed in conference, in the belief that
"even without a statutory requirement, there will be an appropriate weighing of criminal
law enforcement needs against possible harm to the national security." H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 95-1720, at 30 (1978).
169 See infra notes 550-552 and accompanying text (discussing relevance of Attorney
General approval requirement to validity of "primary purpose" test).
170 As explained supra note 73, bills to regulate the executive branch's use of electronic
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extension of the judicially developed "primary purpose" test. The test
originated as a Fourth Amendment restriction on the executive
branch's use of warrantless electronic surveillance. Several lower
federal courts nonetheless adopted the primary purpose test as a
restriction that FISA imposes on surveillance conducted with prior
judicial approval.
1. Origin of the Primary Purpose Test
Before FISA was enacted in 1978, the government conducted
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence without warrants or
any other type of prior judicial approval. 7 1 In 1967, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that electronic surveillance by the government
can be a "search" subject to the Fourth Amendment.172 Between 1967
and 1978-the pre-FISA period during which electronic surveillance
was subject to Fourth Amendment review-several lower federal
courts addressed Fourth Amendment challenges to warrantless
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence. In Zweibon v.
Mitchell, as discussed above, the D.C. Circuit suggested that in the
absence of exigent circumstances all warrantless electronic
surveillance-even for foreign intelligence information-is
unconstitutional.1 73 Three other courts of appeals, however, upheld
warrantless electronic surveillance conducted for the sole or primary
purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information.
The earliest such case involved civil rights activist H. Rap
Brown. 174 Brown challenged his conviction of a federal firearm
offense on the ground that it was based on warrantless-and hence
unconstitutional-wiretaps. 175 In United States v. Brown, the Third
Circuit held that the warrantless wiretaps were constitutional because
they were authorized by the President's delegate, the Attorney
surveillance for foreign intelligence were introduced in each year between 1973 and 1978,
when FISA was finally enacted.
171 See supra notes 37-71 and accompanying text (discussing history of warrantless
electronic surveillance in the name of national security).
172 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967);. see also id. at 359 n.23
("Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the
Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not
presented by this case."); Berger, 388 U.S. at 50-53 (holding that Fourth Amendment
applied to state statute authorizing wiretaps for law enforcement purposes).
7 Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 595 (1975), discussed supra notes 50-57 and
accompanying text.
174 United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 420-21 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974). For a brief biography of H. Rap Brown, who changed his name to Jamil Abdullah
Al-Amin, see http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USArapB.htm.
17' Brown, 484 F.2d at 425.
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General, "for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence."' 176 The
court reasoned that "[r]estrictions upon the President's power which
are appropriate in cases of domestic security become artificial in the
context of the international sphere."' 177 In a concurring opinion, Judge
Goldberg emphasized that the wiretaps were for foreign intelligence,
and not for other purposes such as building a prosecution or stifling
political dissent: "This case in no way involved the spurious use of
national security as a cover for warrantless electronic surveillance of
accused and potential criminal defendants, domestic radicals, or
political dissenters; and the panel opinion narrowly barricades
warrantless wiretaps within the confines of legitimate foreign• , 178
intelligence surveillance. Brown is a leading case partly because
the majority opinion was written by Judge Griffin Bell. 179 Judge Bell
became Attorney General of the United States under President Jimmy
Carter. In that position he led the Carter Administration's support for
the original FISA.
180
The next leading case also came from the Third Circuit, this time
sitting en banc, in United States v. Butenko. 18 1 The defendants
appealed convictions for their plan to steal military secrets for the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.182 They contended that the
prosecutor violated the Fourth Amendment by using evidence from
warrantless wiretaps. 183 The Third Circuit rejected that contention
and held that the Fourth Amendment did not require prior judicial
approval for the wiretaps in that case. i s4 The court recognized that,
generally, prior judicial approval "might have some salutary
effects."' 185 The court explained: "[A] judge, for example, could
assure that the Executive was not using the cloak of foreign
intelligence information gathering to engage in indiscriminate
surveillance of domestic political organizations."' 8 6 The government
116 Id at 426.
177 id
17 Id. (Goldberg, J., concurring).
179 Id
180 See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 10,887 (1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("Both
Attorney General Bell and Attorney General Levi have been most cooperative and helpful
in the drafting of the bill [S. 1566, 95th Cong. (1977)].").
81 494 F.2d 593 (Cir. 1974) (en bane), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
182 See Butenko, 494 F.2d at 616-17 (Aldisert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also id. at 596 n. I (referring the reader to Judge Aldisert's opinion "for a fuller
exposition of the factual background").
183 See id. at 617-18 (Aldisert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184 See id. at 602-06.
'85 Id. at 605.
186 Id.
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did not need prior judicial approval in the case before the court,
however, "since the district court found that the surveillances ...
were 'conducted and maintained solely for the purpose of gathering
foreign intelligence information."' 187 Thus, the court in Butenko, like
Judge Goldberg concurring in Brown, worried that the government
could target electronic surveillance at "political" organizations but
upheld the surveillance, despite the absence of a warrant, because it
was for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information. The
court further held that, because the surveillance's "primary purpose"
was to gather foreign intelligence information, it was reasonable• .•188
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In so holding, the
Butenko court distinguished the purpose of gathering foreign
intelligence information, on the one hand, from the purpose of
"looking for evidence of criminal conduct unrelated to the foreign
affairs needs of a President."'
189
Although the Third Circuit in Butenko used a "primary purpose"
test, the test is more often associated with the Fourth Circuit's later
decision in United States v. Truong Dinh Hung.190 Truong, like
Brown and Butenko, involved warrantless electronic surveillance that
occurred before the FISA took effect. 191 The Fourth Circuit did not
issue its decision in Truong, however, until 1980, after the FISA took
effect. 192 The legislative history accordingly does not cite the Fourth
18
71d. (quoting United States v. Butenko, 318 F. Supp. 66, 72 (D.N.J. 1970)).
... See id. at 605-06.
189 Id. at 606.
190 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980); see, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 725 (citing
Truong as "the origin" of what government argued was false dichotomy between law
enforcement and foreign intelligence underlying "primary purpose" test); U.S. Gen.
Accounting Office, Report No. 01-780, FBI INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS:
COORDINATION WITHIN JUSTICE ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CRIMINAL MATTERS IS
LIMITED, 13 n.16, 36 (July 2001) (citing only Truong as source of primary purpose test).
In addition to Butenko's use of a "primary purpose" test before Truong, Judge Wilkey
endorsed a primary purpose test in Zweibon, which pre-dated Truong, for the purpose of
determining whether electronic surveillance was subject to Title III's requirements. See
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Wilkey, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part):
The function which the surveillance [before the court] was intended to serve was
not primarily one of uncovering evidence of domestic crime. . . . It was an
intelligence operation undertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional
power to conduct this country's foreign affairs, as distinct from his duty to
administer domestic criminal legislation.
Id.
191 FISA § 301 ("Effective date of Act Oct. 25, 1978"); Truong, 629 F.2d at 912 (stating
that electronic surveillance of Truong occurred from May 1977 to Jan. 1978).
192 See Truong, 629 F.2d at 908.
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Circuit's decision in Truong.193 Truong remains important, however,
for two reasons. First, it was the first appellate case ever to suppress
evidence under the primary purpose test. Second, it furnished a
springboard for lower courts: In cases after Truong involving
surveillance under FISA surveillance orders, lower courts would cite
Truong and rely on its reasoning to apply the "primary purpose" test,
which had been developed for pre-FISA, warrantless electronic
surveillance, to surveillance authorized under judicially issued FISA
surveillance orders. 1
94
In Truong, the FBI tapped the phone and bugged the apartment of
Mr. Truong for evidence that he was sending classified information to• 195
the government of Vietnam. The FBI did not have a warrant or an
other judicial authorization for electronic surveillance of Truong.
The government used evidence gathered through the surveillance to
convict Truong of espionage and other crimes.197 Truong challenged
his convictions contending that the warrantless electronic surveillance
violated the Fourth Amendment. 1
98
The Fourth Circuit, upholding this challenge in part, held that the
surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment starting on July 20,
1977.199 On that day, judging from internal Justice Department
memoranda, the investigation "became primarily a criminal• .. .. ,,200
investigation. The court upheld the admission of evidence
obtained before that date under a "foreign intelligence exception to
the warrant requirement"'20 1 of the Fourth Amendment. In the court's
193 Cf 124 CONG. REC. 10,887 (1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (referring to
"prosecutions in the Humphrey and Truong cases" to "point out the need" for legislation
such as FISA); H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 109 (1978) (additional views of Reps.
Morgan F. Murphy and Charles Rose) (referring to pending "Truong/Humphrey case"); id.
at 112 n.6 (dissenting views on H.R. 7308) (citation to memorandum opinion of district
court in same case).
194 See infra notes 209-25 and accompanying text.
'9 Truong, 629 F.2d at 911-12.
'96 Id. at 912. It is unclear why the FBI did not obtain a warrant for the surveillance of
Truong under Title III, which was then on the books and authorized electronic surveillance
for evidence of espionage, the crime of which Truong was ultimately convicted. The
Fourth Circuit simply noted: "The practical difficulties of obtaining a warrant for foreign
intelligence surveillance were particularly acute at the time this surveillance was
conducted, because Title III . . . which specifies warrant procedures, contained no
procedures tailored to foreign intelligence surveillance." Id. at 913 n.2.
19' Id. at 912.
198 Id.
199Id. at 916.
200 Id. (describing memorandum as "indicating that the government had begun to
assemble a criminal prosecution").
201 Id.
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view, however, the exception applies only when the executive "is
attempting primarily to obtain foreign intelligence." 2 02 The exception
does not apply "if the government is primarily attempting to put
together a criminal prosecution," 20 3 as occurred starting on July 20,
1977, in the case before it. The court of appeals said the Fourth
Amendment puts this "primary purpose" limit on the foreign
intelligence exception to the warrant requirement because, "once
surveillance becomes primarily a criminal investigation, the courts are
entirely competent to make the usual probable cause determination,
and because, importantly, individual privacy interests come to the
fore and government foreign policy concerns recede when the
government is primarily attempting to form the basis for a criminal
prosecution." 20Since the surveillance of Truong predated the FISA,
the court did not address whether the FISA fell short, satisfied, or
went beyond "the constitutional minimum described in [its]
opinion."
Truong's "primary purpose" test was more restrictive than Butenko
in two ways. First, Butenko suggested that the government could not
use warrantless electronic surveillance to get "evidence of criminal
conduct unrelated to the foreign affairs needs of a President."
20 6
Truong, more restrictively, held that the government could not use
warrantless electronic surveillance even to get evidence of a crime-
namely espionage-that did relate to the foreign affairs needs of the
President. 2 7 Second, Truong determined the "primary purpose" of
the surveillance by evaluating contacts between the intelligence. 208
officials involved in the case and the prosecutors. The link,
however, between the "primary purpose" of surveillance and the
degree of contact between intelligence officials and prosecutors is not




4Id. at 915.2 51 Id. at 914n.4:
While the [FISA] suggests that it is possible for the executive branch to conduct
at least some types of foreign intelligence surveillance while being subject to a
warrant requirement, the complexity of the statute also suggests that the
imposition of a warrant requirement, beyond the constitutional minimum
described in this opinion, should be left to the intricate balancing performed in
the course of legislative process by Congress and the President.
Id.
206 United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 606 (3d Cir. 1974).
207 Truong, 629 F.2d at 908.
201 Id. at 916.
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progenitor of the "primary purpose" test that became associated with
the FISA. As discussed below, that test, like the Truong opinion,
assumes that the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information
is incompatible with the purpose of getting evidence for prosecution,
even prosecutions for crimes involving foreign intelligence; and that,
to satisfy the test, contacts between intelligence officials and
prosecutors must be minimized.
2. Linkage of the "Primary Purpose" Test to the FISA
Truong held that warrantless electronic surveillance violated the
Fourth Amendment because the government was "primarily
attempting to put together a criminal prosecution" rather than "to
obtain foreign intelligence." 209 Although Truong used this "primary
purpose" test as a Fourth Amendment restriction on warrantless
surveillance, other lower courts later used the test to restrict
surveillance conducted with prior judicial approval under the FISA.
An early case linking the primary purpose test to the FISA was
United States v. Megahey. 2 1 In Megahey, a New York federal district
court said that FISA surveillance was "appropriate only if foreign
intelligence surveillance is the Government's primary purpose.
2 -11
The court found that standard satisfied and upheld a conviction based
partly on evidence obtained under a FISA surveillance order.2 12 In
affirming the conviction (in an opinion named for a different
defendant), the Second Circuit in United States v. Duggan, agreeing
with the district court in Megahey, found "plain" in the text of the
FISA "[t]he requirement that foreign intelligence information be the
primary objective of the surveillance."2 13  The Second Circuit also
agreed with the district court that the FISA surveillance in that case
"was to secure foreign intelligence information and was not . . .
directed towards criminal investigation or . . . criminal.. ,,,214
prosecution.
Duggan is important for three reasons. First, it adopted the primary
purpose test as a restriction imposed by the FISA. The Fourth
2
09 td.
210 553 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), affd sub nom. United States v. Duggan, 743
F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
211 Megahey, 553 F. Supp. at 1189-90.
212 See id at 1189-90.
213 Duggan, 743 F.2d at 77.
214 Id. at 78 (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting Megahey, 553 F. Supp. at
1190).
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Amendment influenced the court's interpretation of the FISA, but its• • • 215
holding rested on statutory interpretation. Second, the Duggan
court described the test as distinguishing between the purpose of
gathering foreign intelligence and the purpose of gathering evidence• 216
for a prosecution. That description does not contemplate that the
government's purposes could be to gather information that is both
foreign intelligence information and evidence of crime--e.g., a plan
by international terrorists to bomb a U.S. government building-and
to use that information for a prosecution that serves foreign
intelligence objectives by, for example, preventing conduct that both
violates federal criminal law and harms national security. Third,
Duggan traced the primary purpose test to the purpose provision of
the original FISA-i.e., the provision that required a certification that
"the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence
information."
2 17
All three aspects of Duggan gained acceptance in other courts. The
First Circuit's decision in United States v. Johnson supplies a good
example.2 18 The Johnson court upheld the defendants' convictions for
U.S.-based terrorist acts against the British in Northern Ireland. 2 19 To
25 See id at 77 ("The requirement that foreign intelligence information be the primary
objective of the surveillance is plain not only from the language of [FISA] § 1802(b) but
also from the requirements in § 1804 as to what the application must contain."); see also
id. (articulating primary purpose test in addressing defendants' "conten[tion] that the
surveillance ... was not authorized by FISA because the information was sought as part of
a criminal investigation").
216 Id. at 78 (noting that FISA surveillance in that case was "to secure foreign
intelligence information and was not . . .directed towards criminal investigation or ...
criminal prosecution") (quoting Megahey, 553 F. Supp. at 1190).
217 See id. at 77 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7) (Supp. V. 1981) (amended 2001)). In
addition to relying on the "purpose" provision in the original FISA, the court in Duggan
also relied on the FISA provision that requires a government official to explain the basis
for his or her belief that the information sought is the type of foreign intelligence
information described in the application, see 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(E)(i) (2000)
(amended 2001), and FISA § 1802(b), which refers to a court's authority to "approv[e]
electronic surveillance of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power for the purpose of
obtaining foreign intelligence information," 50 U.S.C. § 1802(b) (2000) (amended 2001).
See Duggan, 743 F.2d at 77.
218 952 F.2d 565 (1st Cir. 1991); accord United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1462,
1464 (11 th Cir. 1987) (finding, contrary to defendant's contention, that FISA surveillance
"did not have as its purpose the primary objective of investigating a criminal act. Rather,
surveillance was sought for the valid purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence
information"); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1074-76 (4th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
defendant's contention that FISA surveillance of him "was not conducted for 'foreign
intelligence purposes' as required by the statute"; agreeing with district court that "the
'primary purpose of the surveillance, both initially and throughout, was to gather foreign
intelligence information"); cf United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 277-78
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (adopting primary purpose test to assess Fourth Amendment challenge to
warrantless surveillance for foreign intelligence overseas).
219 See Johnson, 952 F.2d at 569.
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get those convictions, the government used evidence obtained under
FISA surveillance orders. 22 On appeal, the defendants challenged the
FISA surveillance "on the ground that it was undertaken not for
foreign intelligence purposes, but to gather evidence for a criminal
prosecution." The court, applying the primary purpose test, rejected
the challenge. After referring to the purpose provision of the FISA,
the court said that, "[a]lthough evidence obtained under FISA
subsequently may be used in criminal prosecutions, the investigation
of criminal activity cannot be the primary purpose of the• , ,,222
surveillance. To support that statement, the Johnson court cited
Duggan and Truong.
223
Some courts that have adopted the primary purpose test as a FISA-
imposed restriction have done so even though they recognized that
information gathered through FISA surveillance sometimes would be
used for prosecution, and that Congress approved such use in FISA's
text and legislative history.224 These courts apparently trusted their
ability to determine when prosecutorial use was the government's
primary purpose for the FISA surveillance; Truong indicated this
determination could be based on contacts between intelligence
officials and prosecutors. Despite that guidance and Truong's
suppression of evidence, no court ever used Truong's primary
purpose test to suppress evidence acquired under the FISA.
2 5
Perhaps that is because the Department of Justice, which prepares and
220 See id. at 571.
221 Id. at 572.
222 id.
223 Id. But cf United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 964-65 (9th Cir. 1988)
(declining to decide whether FISA surveillance had to satisfy "primary purpose" test and
"refus[ing] to draw too fine a distinction between criminal and intelligence
investigations"); United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1313-14 (E.D.N.Y 1982)
(rejecting defendants' argument that FISA surveillance was invalid because "the
Government was clearly conducting a routine criminal investigation" and distinguishing
Truong as involving warrantless search, inapplicable to FISA searches because FISA
prescribes a warrant procedure).
224 See, e.g., Johnson, 952 F.2d at 572 ("[E]vidence obtained under FISA subsequently
may be used in criminal prosecutions."); Duggan, 743 F.2d at 78 ("[Wle emphasize that
otherwise valid FISA surveillance is not tainted simply because the government can
anticipate that the fruits of such surveillance may later be used, as allowed by § 1806(b),
as evidence in a criminal trial. Congress recognized that in many cases the concerns of the
government with respect to foreign intelligence will overlap those with respect to law
enforcement.").
225 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 727 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002)
(observing that court of appeals decisions adopting the primary purpose test as a gloss on
the FISA "affirm district court opinions permitting the introduction of evidence gathered
under a FISA order").
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submits all applications for FISA surveillance, 22 6 implemented the
test so vigorously, as discussed next.
D. The Department of Justice's Use of the Primary Purpose Test as
the Foundation for the Wall
The Department of Justice implemented the primary purpose test
by building a high wall between foreign intelligence officials and law
enforcement officials. More specifically, what the public came to
know as "the wall" arose from (1) the case law discussed above
adopting the "primary purpose" test as an interpretation of the original
FISA's "purpose" provision; (2) internal procedures adopted by the
Department to implement the primary purpose test; and (3) the
interpretation of those procedures by Department officials and the
FISA Trial Court. 2 2 7  This section discusses the latter two
developments, relying mostly on government reports, including the
final report of the 9/11 Commission.
22 8
Until the early 1990s the Department used informal procedures to
ensure that FISA surveillance did not take on the "primary purpose".. 229
of gathering evidence for prosecution. The Department's
prosecutors obtained foreign intelligence information gathered
through the FISA process with "the understanding.., that they would
not improperly exploit that process for their criminal cases."2 30 The
prosecutors' main source of foreign intelligence information was the
FBI, which conducts almost all FISA surveillance targeting U.S.
persons for counterintelligence. 23 1 "Whether the FBI shared with
226 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, pt. 2.5, 3 C.F.R. (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
(2000) (delegating to Attorney General power to authorize FISA surveillance).
227 See infra notes 243-62 and accompanying text.
228 See generally 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 78-80 (section entitled "Legal
Constraints on the FBI and 'The Wall"'); REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY, supra note 13,
at xvii, 80-84 (pagination from unclassified version of report) (discussing role of "the
wall" in events leading up to 9/11); U.S. General Accounting Office, Report No. 01-780,
FBI INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: COORDINATION WITHIN JUSTICE ON
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CRIMINAL MATTERS Is LIMITED, (July 2001); U.S. Department
of Justice, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REVIEW TEAM ON THE
HANDLING OF THE LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY INVESTIGATION, 707-62 (May
2000) (Chapter 20 entitled "'Primary Purpose' and the Sharing of Intelligence Information
Among the FBI, OIPR, and the Criminal Division") [hereinafter "BELLOWS REPORT" after
the name of the lawyer who headed the team]; Office of the Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Justice, The Handling of FBI Intelligence Information Related to the Justice
Department's Campaign Finance Investigation, Unclassified Executive Summary, § 5.A.2
(July 1999) (addressing problems of intelligence sharing within Department of Justice);
Hill, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, supra note 3, at 21-26 (section entitled "The Wall").
229 See 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 78.
230 id.
231 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 1.14(a), 3 C.F.R. 200,212 (1981), reprinted in 50
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prosecutors information pertinent to possible criminal investigations
was left solely to the judgment of the FBI."2 32 This informal
arrangement apparently worked because of the knowledge and
experience of Mary Lawton, the head of the Justice Department's
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) until 1993.2 33 OIPR
was and remains the office that prepares applications for FISA
surveillance and presents them to the FISA Trial Court for
approval.
234
By the 1990s the Department of Justice had gotten "sloppy" about
complying with the primary purpose test, according to Lawton's
successor, Richard Scruggs. Scruggs went to Attorney General
Janet Reno about it.236 Scruggs told Reno that, in particular, he
worried about contacts between the FBI and Justice Department
prosecutors in the Aldrich Ames investigation, which included FISAS 237
surveillance. Indeed, Scruggs told Reno he worried that these
contacts violated the FISA and caused some of Reno's certifications• • • 238 ,
in the FISA applications to be inaccurate. Reno became very
upset" and told Scruggs to "make sure this did not happen again."
2 T9
After Ames pleaded guilty to espionage in 1994, FBI headquarters
made clear that FBI agents should not contact Criminal Division
U.S.C. § 401 note (providing that the Director of FBI "shall ... within the United States
conduct counterintelligence and coordinate counterintelligence activities of other agencies
within the Intelligence Community" and shall "[p]roduce and disseminate foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence"); Exec. Order 12,036, § 1-1401 (similar provision in
predecessor order in effect when FISA was enacted), 43 Fed. Reg. 3674 (1978); see also
Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 42, at 15 (statement of Attorney General
Griffin Bell) (stating that most electronic surveillance under bill that became the FISA
would be conducted by either the FBI or the National Security Agency); 9/11 COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 2, at 423 (observing that in the 1980s and 1990s FBI "was the lead
agency for the investigation of foreign terrorist groups operating in the United States").
232 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 78.
233 See BELLOWS REPORT, supra note 228, at 712 (stating that informal system "appears
to have worked quite satisfactorily while Mary Lawton was the head of OIPR, both from
the perspective of the Criminal Division and from that of the FBI").
234 See 28 C.F.R. § 0.33b (2004); see also United States Attorneys' Manual, § 1-2.106
(stating that OIPR "prepares certifications and applications" for FISA surveillance).
235 BELLOWS REPORT, supra note 228, at 712.
2 3 6
1 d. at 712-13.
237 See 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 78 ("[T]he prosecution of Aldrich Ames
for espionage in 1994 revived concerns about the prosecutors' role in intelligence
investigations"; Richard Scruggs "complained to Attorney General Janet Reno about the
lack of information-sharing controls."); BELLOWS REPORT, supra note 228, at 713 (to the
same effect); see also 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 91 (explaining that Ames
was CIA officer who, "[t]hough obviously unreliable, had been protected and promoted by
fellow officers while he paid his bills by selling to the Soviet Union the names of U.S.
operatives and agents, a number of whom died as a result").
238 BELLOWS REPORT, supra note 228, at 713.
239 id.
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prosecutors without OIPR's approval; violation of this by an FBI,, ,,240
agent would be a "career stopper. Thereafter, OIPR "became the
gatekeeper for the flow of FISA information to criminal. ,,241
prosecutors. OIPR played this role with a vengeance, conveying
to the FBI "the overarching message . . . that contact with the
Criminal Division is dangerous, either because future FISA coverage
will not be approved or because existing FISA coverage will be taken
down."
24 2
After much internal debate, in July 1995 the Attorney General
adopted written procedures to implement the primary purpose test.
24 3
As interpreted by Justice Department officials, the July 1995,,,244
procedures erected "the wall.' Three particular provisions of the
procedures did most of the wall-building work. The three provisions
applied to all foreign intelligence (FI) or foreign counterintelligence
(FCI) investigations in which the FBI conducted FISA
surveillance.
2 V
One provision prohibited the Criminal Division from giving the
FBI advice that would "result in either the fact or the appearance of
the Criminal Division's directing or controlling the FI or FCI
240 Id. at 714; see also 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 79.
2419/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 78.
242 BELLOWS REPORT, supra note 228, at 731.
243 Memorandum of from Janet Reno, Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice; Director, FBI, U.S.
Dep't of Justice; Counsel for Intelligence Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice; United States
Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice, "Procedures for Contacts Between the FBI and the
Criminal Division Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence
Investigations," available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1995procs.html (July
19, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Att'y Gen. Procedures]; see also BELLOWS REPORT, supra
note 228, at 714-21 (describing development of 1995 guidelines); id. at 721 (quoting
explanation of draft of 1995 procedures stating that restrictions were "[t]o avoid running
afoul of the 'primary purpose' test").
244 See 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 79 (stating that July 1995 procedures
"were almost immediately misunderstood and misapplied . .. Over time the procedures
came to be referred to as 'the wall."'); REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY, supra note 13, at
83 (pagination from unclassified version of report) (finding that many in FBI
misunderstood Attorney General's 1995 procedures); U.S. General Accounting Office,
REPORT NO. 01-780, supra note 228, at 4 (July 2001) ("[T]he implementation and
interpretation of the [Attorney General's 1995 procedures] and the previously noted
concerns led to a significant decline in coordination between the FBI and the Criminal
Division.").
245 The provisions were entitled procedures "for Contacts Between the FBI and the
Criminal Division." 1995 Att'y Gen. Procedures, supra note 243, at 1. They also,
however, regulated contacts between the FBI and the U.S. Attorneys Offices. See id
Generally, they required the FBI to contact U.S. Attorneys' Offices only with approval of
the Criminal Division and OIPR. See id. at § A.2 ("The FBI shall not contact a U.S.
Attorney's Office concerning [an Fl or FCI investigation using FISA surveillance] without
the approval of the Criminal Division and OIPR.").
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investigation toward law enforcement objectives.' 246 This provision
had particular bite because it banned even "the appearance" of
Criminal Division direction and control. 247 Although the provision
allowed Criminal Division advice aimed at "preserving" the
possibility of prosecution, it seemed by negative implication to bar
advice aimed at "enhancing" the possibility of a prosecution.24 8 In
practice, the line between preserving and enhancing advice was so
murky that advice-giving was substantially curtailed.249 Moreover,
the provision did not define "directing or controlling," which led to
different interpretations. 20 Beyond that, it seemed to restrict the
Criminal Division's participation in, not just the FISA surveillance,
but all aspects of an investigation (including, e.g., physical
surveillance). 251 Consequently, prosecutors in the Justice Department
failed to receive important information from not only the FBI (which
did the FISA surveillance) but also from other agencies involved in
the non-FISA aspects of intelligence investigations, such as the
National Security Agency and the CIA.
252
211 Id. at § A.6.
247 See BELLOWS REPORT, supra note 228, at 719 (stating that "appearance"
formulation, coupled with other wording in 1995 procedures, was "considerably ...
problematic"); id. at 729 (describing "appearance" formulation as one aspect of 1995
procedures that-more than preventing the Criminal Division from being "at the table"
during FISA investigations-kept the Criminal Division out of "the neighborhood"); id. at
750 (citing "appearance" formulation as one aspect of 1995 procedures that, as
implemented by OIPR, "crippled" the Criminal Division's ability to carry out "what ought
to be one of its core functions").
248 See 1995 Att'y Gen. Procedures, supra note 243, at § A.6.
249 See BELLOWS REPORT, supra note 228, at 721-34.
250 See id. at 727-30.
251 See 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 79 (1995 procedures were interpreted to
restrict information sharing and coordination even in investigations where FISA
surveillance had not been used); BELLOWS REPORT, supra note 228, at 719, 729, 750
(citing investigation-wide scope of proposed 1995 procedures as one aspect that was
"considerably .. .problematic"); id. at 729 (citing investigation-wide aspect of 1995
procedures as one aspect of 1995 procedures that-more than preventing the Criminal
Division from being "at the table" during FISA investigations-kept the Criminal Division
out of "the neighborhood"); id. at 750 (citing investigation-wide scope of 1995 procedures
as one aspect of them that, as applied by OIPR, "crippled" the Criminal Division's ability
to carry out "what ought to be one of its core functions").
252 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 79. The Church Committee reports indicate
that the NSA and CIA, as well as FBI intelligence officials, withheld intelligence
information from Justice Department prosecutors even before the Department of Justice
adopted formal procedures walling-off prosecutors from intelligence officials. See, e.g.,
Church Committee Final Report, supra note 64, at 39, 59, 86, 103 n.473, 130, 149-52,
273-74, 284. Professor Funk suggests that this was partly because of concern about the
legality of sharing intelligence information with prosecutors and partly because of concern
that the use of intelligence for prosecutions would compromise intelligence sources and
methods. E-Mail from William F. Funk, Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School, to
Richard H. Seamon (Oct. 2, 2004).
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Another provision of the 1995 procedures required the FBI and
OIPR to notify the Criminal Division whenever an investigation using
FISA surveillance developed evidence "that reasonably indicate[s]
that a significant federal crime has been, is being, or may be
committed. ' 253 This provision did not explain the term "significant"
or the timing or procedures for the FBI and OIPR to notify the
Criminal Division. Without guidance, the FBI and OIPR violated the
notification requirement, sometimes by not notifying the Criminal
Division at all and, other times, by delaying notification until it was
too late for Criminal Division input to do any good.
254
Finally, the 1995 procedures were interpreted to make the OIPR a
gatekeeper that controlled (1) the flow of foreign intelligence
information that could go from the FBI to the Criminal Division as
well as (2) the flow of advice about potential prosecutions that could
go from the Criminal Division to the FBI.255 This meant, among other
things, that an OIPR lawyer attended any meeting at which FBI
agents and Criminal Division lawyers discussed intelligence
investigations. 256 Because OIPR took such a stringent view of the
separation required between the FBI and the Criminal Division under
the 1995 Guidelines, those meetings were "not the ordinary
interaction between agents and prosecutors"; rather, they were
"surreal" and "weird." In other ways, too, according to a later
internal review, "OIPR has effectively crippled the Criminal
Division's ability to carry out what ought to be one of its core
functions, which is to provide advice and guidance at critical
junctures during FCI investigations."
258
OIPR was apparently acting under pressure from the FISA Trial
Court. OIPR regularly told that court about "consultations and
discussions between the FBI, the Criminal Division, and U.S.
Attorney's offices in cases where there were overlapping intelligence
and criminal investigations or interests." 2 59 Furthermore, sometimes
the court itself acted as a self-described "'wall' so that FISA
253 1995 Att'y Gen. Procedures, supra note 243, at § A. 1.
254 BELLOWs REPORT, supra note 228, at 723-26.
255 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 78.
256 See BELLOWS REPORT, supra note 228, at 733-34.
257 Id. at 732; see also id. at 756 ("The practice of requiring prior notice to OIPR (of
contacts between the FBI and the Criminal Division] . . . has served to stifle
communications between the Criminal Division and the FBI.").
258 Id. at 750.
259 FISA Trial Court Opinion, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev.
2002).
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information could not be disseminated to criminal prosecutors without
the Court's approval."26 0 This happened "[i]n significant cases,
involving major complex investigations such as the bombings of the
U.S. Embassies in Africa, and the millennium investigations, where
criminal investigations of FISA targets were being conducted
concurrently, and prosecution was likely." 26 1 The result was that
"[t]he wall in FISA matters became thicker and higher over time."
262
Even before 9/11, the wall hurt the Justice Department's ability to
protect national security from foreign threats. So concluded reports by
the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Justice Department.
The GAO found that the wall hampered the Department's
investigation into efforts by the People's Republic of China toS 263
influence U.S. political campaigns. The Justice Department found
that the wall also "adversely and materially affect[ed]" the
investigation during the 1980s and 1990s of Wen Ho Lee, a nuclear
scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. 264 The GAO Report
260 Id.
261 Id.; see also 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 539 n.83 (noting that in 1990s
FISA Trial Court "began designating itself as the gatekeeper for the sharing of intelligence
information"). For a description of the embassy bombings to which the court was
referring, see id. at 68-70 (section entitled "Embassy Bombings"). For background on the
millennium investigation to which the court was referring, see id. at 174-82 (section
entitled "The Millennium Crisis").
262 Hill, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, supra note 3, at 24. In addition to pressure from
the FISA Court, the Justice Department got some pressure from congressional oversight
committees, see THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978: THE FIRST
FIVE YEARS, S. REP. No. 98-660, at 15 (1984) (stating that "the Justice Department
should" not use FISA "when it is clear that the main concern with respect to a terrorist
group is domestic law enforcement and criminal prosecution"); IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 98-738, at 6 (1984) (arguing
that "the wiser course" is not to use FISA "once prosecution is contemplated, unless
articulable reasons of national security dictate otherwise"); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1808(a)(1)
("On a semiannual basis the Attorney General shall fully inform the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
concerning all electronic surveillance under this subchapter.").
263 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE HANDLING OF FBI
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION RELATED TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S CAMPAIGN
FINANCE INVESTIGATION, UNCLASSIFIED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, § 5.A.2 (1999)
(recommending that "the Criminal Division, OIPR, and the FBI resolve the issue of their
conflicting understandings of the Departmental guidelines concerning intelligence-sharing,
and that the guidelines be amended accordingly"); see also GAO Report No. 01-780,
supra note 228, at 1 (July 2001) (citing investigation of possible Chinese infiltration of
U.S. political campaigns as one that "brought to light serious problems that have limited
whether and when the FBI coordinates into investigations with the Department of Justice's
(DOJ) Criminal Division"); id. at 3 (finding that "[a] key factor" in lack of coordination
between Criminal Division and FBI was "concern over how the [courts] might rule on the
primary purpose of the [FISA] surveillance or search in light of such coordination").
264 BELLOWS REPORT, supra note 228, at 13; see also Draft Report of the Subcomm. on
Dep't of Justice Oversight of Sen. Judiciary Comm., 147 CONG. REC. S13,803 (daily ed.
Dec. 20, 2001).) (FISA surveillance of Wen Ho Lee was not sought because of concern
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more generally concluded that a "key factor" in the intelligence-
sharing problems in these investigations was the Department's efforts
to satisfy the primary purpose test.
2 65
It is the wall's apparent role in the 9/11 attacks, however, that. 266
seared it into national consciousness. That apparent role came to
light largely through an e-mail that was sent shortly before 9/11 and
became public on about the first anniversary of the attacks. The e-
mail was from a New York FBI agent who, because of the supposed
wall, was not allowed to participate in a hunt for one of the men who,
a few weeks later, would be a 9/11 hijacker:
Whatever has happened to this-someday someone will die-and
wall or not-the public will not understand why we were not more
effective and throwing every resource we had at certain
'problems.' Let's hope the [FBI's] National Security Law Unit will
stand behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest
threat to us 6w, UBL [Usama bin Laden], is getting the most
"protection."
This e-mail came to light in September 2002 during congressional
hearings on the 9/11 attacks. 268 Those hearings produced a report
finding that, in the summer before 9/11, the wall "led to a diminished
level of coverage of suspected al-Qa'ida operatives in the United
States."
, 269
inside Justice Department that investigation had become "way too criminal").
265 GAO Rep No. 01-780, supra note 228, at 3.
266 See 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 269-72. Before 9/1l, the Department
changed the 1995 procedures twice-once after the internal inquiry report on the Wen Ho
Lee investigation and again after the GAO report on the campaign finance. See In re
Sealed Case, 3 10 F.3d at 728. General Reno approved the first set of changes on January
21, 2000. Under those changes, the FBI had to start (1) automatically sending the Criminal
Division Letterhead Memoranda on certain foreign counterintelligence investigations
(FCI) and (2) briefing the Division on FCI investigations once a month. See Memorandum
for the Attorney General Through the Deputy Attorney General From Gary G. Grindler
and Jonathan D. Schwartz, to Recommend that the Attorney General Authorize Certain
Measures Regarding Intelligence Matters in Response to the Interim Recommendations
Provided by Special Litigation Counsel Randy Bellows (approved by Attorney General
Janet Reno on Jan 21, 2000), available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag012100.html.
The Deputy Attorney General made the second set of changes in August 2001, about one
month before 9/11; they clarified some parts of the 1995 procedures and prescribed some
new procedures designed to expand the information flow from the FBI to the Criminal
Division. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, on
Intelligence Sharing, (Aug. 6, 2001), available at
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/dag080606.html.
267 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 271; REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY, supra
note 13, at 84.
268 REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY, supra note 13, at 84; see, e.g., Frank Davies,
Agent's pre-9/l 1 e-mail: 'Someday someone will die, ' MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 20, 2002, at
Al.
269 REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY, supra note 13, at xvii.
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The wall's role in the United States' failure to prevent the 9/11
attacks again drew national attention during proceedings of the "9/11C • • ,,270
Commission. Many witnesses testified that the wall hurt the
government's ability to investigate and protect against terrorism
before 9/11. 2 7 1 The Commission's staff found that "domestic
counterterrorism efforts were impaired" by the wall. 272 Attorney
General Ashcroft went farther. He testified before the 9/11
270 The official name is the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States. The Commission was created by federal statute. See Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, §§ 601-611, 116 Stat. 2408 (2002); see also
Pub. L. No. 108-207, 118 Stat. 556 (2004) (extending life of commission).
271 See, e.g., Stewart A. Baker, Prepared Testimony for the 9/11 Comm'n, at 7-11 (Dec.
8, 2003) (explaining that "we missed our best chance" to prevent 9/11 attacks because of
the wall); William P. Barr, Prepared Statement to 9/I1 Comm'n at Sixth Public Hearing
(Dec. 8, 2003) (unpaginated) ("Prohibitions on .. .using intelligence information in
criminal investigations created a 'wall of separation.' That separation effectively forced
the Bureau to proceed largely on the criminal justice track if it wanted to preserve the
option of using its law enforcement powers to incapacitate terrorists once they were
detected."); Louis J. Freeh, Prepared Testimony before the 9/11 Comm'n, at 14 (Apr. 13,
2004) ("For two decades the Department of Justice constructed the wall between
counterintelligence and law enforcement higher and higher to a height that far exceeded
common sense and the plain meaning of the underlying 1978 statute."); Robert S. Mueller
II1, FBI Director, Prepared Statement to 9/11 Comm'n, at 2 (Apr. 14, 2004) ("The legal
walls between intelligence and law enforcement operations that handicapped us before
9/11 have been eliminated."); Thomas J. Pickard, Prepared Statement to the 9/11 Comm'n,
at 7 (Apr. 13, 2004) (stating that case law "resulted in 'walls' being inserted between
intelligence and criminal cases, so that the information could not be shared"); John S.
Pistole, Exec. Ass't Director for Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence, FBI, Prepared
Statement to 9/11 Comm'n, at 3 (Apr. 14, 2004) ("Before [9/1 1] ... due to limitations of
the legal 'wall' intelligence agents and criminal investigators working on a terrorist target
had to proceed without knowing what the other may have been doing about the same
target. In short, we were fighting international terrorism with one arm tied behind our
back."); Larry D. Thompson, Prepared Statement to 9/11 Comm'n (Dec. 8, 2003)
(unpaginated):
Before the attacks of September 11 th, many provisions of federal law had been
interpreted to limit sharply the ability of intelligence investigators to
communicate with federal law enforcement officials as well as the ability of
federal law-enforcement officers to share terrorism-related information with
members of the intelligence community. This metaphorical "wall" between
intelligence officials and law enforcement officials often inhibited vital
information sharing and coordination.
Id; cf Stephen J. Schulhofer, Prepared Statement to 9/11 Comm'n (Dec. 8, 2003)
(unpaginated) (stating that "legal requirements associated with the FISA 'wall"' were
"problematic," but "FBI misconceptions about FISA requirements were more basic and
predated tensions related to the wall"). But see Janet Reno, Prepared Statement to 9/11
Comm'n, at 5 (Apr. 13, 2004) ("There are simply no walls or restrictions on sharing the
vast majority of counterterrorism information."). All available at http://www.9-
I Icommission.gov/hearings.
272 9/11 Comm'n Staff, Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism, and Intelligence Collection
in the United States Prior to 9/11, Staff Statement No. 9, at 5 (Apr. 13, 2004); see also id.
at 7, 11 (describing specific ways that "the wall" hampered counterterrorism
investigations); 9/11 Comm'n Staff, Threats and Responses in 2001, Staff Statement No.
10, at 11 (Apr. 13, 2004) (including "the wall" among the "significant problems sharing
information within the FBI").
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Commission: "The single greatest structural cause for September 11
was the wall that segregated criminal investigators and intelligence
agents."'273 General Ashcroft also claimed that a member of the 9/11
Commission, Jamie Gorelick, provided the "basic architecture for the
wall" in a previously classified memorandum that General Ashcroft
declassified for the occasion of his testimony.2 74  The 9/11
Commission's final report criticized General Ashcroft's testimony as
"not fairly or accurately reflect[ing] the significance of the 1995
documents and their relevance to" the events in 2001 that produced
the dire e-mail from a New York FBI agent reproduced above.
2 75
The Commission's final report also makes clear, however, that the
wall played a role in the government's failure to prevent the 9/11
attacks. The report identifies several "missed opportunities to thwart
the 9/11 plot." Several of those opportunities involved picking up
the trail of two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al
Hazmi, before 9/11. 277 One such opportunity arose at a meeting on
June 11, 2001, between a CIA analyst and FBI agents, including an
agent whom the Commission Report calls "Jane."'278 Jane did not give
her fellow FBI agents "significant" information about one of the
future hijackers because she had gotten the information from reports
of the National Security Agency (NSA).279 The NSA reports
"contained caveats that their contents could not be shared with
criminal investigators [of the FBI]" without the permission of the
Justice Department's OIPR. Therefore, 'Jane' concluded that she
could not pass on information from those reports to the agents."
280
273 Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft before the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Apr. 13, 2004) (unpaginated).
274 Id.; see also Memorandum from Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General on
Instructions on "Separation of Certain Foreign Counterintelligence and Criminal
Investigations," (undated), available at
http://www.cnsnews.com/pdf/2004/secret-final2.pdf; Jamie S. Gorelick, "The Truth About
the Wall," WASH POST, Apr. 18, 2004, at B07 (saying that memo was written in March
1995).
275 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 539 n.83.276 Id. at 353; see also id. at 355-56 (table of "Operational Opportunities").
217 See id. at 266 ("On four occasions in 2001, the CIA, the FBI, or both had apparent
opportunities to refocus on the significance of Hazmi and Mihdhar and reinvigorate the
search for them."); see also id at 239 (reproducing photos of al Hazmi and al Mihdhar,
and identifying them as members of group that hijacked American Airlines Flight 77,
which crashed into Pentagon, id at 10).
171 Id. at 268; see also id. at 356 (listing as 6th missed "Operational Opportunity": "FBI
and CIA officials do not ensure that all relevant information regarding the Kuala Lumpur
meeting was shared with the Cole investigators at the June II meeting.").
279 Id. at 269. The information concerned a meeting in Kuala Lumpur attended by the
two future hijackers, among others. See id. at 158-59, 181, 215, and 266-67.
280 Id. at 269.
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This is one incident the 9/11 Commission apparently had in mind
when it says that, because of the wall, "relevant information from the
National Security Agency... often failed to make its way to criminal
investigators. After the June 11 meeting, Jane refused to let an
FBI agent who worked on a criminal investigation in the New York
field office participate in the ongoing effort to locate Mihdhar in the
United States. 282 That effort relied on intelligence information, which,
Jane believed, could be shared only with FBI intelligence agents, and
not with FBI criminal agents. 283 Jane's refusal to allow the criminal
agent to participate provoked the famous angry e-mail quoted
above.284 The 9/11 Commission found that Jane "appears to have
misunderstood the complex rules that could apply to this situation."
285
If so, this reinforces the point that "the wall" resulted not only from
the Attorney General's 1995 information sharing procedures but also
from the interpretation of those procedures by the FBI, other members
of the Department, and the FISA Trial Court.
286
E. The Patriot Act's Supposed Demolition of the Wall
The 9/11 attacks convinced the Bush Administration to eliminate
the primary purpose test and to lower the wall that the Department
had built to implement the test. The administration proposed
legislation for those purposes less than one week after the attacks.
28 7
The proposal would have changed one word in the original FISA. The
original FISA required the government to certify that "the purpose of
the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence."28 8 As discussed
above, this purpose provision in the original FISA was what the lower
federal courts had interpreted to impose the primary purpose test.
289
The administration proposed to change the phrase "the purpose" in
281 Id at 79.
282 Id at 271.
283 id.
284 See supra text accompanying note 267.
285 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 271.
286 See also September 11 and the Imperative of Reform in the U.S. Intelligence
Community: Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman, Senate Select
Comm. On Intelligence (Dec. 10, 2002) at 46, available at
http://intellilgence.senate.gov/shelby.pdf ("Much of the blame for the dysfunctional nature
of pre-September 11 LEA/IC [Law Enforcement Agency/Intelligence Community]
coordination can be traced to a series of misconceptions and mythologies that grew up in
connection with the implementation of... the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.").
287 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 328.
288 FISA § 1804(a)(7)(B) (italics added).
289 See supra notes 209-225 and accompanying text.
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that provision to "a purpose."'290 The idea was to allow the
government to use FISA surveillance for the primary purpose of
getting evidence for a prosecution, as long as the gathering of foreign
intelligence was also "a" purpose of the surveillance.
29 '
The administration's proposed amendment to the original FISA's
purpose provision was one of many that the Administration
proposed.292 It got little attention in hearings on the House side.29 3 In
contrast, some Senators worried about the constitutionality of
eliminating the primary purpose test.2 94 Their concern was reinforcedby opponents of the amendment who doubted its constitutionality. 295
291 See Administration's Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the Judiciary
Comm. of the House of Representatives, 107th Cong., at 56-57 and 74 (2001) [hereinafter
House Judiciary Hearing on Patriot Act] (reproducing § 153 of administration's proposed
legislation, as well as administration's explanation of this provision, which proposed
amendment of FISA § 1804(a)(7)(B)).
291 See, e.g., S. 1448, The Intelligence to Prevent Terrorism Act of 2001 and Other
Legislative Proposals in the Wake of the September 11, 2001 Attacks: Hearing Before the
Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 53 (2001) [hereinafter Senate
Intelligence Hearing on Patriot Act] (prepared statement of Jerry Berman, Exec. Dir.,
Center for Democracy and Technology) ("The proposed provision would permit FISA's
use if [foreign intelligence gathering] is 'a' purpose, even if the primary purpose was to
gather evidence for a criminal prosecution."); Protecting Constitutional Freedoms in the
Face of Terrorism: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and
Property Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 18 (2001) [hereinafter Senate
Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing on Patriot Act] (testimony of Morton H. Halperin, Center for
National Security Studies and Council on Foreign Relations) (stating that "the most
disturbing" administration proposal "would essentially allow the Justice Department to
begin a FISA surveillance even [if] it has already decided that its primary purpose is to
develop evidence to indict and convict somebody of a crime and even if that person is a
United States citizen"); see also id. at 7 (prepared statement of Sen. Sessions) (stating that
administration's amendment "would allow, for example, our criminal investigators to
assist our intelligence officers in arresting a criminal before he supplies a terrorist with
deadly weapons"); Senate Intelligence Hearing on Patriot Act, supra, at 22 (testimony of
David Kris, Assoc. Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice) ("What our
amendment would do would be to eliminate any artificially high statutory barrier and
allow the constitutional standard to be developed on a case-by-case basis.").
292 See House Judiciary Hearing on Patriot Act, supra note 290, at 67-90 (reproducing
administration's proposed legislation).
293 See id. at 27 (testimony of Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson explaining
proposal); id. at 35 (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff explaining
proposal).
294 See Senate Intelligence Hearing on Patriot Act, supra note 291, at 12, 36 (Sept. 24,
2001) (Sen. Edwards' raising question of constitutionality of eliminating primary purpose
test); id. at 29 (Sen. Feinstein's raising question about constitutionality of eliminating
primary purpose test); id. at 32 (Sen. DeWine's citing Keith and suggesting "real
problems" associated with elimination of primary purpose test); see also id. at 21
(testimony of David Kris, Assoc. Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice)
(describing constitutionality of proposed elimination of primary purpose test as "a real
issue"); Homeland Defense: Hearing before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 24
(2001) [hereinafter Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearing on the Patriot Act] (Sen. Feinstein's
saying that "we are concerned that the elimination of the [primary purpose] test might
place the FISA in danger of being struck down by a court.").
295 See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Subcomm. Hearing on Patriot Act, supra note 291, at 20
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Because of that concern, Senator Feinstein asked Attorney General
Ashcroft whether the administration would be satisfied by amending
the purpose provision to require "a substantial or significant" purpose• .,,. 296
to be obtaining foreign intelligence. General Ashcroft seemed
amenable.
297
The bill introduced in Congress as the USA PATRIOT Act
proposed to amend the original FISA's purpose provision to require
the government to certify that "a significant purpose" of proposed
surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information. Members
of Congress understood that the "significant purpose" language was aS298
compromise. They also understood that it would eliminate the
"primary purpose" test.29 9  For that reason, some members of
Congress suggested that even the compromise version was
unconstitutional.3 0 0  Congress nonetheless quickly and
(prepared statement of Morton H. Halperin, Center for National Security Studies and
Council on Foreign Relations) (stating that administration's amendment to original FISA's
purpose provision would allow government to "circumvent[] the notice and probable cause
requirements of the Fourth Amendment"); see also id. at 28 (prepared statement of Jerry
Berman, Exec. Dir., Center for Democracy and Technology) (stating that amendment
could cause prosecutions to be "thrown out on constitutional grounds"). But see id. at 24
(prepared statement of Prof. John 0. McGinnis) (stating that amendment would be
constitutional); id. at 39 (prepared statement of Prof. Douglas Kmiec) (also stating that
amendment would be constitutional).
296 Senate Judiciary Comm. Hearing on the Patriot Act, supra note 291, at 24-25.
297 Id. at 35 (testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft) ("I think.., we would move
toward thinking to say that if 'a purpose' isn't satisfactory [to Congress], say a 'significant
purpose' reflects a considered judgment that would be the kind of balancing that I think we
are all looking to find."); see also The USA PATRIOT Act in Practice: Shedding Light on
the FISA Process: Hearing before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. 7 (2002)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing on the Patriot Act in Practice] (statement of Sen.
Feinstein) (recalling that she had proposed "significant purpose" as a compromise to
which General Ashcroft seemed amenable).
298 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S10,591 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein) ("The language is a negotiated compromise between those who wished the law
to stay the same and those who wished to virtually eliminate the foreign intelligence
standard entirely."); 147 CONG. REC. H6759 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Sensenbrenner) (describing "significant purpose" standard as compromise).
'99 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. SI 1,025 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Wellstone) ("The bill broadens the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, by
extending FISA surveillance authority to criminal investigations, even when the primary
purpose is not intelligence gathering.").
300 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S11,021 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Feingold) (by replacing primary purpose test with "significant purpose" provision, "even if
the primary purpose is a criminal investigation, the heightened protections of the fourth
amendment will not apply"); id at S 11,003-04 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (stating that
Administration's original proposal "raised constitutional concerns," and that, under the
compromise version, providing for "significant purpose" standard, courts would have to
decide "how far" the government could go); 147 CONG. REC. S10,558 (daily ed. Oct. 11,
2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("[E]ven the Department [of Justice] concedes that the
court's [sic] may impose a constitutional requirement of 'primary purpose' based on the
appellate court decisions ... over the past 20 years."); id. at S10,589 (statement of Sen.
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overwhelmingly passed the bill of which it was a part.
30 1
The Patriot Act included another provision relevant to the primary
purpose test. The provision authorizes coordination between officials
who conduct FISA surveillance and law enforcement officials:
(1) Federal officers who conduct electronic surveillance to acquire
foreign intelligence information under this title may consult with
Federal law enforcement officers to coordinate efforts to
investigate or protect against
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence servi or
network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power.
The provision also specifies that this coordination will not preclude
either certification that a significant purpose of the FISA surveillance
is to obtain foreign intelligence or the issuance of a surveillance
order:
(2) Coordination authorized under paragraph (1) shall not preclude
the certification required by section 180 4 (a)( 7 )(B) 3o this title or
the entry of an order under section 1805 of this title.
In sum, Congress amended the original FISA's purpose provision,
and added a coordination provision, to eliminate the primary purpose
test and lower the wall associated with the test. After Congress
enacted the Patriot Act, however, many described the Act as
altogether tearing down the wall. 304 Uncertainty about the intent and
Edwards) (stating that, while "significant purpose" language was "substantial
improvement" of Administration's proposal, FISA Trial Court "will still need to be careful
to enter FISA orders only when the requirements of the Constitution as well as the statute
are satisfied"); id. at S10597 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (stating that Patriot Act's
"significant purpose" amendment "may well make the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act unconstitutional under the fourth amendment"); 147 CONG. REC. H6,760 (daily ed.
Oct. 12, 2001 ) (statement of Rep. Scott) (opposing "significant purpose" amendment as
one of changes to wiretap law that, "taken together, represent a fundamental attack on
principles of privacy").
301 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (2001), codified as amended in
Patriot Act § 218. The Patriot Act passed the Senate 98-1 and the House of
Representatives 357-66. See, e.g., White House Press Release, Fact Sheet: President Bush
Calls for Renewing the USA PATRIOT Act (Apr. 19, 2004), at 2004 WL 61638389.
302 Patriot Act, § 504(a), 115 Stat. 364 (2001), codified as amended in 50 U.S.C. §
1806(k).
303 Id.
304 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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effect of the Patriot Act on this score developed as the Department of
Justice changed its procedures to implement the Patriot Act's changes
to the FISA and the courts, in turn, reviewed the Department's efforts.
Those events are discussed in the next part of this article.
II. IN RE SEALED CASE
A. How the Case Arose
1. The FISA Trial Court Adopts the Attorney General's 1995
Procedures as Required "Minimization Procedures"
In November 2001, a few weeks after Congress enacted the Patriot
Act, the FISA Trial Court adopted the Attorney General's 1995
procedures as the required procedures for all future FISA
surveillance.3 05 This meant that the Attorney General could no longer
change those procedures without court approval because they would
be incorporated in, and required by, all future surveillance orders
issued by the FISA Trial Court.
The FISA Trial Court's action was odd for two reasons. First was
its timing. The Attorney General's 1995 procedures implemented the
primary purpose test. Yet the FISA Trial Court adopted these
procedures as its own after the Patriot Act amended the FISA
ostensibly to eliminate the primary purpose test. The court must have
known that the Patriot Act was understood to eliminate the primary
purpose test; this feature of the Act was widely reported.
307 Also odd
was the label that the FISA Trial Court gave its action. The court said
305 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d. 717, 729 n.17 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (noting
that the FISA Trial Court adopted part of the 1995 procedures specifically concerning
investigations in which FISA surveillance was used).
306 See supra notes 243-262 and accompanying text.
307 See, e.g., Michael Doyle, Secret Surveillance Court Raises Fears; Government Given
Authority to Wiretap and Search Without Usual Accountability, SEA17LE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 5, 2001:
Congress created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to ease this tension.
Investigators got the secrecy they need, but they also had to keep foreign
intelligence collection as the "primary purpose" of the searches.
The new anti-terrorism law, though, expands this so that foreign intelligence
need only be a "significant purpose." This seemingly slight shift in wording
worries those who fear too many people will be swept up in a law enforcement
net.
Id. at A8; Jim McGee, An Intelligence Giant in the Making: Antiterrorism Law Likely to
Bring Domestic Apparatus of Unprecedented Scope, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2001, at A4
(reporting that debate over wording of amendment to original FISA's purpose provision
"was one of the fiercest surrounding" the PATRIOT Act).
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it was adopting the 1995 procedures as "minimization procedures."
30 8
The Department had not labeled them such or ever suggested that
they were designed as such. Indeed, the Department had a separate set
of (classified) procedures that were called "minimization"
procedures.
30 9
The timing and labeling suggested that the FISA Trial Court
wanted to entrench the procedures that established the wall using a
statutory basis (the FISA provisions on minimization procedures) that
the Patriot Act had not changed. 3 1 If so, the FISA Trial Court may
have been influenced by events besides the enactment of the Patriot
Act. Specifically, in 2000 and 2001 the Department of Justice had
reported to the FISA Trial Court that many prior FISA applications
contained errors and omitted material facts. Almost all of those
errors and omissions concerned the Department's compliance with the
"wall" procedures. 3 12 In response, the FISA Trial Court had, in its
words, "taken some supervisory actions to assess compliance with the, , ,,~313 ...
'wall' procedures." This apparently included disquahfying one FBI
agent from involvement in any future FISA applications. 3 14 The FISA
Trial Court's later adoption of the Attorney General's 1995
procedures as the required minimization procedures for all future
FISA surveillance may have partly reflected the court's belief that,
through systematic violations of the wall procedures, the Department
was tearing down the wall even before Congress enacted the Patriot
308 In re Sealed Case, 3 10 F.3d at 729 & n. 17.
309 Id. at 728 & n.16.
310 Cf Banks, supra note 30, at 1170 (characterizing FISA Trial Court's reliance on
minimization procedures as "tactical judgment" that was "certainly questionable").
3 FISA Trial Court Opinion, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620-21 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev.
2002).
312 See FISA Trial Court Opinion, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 621 ("In virtually every instance,
the government's misstatements and omissions in FISA applications and violations of the
Court's orders involved information sharing and unauthorized disseminations to criminal
investigators and prosecutors."); see also In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 730 n.18 (noting
that confessed inaccuracies in Department's FISA applications had concerned "assertions
regarding the information shared with criminal investigators and prosecutors"). But cf
Senators Patrick Leahy, Charles Grassley, and Arlen Specter, Interim Report on FBI
Oversight in the 107th Cong. by the Sen. Judiciary Comm. at § l11.C.2 (Feb. 2003) (finding
that FBI's "errors in the 'wall' procedure" was not "the only problem the FBI and DOJ
were having in the use of the FISA" and that caused errors and omissions in
representations to FISA Trial Court), available at
http//www.fas.org/irp/congress.2003_rpt/fisa.html.
13 FISA Trial Court Opinion, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
314 See Senate FISA Hearing on the PATRIOT Act in Practice, supra note 297, at 9
(statement of Sen. Specter) (referring to FISA Trial Court's disqualification of FBI agent
and expressing frustration that Judiciary Committee could not find out why this happened).
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Act to accomplish that result.
315
2. In 2002, the Department of Justice Changes Information Sharing
Procedures To Implement the Patriot Act
In March 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued new
"Intelligence Sharing Procedures" to implement the provisions of the
Patriot Act that amended the FISA's purpose provision and added the
coordination provision. 3 16 General Ashcroft announced these new
procedures in a March 2002 memorandum. The introductory section
of the memorandum said that the March 2002 procedures prescribed
in the memo superseded the Attorney General's 1995 Procedures on
intelligence sharing. The introduction also explained the
Department's interpretation of the Patriot Act's effect on the FISA:
The USA Patriot Act allows FISA to be used for "a significant
purpose," rather than the primary purpose, of obtaining foreign
intelligence information. Thus, it allows FISA to be used primarily
for a law enforcement purpq, as long as a significant foreign
intelligence purpose remains.
This explanation treated the Patriot Act as eliminating the primary
purpose test. Ironically, though, it also reflected the premise
underlying the test by distinguishing "a law enforcement purpose," on
the one hand, from "a ... foreign intelligence purpose," on the other
hand. The Department would later persuade the FISA court of review
that this distinction was a "false dichotomy."
318
The March 2002 procedures authorized extensive information
sharing between the FBI and the Criminal Division. The procedures
said that in general the Division "shall have access to all information"• .. .. 319
developed in FBI intelligence investigations. To ensure such
access, the procedures generally required the FBI to keep the Division
315 See Banks, supra note 30, at 1171 (stating that FISA Trial Court "reacted to alleged
abuses and inadequate management of FISA activities within the Department").
316 Memorandum from Attorney General on "Intelligence Sharing Procedures for
Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations Conducted by the
FBI," Mar. 6, 2002, available at http://www.fas.prg/irp/agency/doj/fisa/agO3602.html
[hereinafter 2002 Att'y Gen. Intelligence Sharing Procedures]; see also The Attorney
General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence
Collection, § VII.B.2, at 25-27 (effective Oct. 31, 2003) (redacted version, reflecting
procedures announced in 2002 Att'y Gen. Intelligence Sharing Procedures) [hereinafter
cited as 2003 Attorney General Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations],
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj.tbi.nsiguidelines.pdf.
317 2002 Att'y Gen. Intelligence Sharing Procedures, supra note 316, § I, reproduced
supra text accompanying note 246.
318 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735.
319 2002 Att'y Gen. Intelligence Sharing Procedures, supra note 316, § II.A.
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and OIPR "apprised of all information ... necessary to the ability of
the United States to investigate or protect against foreign attack,
sabotage, terrorism, and clandestine intelligence activities."320 (This
language tracked that of the coordination provision that the Patriot
Act had added to the FISA. 321) In detailing the FBI's obligation, the
procedures specified, "Relevant information includes both foreign
intelligence information and information concernin! a crime which
has been, is being, or is about to be committed." This statement
distinguishes foreign intelligence information from evidence of crime,
again suggesting- as did the introductory section of the memo-the
same dichotomy between law enforcement and intelligence functions
that underlay the primary purpose test. Even so, the March 2002
procedures greatly relaxed the restrictions that the 1995 procedures
had put on the flow of information from the FBI to the Criminal
Division.
The March 2002 procedures also relaxed the restrictions that the
1995 procedures had put on the Criminal Division's ability to consult
with the FBI. The 1995 procedures had prohibited "the fact or the
appearance of the Criminal Division's directing or controlling the FI
or FCI investigation toward law enforcement objectives."32 3 In
contrast, the 2002 Procedures authorized consultations on "the
initiation, operation, continuation, or expansion of FISA searches or-, ,,3 2 4
surveillance. By authorizing the Criminal Division to advise the
FBI to "initiat[e]" or "expan[d]" FISA surveillance,325 the 2002
procedures, unlike the 1995 procedures, allowed at least "the
appearance" that the Division was "directing or controlling" FISA
surveillance "toward law enforcement objectives."
326
In addition to the provisions about information sharing and
consultation between the FBI and the Criminal Division, the March
2002 procedures opened up the information flow in two other ways.
First, they largely eliminated OIPR's role as a gatekeeper. 327 Second,
320 i.
321 Patriot Act, § 504(a), 115 Stat. 364 (2001), codified as amended in 50 U.S.C. §
1806(k), reproduced supra text accompanying note 302-03.
322 2002 Att'y Gen. Intelligence Sharing Procedures, supra note 316 § II.A.
323 1995 Att'y Gen. Procedures, supra note 243, at § A.6.
324 2002 Att'y Gen. Procedures, supra note 316, at § 11.B; see also id. § III (generally
authorizing U.S. Attorney's Offices to receive information and engage in consultations to
same extent as Criminal Division lawyers were authorized to do under § II).
325 Id
326 1995 Att'y Gen. Procedures, supra note 243, at § A.6.
327 2002 Att'y Gen. Procedures, supra note 316, § 1.B (providing that FBI and Criminal
Division could consult directly without OIPR's presence).
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they allowed the U.S. Attorneys' Offices to "receive information and
engage in consultations to the same extent as the Criminal
Division."'32 8 Under the 1995 procedures, in contrast, the FBI needed
the Criminal Division's advance approval to contact a U.S. Attorney's
Office about any investigation that included FISA surveillance.
329
The March 2002 procedures would precipitate a showdown between
the Department and the FISA Trial Court.
3. The FISA Trial Court Rejects the Department's March 2002
Information Sharing Procedures
The day after Attorney General Ashcroft announced the March
2002 intelligence sharing procedures, the Department responded to
the FISA Trial Court's order (issued four months earlier) adopting the
now-superseded 1995 procedures as court-required minimization
procedures. The Department filed a motion, accompanied by a copy
of the March 2002 procedures, "to vacate the minimization and 'wall'
procedures in all cases now or ever before the Court, including this
Court's adoption of the Attorney General's July 1995 intelligence
sharing procedures, which are not consistent with new intelligence
sharing procedures submitted for approval with this motion."
330
In May 2002, the FISA Trial Court issued an opinion and order on
the motion. The opinion was written by the outgoing Chief Judge of
the FISA Trial Court (and longtime Justice Department official),
Royce Lamberth. 33 1 The opinion indicated that "[a]ll seven judges of
the Court concur[red]" in the opinion. 332 The court described its
disposition of the government's motion in a way that implied a
government victory: "The Government's motion will be GRANTED,
EXCEPT THAT THE PROCEDURES MUST BE MODIFIED IN
PART." Really, the decision was at most only a partial win for the
government, and only in its result, not its reasoning. The result was
that the court accepted the portion of the government's March 2002
procedures that governed information sharing. 333 The court largely
rejected, however, the portion of the March 2002 procedures
governing consultation between the Criminal Division and the FBI.
328 ld. at § II.
329 1995 Att'y Gen. Procedures, supra note 243, at § A.2.
330 FISA Trial Court Opinion, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 613 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev.
2002).
331 Id.; see also Almanac of the Federal Judiciary (entry on Royce C. Lamberth),
available at 2002 WL 32050752.
332 FISA Trial Court Opinion, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 625.
333 See id.
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The court replaced that portion of the procedures with restrictions
derived from the superseded 1995 procedures. 334 Beyond that result,
the court's reasoning reaffirmed the "primary purpose" test while
tracing it to a new place: not the FISA's "purpose" provision, but its
provisions on "minimization procedures."
As a predicate for this new approach, the FISA Trial Court found
that the Attorney General's March 2002 procedures were
minimization procedures (though the Department had not called them
such).335 The court relied on the FISA's definition of "minimization
procedures" to reject the procedures. 3 36 Specifically, the court
determined that the procedures were "designed to enhance the
acquisition, retention, and dissemination of evidence for law
enforcement purposes, instead of being consistent with the need of
the United States to 'obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign
intelligence information."337 Their design reflected the government's
position that the FISA "may now be used primarily for a law
enforcement purpose."'338 In the court's view, the 2002 procedures
thus made the government's interest in foreign intelligence gathering
"subordinat[e]" to "law enforcement objectives."33 9 For that reason,
the 2002 procedures were not "'consistent' with the need to obtain,
produce, and disseminateforeign intelligence information."
34 0
334 As modified, the procedures specifically prohibited-instead of specifically
authorizing--"law enforcement officials" from "mak[ing] recommendations to
intelligence officials concerning the initiation, operation, continuation or expansion of
FISA searches and surveillance." See id.; cf. 2002 Att'y Gen. Procedures, supra note 316,
at § II.B, Ill (reproduced in relevant part in text accompanying note 324 supra). Further,
the court's modification added these injunctions: "[T]he FBI and the Criminal Division
shall ensure that law enforcement officials do not direct or control the use of the FISA
procedures to enhance criminal prosecution, and that advice intended to preserve the
option of a criminal prosecution does not inadvertently result in the Criminal Division's
directing or controlling the investigation using FISA searches and surveillance toward law
enforcement objectives." FISA Trial Court Opinion, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 625. The court's
modifications also added a new provision, which the government dubbed "the chaperone
requirement." It required that OIPR be invited to all consultations between the FBI and the
Criminal Division; if OIPR could not attend, "OIPR shall be apprised of the substance of
the consultations forthwith in writing so that the Court may be notified at the earliest
opportunity." Id. Finally, "to monitor compliance" with these requirements, the FISA Trial
Court adopted a "new administrative rule," designated Rule 11, which required all FISA
applications to "include informative descriptions of any ongoing criminal investigations of
FISA targets, as well as the substance of any consultations between the FBI and criminal
prosecutors at the Department of Justice or a United States Attorney's Office." Id. at 627.
335 Id. at 616.
336 id.
337 Id. at 623 (quoting 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h) and 1821(4)) (emphasis added by the FISA
Trial Court).
338 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
339 Id. at 623-24.
340 Id. at 622.
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4. The Department of Justice Creates a Route for Appealing the FISA
Trial Court's Opinion
The FISA Trial Court's May 2002 ruling was probably not
appealable. The court had ruled on a procedural motion by the
government-not on an application for a surveillance order. The
FISA authorizes appellate review only of "the denial of an[]
application" by the FISA Trial Court.34 1 Apparently to create a route
for appealing the May 2002, ruling, the government later applied for a
FISA surveillance order that did not include the "minimization
procedures" that the court had prescribed in the May 2002
decision.342 The FISA Trial Court granted the application only after
modifying it to include the procedures that it had prescribed in that
decision. 43 The court did the same thing when the government
applied to have the order renewed without the prior modifications.
344
The government then appealed on the ground that the court had
partially denied the original and renewal applications. The FISA
Court of Review took jurisdiction.
345
B. The FISA Court of Review's Opinion
On appeal, the government made two arguments of statutory
interpretation. It argued, first, that the original FISA did not impose
the "primary purpose" test; the test was invented by some lower
federal courts based on a supposed "dichotomy" between foreign• • 346
intelligence and law enforcement. Second, the government argued,
even if the original FISA imposed a primary purpose test, the Patriot
Act amendments eliminated that test.34 7 In addition to these statutory
arguments, the government argued that, as amended by the Patriot
Act, the FISA does not violate the Fourth Amendment, because the
Fourth Amendment does not, of its own force, compel the primary
purpose test for FISA surveillance. 348 Two amicus groups, the
341 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b).
342 Il re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 720-21 & n.4.
141 Id. at 720.
344 Id. at 720 n.4.34 5
1 d. at 721.
346 Id.; see also Brief for the United States at 8, In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717
(Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (No. 02-001) [hereinafter Principal Brief for U.S., In re
Sealed Case]; Supplemental Brief for the United States, at 1, In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d
717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (No. 02-001).
347 Principal Brief for U.S., In re Sealed Case, supra note 346, at 12-26.
348 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 722; see also Supplemental Brief for the United
States, supra note 346, at 17-23; Principal Brief for U.S., In re Sealed Case, supra note
346, at 26-32.
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American Civil Liberties Union and the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, argued that the FISA violates the Fourth
Amendment unless it is construed to impose the primary purpose
test.
349
The FISA Court of Review ruled mostly in favor of the
government. Its rulings on the original FISA; the FISA as amended by
the Patriot Act; and the Fourth Amendment are discussed separately
below.
1. The Court of Review's Analysis of the Original FISA
The Court of Review agreed with the government that the original
FISA did not impose the primary purpose test.350 The court
determined that the test rests on a dichotomy between gathering
foreign intelligence on one hand, and investigating and prosecuting
crime, on the other.3 51 The court found no basis for this dichotomy in
the text or the legislative history of the FISA. The court did, however,
construe the original FISA to restrict the government's use of FISA
surveillance for prosecutorial purposes.
The court found the text and legislative history of the original FISA
incompatible with the dichotomy on which the primary purpose test is
premised. Far from distinguishing foreign intelligence information
from evidence of crime, the text of the FISA defined "foreign
intelligence information" to "include[]3 evidence of crimes such as
espionage, sabotage [and] terrorism." Indeed, the definition as
applied to U.S. persons "is grounded on criminal conduct."
353
Moreover, the legislative history confirmed Congress's understanding
and intent that "foreign intelligence information" would include
"evidence of certain crimes":
[T]he term "foreign intelligence information," especially as
defined in subparagraphs (e)(1)(B) and (e)(1)(C), can include
evidence of certain crimes relating to sabotage, international
terrorism, or clandestine intelligence activities. With respect to
information concerning U.S. persons, foreign intelligence
information includes information necessary to protect against
clandestine intelligence activities of foreign powers or their agents.
Information about a spy's espionage activities obviously is within
349 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 722.
350 See id. at 723-24 (discussing purpose provision); id. at 730-31 (discussing
minimization procedures).
"' See id at 727.
352 Id. at 723.
353 Id. at 723.
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this definition, ancbil is most likely at the same time evidence of
criminal activities.
The Court of Review admitted that some legislative history
supported the primary purpose test. For example, a House report said
that FISA surveillances "are not primarily for the purpose of
gathering evidence of a crime. They are to obtain foreign intelligence
information." 355 The court found that this statement "was an
observation, not a proscription."
356
In addition to finding congressional recognition that foreign
intelligence information can include evidence of crime, the Court of
Review found support for the government's argument on the
instrumental connection between prosecution and foreign intelligence
purposes. The government argued that "arresting and prosecuting
terrorist agents of, or spies for, a foreign power may well be the best
technique to prevent them from successfully continuing their terrorist
or espionage activity." 357 The court determined that "Congress
actually anticipated" this argument "and explicitly approved it" in the
legislative history. A House report said:
How this information may be used to protect against clandestine
intelligence activities is not prescribed by the definition of foreign
intelligence information, although, of course, how it is used may
be affected by minimization procedures .... And no information
acquired pursuant to this bill could be used for other than lawful
purposes .... Obviously, use of "foreign intelligence information"
as evidence in a criminal trial is one way the Government can
lawfully protect against clandestine intelligence activities,
sabotage, and international terrorism. The bill, therefore, explicitly
recognizes that information which is evidence of crimes involving
[thee 8activities] can be sought, retained, and used pursuant to this
bill.
A Senate report was "on all fours" with the House report, 359 stating:
U.S. persons may be authorized targets, and the surveillance is part
of an investigative process often designed to protect against the
commission of serious crimes such as espionage, sabotage,
assassination, kidnaping, and terrorist acts committed by or on
behalf of foreign powers. Intelligence and criminal law
354 Id. at 724 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 49 (1978)).
355 Id. at 725 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 36 (1978)).356
id.
317 Id. at 724.
358 Id. at 724-25 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 49 (1978)) (emphasis in
original).3
19 Id at 725.
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enforcement tend to merge in this area . . . . [S]urveillances
conducted under [FISA] need not stop once conclusive evidence of
a crime is obtained, but instead may be extended longer where
protective rMsures other than arrest and prosecution are more
appropriate.
The court concluded from the text and legislative history of the
FISA that the original FISA "did not impose any restrictions on the
government's use of foreign intelligence information to prosecute
agents of foreign powers for foreign intelligence crimes." 36 1 The
court defined "foreign intelligence crimes" primarily to mean the
crimes to which the definition of "agent of a foreign power" (as
applied to U.S. persons) refers.
36 2
The court did not believe, however, that the original FISA allowed
the government to use FISA surveillance to get evidence of "non-
foreign intelligence crimes." 363 Acknowledging the government's
argument that even prosecution of non-foreign intelligence crimes by
foreign agents could "stop espionage or terrorism by putting [the
agent] in prison," 364 the court nonetheless concluded that the
government's argument "transgresses the original FISA." 36 5 The
court identified the specific FISA provision precluding the
government's argument as the provision requiring the government to
certify that "the purpose" of the proposed surveillance was "to obtain
foreign intelligence information." 366  House Report statements
confirmed the court's interpretation of the purpose provision, namely
that it served to:
prevent the practice of targeting, for example, a foreign power for
electronic surveillance when the true purpose of the surveillance is
to gather information about an individual for other than foreign
intelligence purposes. It is also designed to make explicit that the
sole purpose of such surveillance is to secure "foreign intelligence
information," as defined, and not to obtain some other type of
360 Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 95-701, at 10-11 (1978)) (alteration in original).
361 Id.
362 Id. at 723; see also id. at 723 n.10 (noting that "foreign intelligence crimes" referred
not only to crimes identified in the FISA definition of "agent of a foreign power," but also
to entering the United States under a false or fraudulent identity or on behalf of a foreign
power, see 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(C) (2000), "which will almost always involve a
crime"); cf id. at 736 (explaining that "foreign intelligence crimes" also include "ordinary
crimes ... inextricably intertwined with foreign intelligence crimes").
363 Id. at 735-36.
364 Id. at 736.
365 Id.
366 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act § 104(a)(7)(B), 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B)
(2000).
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information.
36 7
The court understood this passage to "prevent the government from
targeting a foreign agent when its 'true purpose' was to gain non-
foreign intelligence information, such as evidence of ordinary crimes
or scandals." 398 The court recognized that "ordinary crimes might be
inextricably intertwined with foreign intelligence crimes,"36  The
court explained that, accordingly, "ordinary crimes" could sometimes
be treated like "foreign intelligence crimes." "For example, if a group
of international terrorists were to engage in bank robberies in order to
finance the manufacture of a bomb, evidence of the bank robbery
should be treated just as evidence of the terrorist act itself."' 370 "But,"
the court added, "the FISA process cannot be used as a device to
investigate wholly unrelated ordinary crimes."' 371 Thus, the Court of
Review concluded that evidence of "wholly unrelated ordinary crime"
is not "foreign intelligence information," even if the government
intends to use the evidence to stop a foreign threat.
2. The Court of Review's Analysis of the Patriot Act
Amendments to the FISA
The court observed that after 9/11 the government sought an
amendment of the FISA "in order to avoid the requirement of meeting
the 'primary purpose' test."372 Congress responded in the Patriot Act
with "language which [Congress] perceived as not giving the
government quite the degree of modification it wanted." As
amended by the Patriot Act, the FISA required the government to
certify that "a significant purpose" (rather than merely "a purpose") of
proposed surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information.
The Court of Review found that Congress knew that the
"significant purpose" amendment would "relax[] a requirement that
the government show that its primary purpose was other than criminal
prosecution." 374 The court quoted Senator Patrick Leahy, then
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, who said, "This bill...
367 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 725 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 76
(1978)); see also id at 736.










break[s] down traditional barriers between law enforcement and
foreign intelligence . . .. 375 Specifically relevant to the primary
purpose test, Senator Leahy considered it "very problematic" that the
Patriot Act would "make it easier for the FBI to use a FISA wiretap..
. where the government's most important motivation for the wiretap is
for use in a criminal prosecution." 376 The Court of Review also cited
the floor statement of Senator Dianne Feinstein, member of both the
Senate Intelligence and Judiciary Committees, where she proclaimed
that the Patriot Act would make it "easier to collect foreign
intelligence ...under the [FISA]." 3 77 Elaborating on the need for
such change, Senator Feinstein explained:
Under current law, authorities can proceed with surveillance under
FISA only if the primary purpose of the investigation is to collect
foreign intelligence . . . .Determining which purpose is the
"primary" purpose of the investigation can be difficult .... Rather
than forcing law enforcement to decide which purpose is primary,
law enforcement or foreign intelligence gathering, this bill strikes a
new balance. It will now require that a "significant" purpose of the
investigation must be foreign intelligence gathering to proceed
with surveillance under FISA. The effect of this provision will be
to make it easier for law enforcement to obtain a FISA search or
surveillance warrant for those cases where the subject of the
surveillance is both a potential source of val Able intelligence and
the potential target of a criminal prosecution.
Additionally, the court quoted Patriot Act opponent and Judiciary
Committee member Senator Russell Feingold, who warned that the
"significant purpose" amendment would let the government get a
FISA surveillance order "even if the primary purpose is criminal
investigation." 379 In Senator Feingold's view, this violated the Fourth
Amendment. 380 To the FISA Court of Review, these statements,
combined with the addition of section 1806(k), which expressly
sanctioned coordination between law enforcement and foreign
375 Id. (quoting 147 CONG. REC. S10992 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Leahy)).
376 Id. at 733 (quoting 147 CONG. REC. S10593 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of
Sen. Leahy)).
377 Id. at 732 (quoting 147 CONG. REC. S10591 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of
Sen. Feinstein)).
378 Id. at 732-33 (quoting 147 CONG. REC. S10591 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement
of Sen. Feinstein)).
379 Id. at 733 (quoting 147 CONG. REC. S11021 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of
Sen. Feingold)).
380 Id. (quoting 147 CONG. REC. S11021 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Feingold)).
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intelligence officials, proved that "the Patriot Act amendments [to the
original FISA] clearly disapprove the primary purpose 
test."38 1
Having held that, as amended by the Patriot Act, the FISA allowed
the government to use FISA surveillance for the "primary purpose" of
prosecution, the Court of Review's reasoning then took a somewhat
surprising turn:
[A]s a matter of straightforward logic, if a FISA application can be
granted even if "foreign intelligence" is only a significant-not a
primary-purpose, another purpose can be primary. One other
legitimate purpose that could exist is to prosecute a target for a
foreign intelligence crime. We therefore believe the Patriot Act
amply supports the government's . . .argument [that the Patriot
Act eliminated the primary purpose test] but, paradoxically, the
Patriot Act would seem to conflict with the government's . ..
argument [that the dichotomy between foreign intelligence and law
enforcement is false] because by using the term "significant
purpose," the Act now implies that another Milpose is to be
distinguished from a foreign intelligence purpose.
Thus, the court determined that the Patriot Act's "significant purpose"
amendment caused the FISA, for the first time, to distinguish between
foreign intelligence and law enforcement:
In short, even though we agree that the original FISA did not
contemplate the "false dichotomy," the Patriot Act actually did,
which makes it no longer false. The addition of the word
"significant" to section 1804(a)(7)(B) imposed a requirement that
the government have a measurable foreign intelligence purpose,
other tV just criminal prosecution of even foreign intelligence
crimes.
The court believed that this change reflected a broader change-
namely, that it allowed FISA judges, for the first time, to review the
government's intended use of information obtained by FISA
surveillance:
Although section 1805(a)(5) [providing for judicial review of the
certifications in an application for FISA surveillance] .. may well
have been intended to authorize the FISA court to review only the
question whether the information sought was a type of foreign
intelligence information, in light of the significant purpose
amendment of section 1804 it seems section 1805 must be
interpreted as giving the FISA court the authority to review the
381 Id. at 734.
382
1d.
113 Id. at 735.
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government's purpose in seeking the information.
384
This reasoning left the Court of Review with "something of an
analytic conundrum. ' 385 On the one hand, the Patriot Act did not
amend the FISA definition of "foreign intelligence information."
386
With respect to U.S. persons, that definition therefore continues to
include much information that is evidence of a crime.3 87 On the other
hand, the court recognized that Congress "accepted the dichotomy
between foreign intelligence and law enforcement by adopting the
significant purpose test."' 388 To resolve the conundrum, the Court
articulated three principles for FISA surveillance orders targeting U.S.
persons.
First, the government can use FISA surveillance for the primary
purpose of investigating and prosecuting "foreign intelligence
crimes." 3 89 This first principle reflects that Congress intended the
Patriot Act to relax the judicially developed "primary purpose"
test.
390
The second principle qualifies the first principle: The government
cannot get a FISA surveillance order if its sole purpose is to gather
evidence for a prosecution, even the prosecution of foreign
intelligence crimes. In the court's view, the FISA as amended by
the Patriot Act "excludes from the purpose of gaining foreign
intelligence information a sole objective of criminal prosecution." 2
Accordingly, the court distinguishes the purpose of obtaining foreign
intelligence information from the purpose of obtaining evidence for
criminal prosecution. 393 Granting the difference, if the government's
sole purpose is to build a prosecution-even the prosecution of a
foreign intelligence crime-the government cannot certify, as the
FISA requires, that a "significant" purpose is obtaining foreign
intelligence. The Court of Review explained, "The addition of the
word 'significant' to section 1804(a)(7)(B) imposed a requirement
3 8 4 id.
385
1d
3 8 6 
id
387 See id.; see also supra notes 98-102, 129 and accompanying text (discussing the




390 See id. at 734.
391 See id. at 735.
392 id.
393 See id. ("Congress accepted the dichotomy between foreign intelligence and law
enforcement.").
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that the government have a measurable foreign intelligence purpose,
other than just criminal prosecution of even foreign intelligence
crimes."
394
The court did not think this second principle would "make much
practical difference":
[W]hen [the government] commences an electronic surveillance of
a foreign agent, typically it will not have decided whether to
prosecute the agent (whatever may be the subjective intent of the
investigators or lawyers who initiate an investigation). So long as
the government entertains a realistic option of dealing with the
agent other than throt* criminal prosecution, it satisfies the
significant purpose test.
The court also reiterated, however, that if "the government's sole
objective [is] merely to gain evidence of past criminal conduct-even
foreign intelligence crimes-to punish the [foreign] agent rather than
halt ongoing espionage or terrorist activity, the application [for FISA
surveillance] should be denied."
396
The third principle is that the government cannot get a FISA
surveillance order if it has "a primary objective of prosecuting an
agent for a non-foreign intelligence crime."3 97 The court traced this
principle to the original FISA. 39 8 The court read the legislative history
of the original FISA as precluding the use of FISA when the
government's "'true purpose' [is] to gain non-foreign intelligence
information-such as evidence of ordinary crimes or scandals."
399
The court interpreted the term "foreign intelligence information"
generally to exclude "evidence of ordinary crime," even if, as the
government argued, the prosecution of such crime would serve a
foreign intelligence purpose such as "stopping espionage or terrorism
by putting an agent of a foreign power in prison."40 0 In the court's
view, the original FISA permitted the government to use FISA-
acquired evidence to prosecute "ordinary crime" only if the• 40 1
government "inadvertently came upon" the evidence. The court




397 Id. at 736.
398 Id. (holding that government's interpretation permitting prosecution of even non-
foreign intelligence crimes so long as the prosecution served a foreign intelligence purpose




acknowledged that, by amending the original FISA's purpose
provision, the Patriot Act arguably permits the government to use
FISA surveillance for the primary purpose of prosecuting non-foreign
intelligence crimes as long as the government also has some other
purpose in mind that is "significant" and related to collection of
foreign intelligence. 4 02 The court dismissed that, however, as "an
anomalous reading of the amendment."
40 3
The court did not define the "non-foreign intelligence crimes" that,
under its third principle, the government cannot use FISA surveillance
for the primary (much less the sole) purpose of obtaining. 404 The
court suggested, though, that the term excludes both what it had
previously defined as "foreign intelligence crimes," as well as
otherwise "ordinary" crimes that, in a particular case, are
"inextricably intertwined with foreign intelligence crimes":
40 5
For example, if a group of international terrorists were to engage in
bank robberies in order to finance the manufacture of a bomb,
evidence of the bank robbery should be treated just as evidence of
the terrorist act itself. But the FISA process cannot b 6used as a
device to investigate wholly unrelated ordinary crimes.
The Court of Review realized that its decision required FISA
judges to review the government's purpose in applying for FISA
surveillance orders, as courts did under the "primary purpose" test.
Accordingly, the court cautioned:
[T]he government's purpose as set forth in a section 1804(a)(7)(B)
certification is to be judged by the national security official's
articulation and not by a FISA court inquiry into the origins of an
investigation nor an examination of the personnel involved. It is up
to the Director of the FBI, who typically certifies, to determine the
government's national security purpose, as4o pproved by the
Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General.
In particular, the court warned that a FISA judge should not gauge the
government's purpose "by seeking to inquire into which Justice
Department officials were instigators of an investigation." 408 Instead,
"the relevant purpose is that of those senior officials in the Executive
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national security needs."
40 9
3. The Court of Review's Fourth Amendment Ruling
The Court of Review's statutory interpretation raised a
constitutional issue. Specifically, the Court interpreted the Patriot Act
to replace the judicially created "primary purpose" test with a
"significant purpose" test. Other courts, however, had construed the
FISA to incorporate the primary purpose test as a Fourth Amendment
requirement for surveillance under the FISA to be valid.410 Having
construed the Patriot Act to eliminate that test from the FISA, the
Court of Review addressed whether, so construed, the FISA violates
the Fourth Amendment.
411
The court held that the FISA satisfies the Fourth Amendment. 4 12 In
so holding, the court found it unnecessary to resolve the case under
the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. Looking instead to the
reasonableness clause of that Amendment, the court held that
electronic surveillance under the FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act
and as interpreted by the Court of Review, is "reasonable."
413
4. Summary of Court of Review's Opinion; Description of That
Court s Disposition of the Case; Later Proceedings in the Case
Overall, the FISA Court of Review's decision produced a favorable
outcome for the federal government. True, the court did interpret the
Patriot Act's amendment of the FISA to put two restrictions on FISA
surveillance: The government cannot use it (1) for the sole purpose of
investigating or prosecuting crime, even foreign intelligence crimes;
or (2) for the primary (or sole) purpose of investigating or prosecuting
non-foreign intelligence related crimes. However, the Court of
Review interpreted the Patriot Act to replace the primary purpose test
with a less demanding "significant purpose" test. So interreted, the
court found that the FISA satisfies the Fourth Amendment.
4
409 id.
410 See supra notes 210-23 and accompanying text.
411 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 719 n. 1. Proceedings concerning applications for FISA
surveillance orders are exparte. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.412 See id. at 736-46.
413 See id. at 742-46; see also Principal Brief for the United States at 30, In re Sealed
Case, 310 F.3d 717 ("Even if Truong was correctly decided, and the Constitution requires
a 'primary' intelligence purpose for unilateral Executive Branch surveillance, a
'significant' intelligence purpose for FISA surveillance conducted with the prior approval
of an Article III court would be reasonable and therefore constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.").
414 The FISA Court of Review took three steps to dispose of the case: (1) It reversed the
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The Court of Review's decision became the final decision in the
case. The federal government did not seek review in the U.S.
Supreme Court and could not have done so, having won the
judgment.415 Supreme Court review was sought, however, by two of
the groups participating as amici curiae in the Court of Review, joined
by other groups. They moved in the Supreme Court for leave to
intervene and to file a petition for a writ of certiorari; 4 16 this wassummarily denied in March 2003.417
III. ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY ISSUES AND THEIR TREATMENT BY THE
FISA COURTS
The FISA Court of Review came to an admittedly "paradoxical"•• 418
conclusion. The Patriot Act was supposed to expand the
government's power to combat international terrorism and other
foreign threats. The Court of Review, however, construed the Act to
restrict that power by creating, for the first time, a statutory basis for
distinguishing between foreign intelligence purposes and law
enforcement purposes. According to the court, it was the Patriot Act,
not the original FISA, in which "Congress accepted the dichotomy
between foreign intelligence and law enforcement. 4 19 This Part of
the article analyzes that interpretation, building on the explication in
FISA Trial Court's orders "to the extent they imposed conditions on the grant of the
government's applications"; (2) it remanded the case "with instructions to grant the
[government's] applications [for FISA surveillance] as submitted"; and (3) it vacated the
FISA Trial Court's "Rule I." In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 746; see also supra note 334
and accompanying text (describing Rule 11).
415 The FISA authorizes U.S. Supreme Court review if the FISA Court of Review
"determines that [a government] . . . application [for an order approving FISA
surveillance] was properly denied [by the FISA Trial Court]." That situation did not occur
in In re Sealed Case, where the FISA Court of Review determined that the government's
applications for FISA surveillance orders were improperly denied (in part) by the FISA
Trial Court. Moreover, the government won the judgment in the FISA Court of Review.
That court entered a judgment reversing the FISA Trial Court judgment and remanding the
case with instructions to grant the government's applications. True, the FISA Court of
Review articulated two restrictions on the government's use of FISA surveillance. See
supra notes 391-406 and accompanying text. Since the portion of the court's decision
doing so was not necessary to the judgment, however, it is dicta and, as such, is not subject
to Supreme Court review at the instance of the government as the judgment winner. See,
e.g., Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956) ("This Court... reviews judgments,
not statements in opinions.").
416 See Petition of American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU] et al. for Leave to Intervene
and Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, In re Sealed Case, available at
http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id=l 1838 (last visited November 23, 2004);
Petition of ACLU et al. for a Writ of Certiorari, In re Sealed Case, available at
http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cftn?id= 1836 (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
417 American Civil Liberties Union v. United States, 538 U.S. 920 (2003).
418 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 734.4 19 Id. at 735.
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Part I of the relevant statutory language and the identification in Part
II of some of the relevant legislative history. This Part concludes that
the Court of Review incorrectly interpreted both the original FISA
and the FISA as amended by the Patriot Act. But so did the FISA
Trial Court when it interpreted the FISA, as amended by the Patriot
Act, to retain the primary purpose test, and so did the federal courts of
appeals that interpreted the original FISA to impose the primary
purpose test. This article respectfully contends that all of this
precedent is mistaken.
First, Section A below explains why these issues of statutory
interpretation are important. In a nutshell, they are important because
the meaning of FISA is intertwined with the Fourth Amendment
issue, and Congress is fast approaching a deadline for deciding which
version of the FISA, if any, will stay on the books. Furthermore,
whatever Congress does (or fails to do), courts in current and future
prosecutions will have to address the legality of the surveillance that
is occurring under the current version of FISA and is producing
evidence of crime.
Section B analyzes the original FISA. The analysis shows that the
original FISA did not impose the primary purpose test. The original
FISA did, however, require the government to intend to use foreign
intelligence information obtained under FISA surveillance for one or
more of five foreign intelligence purposes specified in the FISA's
definition of "foreign intelligence information." Thus, the FISA Court
of Review was right-and other federal courts of appeals (as well as
the FISA Trial Court) have been wrong-in deciding that the original
FISA did not impose the primary purpose test. The FISA Court of
Review was wrong, however, in interpreting the original FISA not to
impose any limit on the government's use of foreign intelligence
information to prosecute "foreign intelligence crimes." In short, the
original FISA was more restrictive of FISA surveillance than the
Court of Review determined.
In contrast, Section C concludes that, as amended by the Patriot
Act, the FISA is less restrictive than the Court of Review determined.
The current FISA does not impose either of the restrictions that the
Court of Review discerned. Thus, the FISA allows the government to
use FISA surveillance for the sole purpose of prosecuting a foreign
intelligence crime. Furthermore, the government can use FISA
surveillance for the primary (or sole) purpose of prosecuting
"ordinary crime." Prosecutorial use of FISA surveillance is
permissible as long as the government intends the prosecution to
The Patriot Act
serve a foreign intelligence purpose.
A. Importance of Statutory Rulings in In re Sealed Case
The Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee called the FISA
Trial Court's decision in In re Sealed Case "one of the most important
legal opinions in the last 20 years of national security law" when
opening a hearing devoted to the case.420  The Court of Review's
decision reversing the FISA Trial Court is likewise a "landmark"• • 421
opinion addressing "one of the most important" provisions in the
Patriot Act.422 The decisions have not received much scholarly
commentary, however, and most scholarly commentary that does
exist focuses on the Fourth Amendment issues posed by FISA
surveillance, rather than the statutory issues.423 The statutory issues
deserve attention, however, for three reasons.
First, the statutory issues affect the existence and nature of the
Fourth Amendment issues. The central Fourth Amendment issue is
whether the Fourth Amendment requires FISA surveillance to meet
the "primary purpose" test of Truong.424 That issue arises, however,
only if the FISA does not of its own force impose the test. 425 Thus,
the FISA Trial Court did not address the Fourth Amendment issue
420 Senate Hearing on the Patriot Act in Practice, supra note 297, (statement of Sen.
Leahy), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/member statement.cfm?id=398&wit id=50; see also Senators
Patrick Leahy, Charles Grassley, and Arlen Specter, Interim Report on FBI Oversight in
the 107th Cong. by the Sen. Judiciary Comm. at § I.B.1 (Feb. 2003) (describing FISA
Trial Court opinion as a "landmark legal opinion"), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress.2003_rpt/fisa.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
421 September 11 and the Imperative of Reform in the US. Intelligence Community:
Additional Views of Sen. Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman, Senate Select Comm. on
Intelligence (Dec. 10, 2002), at 47 (describing FISA Court of Review's decision as "a
landmark decision"), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/shelby.pdf) (last visited
Nov. 23, 2004); Dan Eggen, Broad US. Wiretap Powers Upheld; Secret Court Lifts Bar
on Terror Suspect Surveillance, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2002, at Al (reporting civil
libertarians' description of Court of Review's decision as a "tremendous setback").
422 Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 1626.
423 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (summarizing relevant commentary).
424 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736-37; 147 CONG. REC. S10597 (daily ed.
Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (stating that Patriot Act's "significant
purpose" amendment "may well make the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment").
421 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S10558 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) ("[E]ven the Department [of Justice] concedes that the court's [sic] may impose a
constitutional requirement of 'primary purpose' based on the appellate court decisions...
over the past 20 years."); 147 CONG. REC. S10589 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of
Sen. Edwards) (stating that, while "significant purpose" language was a "substantial
improvement" of administration's proposal, the FISA Trial Court "will still need to be
careful to enter FISA orders only when the requirements of the Constitution as well as the
statute are satisfied").
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because it construed the FISA to impose the primary purpose test.
426
By the same token, the FISA Court of Review reached the Fourth
Amendment issue only because it did not construe the FISA, of its
own force, to impose the primary purpose test.42 7 Although the Court
of Review did not interpret the FISA to impose the primary purpose
test, the court did interpret the FISA to impose some restrictions on
the government's use of FISA surveillance for prosecution428
purposes. If those restrictions rest on flawed statutory
interpretation, as this article contends, the Fourth Amendment
analysis of the statute would change because the meaning of the
statute would change.4 29 In short, the Fourth Amendment validity of
surveillance under the FISA depends on what the FISA means.
Because the Fourth Amendment issue has great importance, so do the
statutory issues.
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The statutory issues are also timely in light of the government's
current need to fight international terrorism and other foreign threats.
This point should not be overstated: The Court of Review's decision
restricts FISA surveillance much less than did the primary purpose
test. Even so, the restrictions operate in two situations. First, the
government cannot use FISA surveillance for the sole purpose of
getting evidence to prosecute even foreign intelligence crimes such as
those arising from international terrorism. 4 3  Under this restriction,
for example, after the 9/11 attacks the government could not have
gotten a FISA order solely to gather evidence of Jose Padilla's past
426 In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 614 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 2002) ("The question before the Court... raises
no constitutional questions that need to be decided.").
427 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736 ("Having determined that FISA, as amended, does
not oblige the government to demonstrate to the FISA court that its primary purpose in
considering electronic surveillance is not criminal prosecution, we are obliged to consider
whether the statute as amended is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.").
428 See supra notes 391-406 and accompanying text.
429 See infra notes 457-60, 474-520 and accompanying text.
430 In commenting on a draft of this article, Professors Peter Raven-Hansen and Kim
Lane Scheppele incisively observed that the statutory analysis presented here must be
informed by consideration of the constitutional issues. This article's focus on the statutory
issue does not reflect disagreement with that observation. Indeed, the analysis in this Part
of the article discusses at some length the constitutional concerns that influenced various
aspects of the original FISA and the Patriot Act provision amending the original FISA's
purpose provision. The article's focus on statutory issues reflects my views that (1) in
addressing the constitutional issues, the courts and commentators have not paid enough
attention to the statutory issues; and (2) careful analysis of the statutory issues may
usefully inform analysis of the constitutional issues as well as Congress's consideration of
whether the relevant Patriot Act provision, Section 218, should be allowed to sunset. See
infra notes 436-37 and accompanying text (discussing sunset).
431 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2004) (defining "international terrorism").
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involvement in those attacks. 432 The government would need a future-
oriented objective, as well, such as the prevention of future acts of
terrorism. The government usually would have no trouble articulating
such an objective, which is why the Court of Review thought this
restriction did not pose much of a practical problem. 433 The restriction
could, however, complicate the process for getting FISA surveillance
for some investigations and lead to litigation over the government's
purposes for seeking FISA surveillance orders. Under an additional
limitation articulated by the Court of Review, the government cannot
use FISA surveillance if its "primary objective" is to prosecute
foreign agents for "ordinary crimes". "wholly unrelated" to foreign
intelligence. 434  Thus, for example, the government could not use
FISA surveillance for the primary (much less the sole) purpose of
prosecuting a suspected terrorist of cocaine dealing if the cocaine
dealing served only to support the suspect's own drug habit and not to
fund her terrorist activity. The government apparently could not do
this even if it could show that incapacitating the terrorist advanced
foreign intelligence purposes by, for example, thwarting a terrorist
attack.
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Finally, the statutory rulings will require Congress's attention when
it debates reauthorization of the Patriot Act. The provision in the
Patriot Act amending the "purpose" provision of the original FISA, as
well as the provision in the Patriot Act adding a coordination
provision to the FISA, sunsets on December 31, 2005.436 Congress
has the options of(l) doing nothing, i.e., allowing the sunset to occur,
in which case the original version of FISA's purpose provision comes
back into force; (2) renewing the current Patriot Act provisions that
amend the original FISA's purpose provision and that expressly
432 See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715-16 (2004) (describing Padilla's
arrest); see also, e.g., Richard B. Schmitt, Government Says Padilla Plotted High-Rise
Attacks; Allegations are released as the Supreme Court prepares to rule on his arrest and
detention, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2004, at Al (reporting government's allegation that, "in
addition to wanting to plant a 'dirty bomb,' [Padilla] also plotted with Al Qaeda to blow
up high-rise apartment buildings in the United States.").
433 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 735 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
434 Id at 736.
43I ld. at 735-36 (rejecting government's argument that "even prosecutions of non-
foreign intelligence crimes are consistent with a purpose of gaining foreign intelligence
information so long as the government's objective is to stop espionage or terrorism by
putting an agent of a foreign power in prison," concluding that this argument "transgresses
the original FISA").
436 Patriot Act, § 224(a), 115 Stat. 295 (2001) (providing that, with certain exceptions,
provisions including § 218 of the Patriot Act, which amended 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B)
to replace "the purpose" with "a significant purpose," expire on Dec. 31, 2005),
reproduced as note after 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2004).
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authorize coordination of law enforcement and intelligence activities;
or (3) doing something new, i.e., clarifying or substantively changing
the statutory law on the permissible purposes of FISA surveillance.
Congress should base its choice on "a full and informed debate."
437
As to the first option, restoration of the original FISA would
immediately create a split among the federal courts of appeals. As
discussed above, several circuits interpret the original FISA to impose
the primary purpose test.438 The FISA Court of Review rejected that
interpretation. This conflict could produce odd results. The Court
of Review's decision binds the FISA Trial Court judges who rule on
applications for FISA surveillance because the Court of Review can
review those judges' decisions." 0 In contrast, the Court of Review's
decision does not bind federal district courts in which defendants are
prosecuted with FISA-acquired evidence, because those courts'
decisions are not subject to review by the Court of Review.
44 1
Consequently, a FISA judge could approve FISA surveillance for the
primary purpose of prosecution, only to have the evidence suppressed
if tendered for prosecution in a federal district whose circuit interprets
the original FISA to impose the primary purpose test.
44 2
The second option, reauthorization of the Patriot Act's amendments
to the original FISA, would leave the law unclear and unsettled. The
FISA Court of Review has interpreted the FISA, as amended by the
Patriot Act, to eliminate the primary purpose test while still putting
certain, less stringent restrictions on the government's use of FISA
surveillance.4 4 3 As mentioned previously, that interpretation binds
only the FISA Trial Court judges." Therefore, courts in which the
437 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 394.
438 See supra notes 210-25 and accompanying text.
439 See supra note 427 and accompanying text; see also Stephanie Komblum, Note,
Winning the Battle While Losing the War: Ramifications of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review's First Decision, 27 SEATILE U. L. REV. 623, 650 (2003)
(observing that FISA Court of Review's interpretation of the original FISA "discredited"
circuit precedent construing original FISA to impose "primary purpose" test).
440 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 721 (discussing jurisdiction); supra notes 75-80 &
341-45 (same).
441 See generally Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court
Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994) (exploring basis for rule that inferior courts
must follow precedent of superior courts that can review the inferior courts' decisions).
442 As Bob Pikowsky observed iimcommenting on a draft of this article, however, if a
later court held that a FISA surveillance order should not have issued, the court still might
admit evidence under the good faith exception. See, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340,
349-60 (1987) (using exception to uphold evidence obtained under statute later held
unconstitutional).
443 See supra notes 372-409 and accompanying text.
4" See supra notes 440-41 and accompanying text.
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government is prosecuting defendants using FISA-acquired evidence
remain free to interpret the Patriot Act amendments differently from
the FISA Court of Review. They might, for example, interpret the
Patriot Act to preserve the primary purpose test.4 45 Alternatively, they
could (and, as this article argues, should) interpret the Patriot Act to
free the government from the restrictions on prosecutorial use of
FISA surveillance that were discerned by the FISA Court of Review.
Thus, if Congress simply reauthorizes the current Patriot Act
provisions, the statutory issues will endure, and their proper
resolution is likely to divide the federal courts.
44 6
The third option, congressional rethinking, can avoid the potential
for conflict and uncertainty in the courts on the meaning of the current
statutes, but brings its own uncertainty. Consideration of the third
option involves at least two issues: (1) whether existing law needs
clarification; and (2) if so, how it should be clarified. The FISA Trial
Court interpreted the FISA, even as amended by the Patriot Act, to
impose the primary purpose test, but the FISA Court of Review
disagreed. Congress could clarify the FISA provisions and, in the
process, legislatively ratify either court's interpretation or go in a new
direction.
The next two sections of this article offer analysis of these statutory
provisions in the hope of shedding light on Congress's options. The
analysis is meant not only to inform the debate over the Patriot Act's
reauthorization, but also to guide the federal courts. Whatever
Congress's decision, the federal courts in current and future
prosecutions will be confronted with evidence of crime obtained in
FISA surveillance under the current version of the statute. This is
inevitable because FISA surveillance has increased sharply after
9/1 1,44 7 as have the number of federal statutes criminalizing various
acts of terrorism. The defendants in future prosecutions can challenge
445 See 147 CONG. REC. S 11003-04 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(stating that administration's original proposal "raised constitutional concerns," and that,
under the compromise version providing for "significant purpose" standard, courts would
have to decide "how far" the government could go); Petition of ACLU et al. for a Writ of
Certiorari, In re Sealed Case, supra note 416, at i (framing as one of questions presented:
"Does the [Patriot Act] authorize the government to conduct surveillance under the [FISA]
even where the government's primary purpose is law enforcement rather than foreign
intelligence?").
446 A bill was introduced in the last Congress that would have repealed the Patriot Act's
sunset provision, making all of the Act's provisions permanent. See S. 2476, 108th Cong.
(2004), reproduced at 150 CONG. REC. S6099 (daily ed. May 21, 2004).
447 See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Orders 1979-2003, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa-stats.html
(last visited Nov. 23, 2004).
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the legality of the FISA surveillance on both statutory and
constitutional grounds. 44 8 The statutory issues, therefore, will not go
away anytime soon.
B. Statutory Analysis of the Original FISA
As discussed above, the original FISA returns to force if the Patriot
Act's amendments to the FISA sunset.449 In that event, there will be a
conflict in the federal courts on the "primary purpose" issue.
4 50
Several federal circuits interpreted the original FISA to prohibit the
government from using foreign intelligence information obtained
through FISA surveillance for the "primary purpose" of investigating
and prosecuting crime. Those courts relied on the original FISA's
purpose provision.45 1  The FISA Trial Court adopted the primary
purpose test while tying it, not to the purpose provision, but to the
FISA provisions on minimization procedures. In contrast, the FISA
Court of Review rejected the primary e test as an interpretation
of any of those statutory provisions. It held that the original FISA
"clearly did not preclude or limit the government's use or proposed
use of foreign intelligence information . . . in a criminal
prosecution." 4 4 However, it interpreted the term "foreign intelligence
information" to exclude "evidence of ordinary crime" unless it is
"inextricably intertwined with foreign intelligence crimes."
455
This section concludes that none of these courts interpreted the
original FISA correctly. The original FISA's purpose provision did
not impose the primary purpose test, as the test has been articulated
by the federal courts.45 Contrary to the FISA Court of Review's
interpretation, however, the original FISA's purpose provision did
"limit the government's . . . proposed use of foreign intelligence
information . . . in a criminal prosecution. 4 5 7 Specifically, the
original FISA's purpose provision required that the government
448 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)-(g).
449 See supra note 436 and accompanying text.
450 See supra notes 438-42 and accompanying text.
41 See supra notes 210-23 and accompanying text.
452 See supra notes 335-40 and accompanying text.
453 See supra notes 350-62 and accompanying text.
4541In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 727 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
455 d at 736 (suggesting, for example, that the government can use FISA surveillance to
investigate bank robbery if the bank robberies are undertaken "in order to finance the
manufacture of a bomb").
456 See infra notes 469-73 and accompanying text.
4571n re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 727.
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intend to use the information obtained through FISA surveillance to
achieve one or more of five foreign intelligence purposes identified in
the FISA's definition of "foreign intelligence information."'4 58 Thus,
the purpose provision prohibited the government from intending to
use FISA-acquired information solely for prosecution as an end in
itself. That prohibition applied whether or not the anticipated
prosecution was for what the Court of Review called "foreign
intelligence crimes." 459 By the same token, the original FISA's
purpose provision allowed the government to use FISA-acquired
information for a prosecution that served a foreign intelligence
460purpose, even the prosecution of ordinary cnmes.
The FISA Trial Court erred in deriving the primary purpose test461
from the FISA's minimization procedures. There is a connection
between the FISA's purpose provision and the FISA's minimization
procedures: the purpose provision focuses on the government's
intended use of information obtained under a proposed FISA
surveillance order, whereas the minimization procedures focus on the
government's actual use of the information so obtained.462 And just
as the purpose provision allows the government to seek a FISA
surveillance order for the purpose of getting evidence for a
prosecution, the minimization procedures generally allow the
information to be actually used for that purpose. The main
difference between the scope of intended prosecutions for which a
FISA surveillance order can be obtained and the scope of
prosecutions that actually may be undertaken is that the latter can
include even prosecutions that are not intended to serve a foreign
intelligence purpose. 464 In short, the government cannot get a FISA
surveillance order for the purpose of pursuing prosecution as an end
in itself.46 5 But if surveillance under the order nonetheless produces
evidence of crime, the government can use that evidence for
458 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2003) (defining "foreign intelligence information"); infra
notes 474-82 and accompanying text (explaining interpretation summarized in the text
accompanying this note).
459 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 723 & n.10; cf id. at 736 (apparently amending
definition of "foreign intelligence crime" to include "ordinary crimes . . . inextricably
intertwined with foreign intelligence crimes").
46
0 Id. at 73 5-36.
461 See supra notes 335-40 and accompanying text (describing FISA Trial Court's
reliance on FISA provisions on minimization procedures to impose primary purpose test).
462 See infra notes 476-82, 601-04, & 667-69 and accompanying text.463 See infra notes 596-604 and accompanying text.
464 See infra notes 537 & 604 and accompanying text.
465 See infra notes 537 & 604 and accompanying text.
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prosecution regardless of whether the prosecution serves a foreign
intelligence purpose.4 66 The government does not need to ignore
evidence of ordinary crime that falls into its lap.
1. The Purpose Provision of the Original FISA
The original FISA's purpose provision limited the government's
intended use of FISA-acquired foreign intelligence information for
prosecution purposes. That limit, however, was not accurately
captured by the judicially developed primary purpose test. Properly
interpreted, the purpose provision allowed the government to
undertake FISA surveillance for the primary purpose-even the sole
purpose-of getting information for a prosecution of any type of
crime, on one condition: the government had to intend the prosecution
to serve one or more of five foreign intelligence purposes identified in
the FISA. This restriction emerges from both the text and legislative
history of the original FISA.
a. Text of the Original FISA's Purpose Provision
i. The Primary Purpose Test s Defective Textual Interpretation
The purpose provision required a high-ranking intelligence
official-typically the Director of the FBI (for surveillance targeting
U.S. persons)467-to certify that "the purpose of the [proposed]
surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information. The
primary purpose case law's reliance on this provision conflicts with
the text of the provision in two ways.
First, the text of the purpose provision refers to "the purpose," not
"the primary purpose." The statute's use of "the purpose" implies that
the sole purpose, not just the primary purpose, be to obtain foreign
intelligence information. If that implication is accepted, a requirement
that the government certify to the "primary purpose" of the proposed
surveillance is more lenient than a requirement that the government
certify to "the purpose" of the proposed surveillance. In this sense, the
primary purpose precedent read the purpose provision more favorably
to the government than it could have (and arguably should have) been
read. Perhaps that is why the Department of Justice acquiesced in the
466 See infra note 604 and accompanying text.
467 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
468 FISA § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2003).
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469.-primary purpose test; it was more generous than a "sole purpose"
test. 4 7 Certainly a strict reading of "the purpose" phrase, in isolation,
supported a sole purpose test rather than a primary purpose test.
4 71
The primary purpose case law has a second, more fundamental
textual problem. The problem lies in the discrepancy between (1) the
purpose about which the provision explicitly speaks and (2) the
purpose with which the primary purpose test is concerned. The text of
the FISA requires the government to have the purpose of obtaininj a
particular type of information: foreign intelligence information.
72
The text does not, on its face, address what purpose the government
must have for wanting that information. Thus, the purpose provision
is explicit about the type of information that the government intends
to obtain, but not about the government's intended use of that
information. The government must certify that the purpose of
proposed surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information,
and not some other type of information. As explained in Part I, there
is a difference between having the purpose of obtaining a thing and
having the purpose of putting that thing to a particular use. To
repeat the analogy proposed in Part I, if I certify to you that I want to
borrow $20,000 from you to buy a car, my certification concerns the
type of thing I want to obtain, but not how I intend to use that thing.
The primary purpose precedent ignores the difference between, on
one hand, having the purpose of obtaining a particular type of
information and, on the other hand, having the purpose of making a
particular use of that information.
ii. The FISA Court of Review's Erroneous Conclusion That the
Original FISA's Purpose Provision Did Not Limit the Government's
Intended Prosecutorial Use of Foreign Intelligence Information
The FISA Court of Review did not make the same mistake that the
primary purpose case law did, but instead erred in a different way.
The Court of Review recognized the difference between the purpose
469 See supra notes 229-62 and accompanying text (discussing Department's
implementation of primary purpose test).
470 See United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 915 (4th Cir. 1980) (describing
defendants' argument that "the 'primarily' test does not go far enough to protect privacy
interests" and that "the government should be able to avoid the warrant requirement only
when the surveillance is conducted 'solely' for foreign policy reasons.").
471 See, e.g., Scheppele, supra note 3, at 1037 (asserting that original FISA's purpose
provision "limited FISA warrants to instances where the government could assert ... that
the surveillance was undertaken exclusively for national security purposes.").
472 See FISA § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2003).
473 See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
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of obtaining a particular type of information and the intended use of
the information, saying that the FISA apparently required a judge
reviewing a government application for proposed surveillance to
determine "whether the information sought is actually foreign
intelligence information, not the government's proposed use of that
information." 474  Because FISA's purpose provision explicitly
addressed the purpose of obtaining a particular type of information
and did not explicitly address the government's intended use of that
information, the Court of Review concluded that the FISA "clearly
did not preclude or limit the government's use or proposed use of
foreign intelligence information . . . in a criminal prosecution."
4 7 5
However, the court went too far in concluding that the FISA puts no
limit on the government's intended use of foreign intelligence
information for prosecutions.
As explained in Part I, although the original FISA's purpose
provision does not expressly address the government's intended use
of FISA-acquired foreign intelligence information, the provision does
so implicitly. 476 That is because of the manner in which FISA defines
the term "foreign intelligence information," as it concerns U.S.
persons. The FISA defines "foreign intelligence information"
instrumentally, i.e., by its usefulness to achieving one or more of five
purposes.4 7 7 It is information:
(1) . . . necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect
against-
(A) [1] actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a
foreign power;
(B) [2] sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power;
(C) [3] clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service
or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(2)... necessary to-
474 1n re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 724 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).47 5
1 dat 727.
476 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
477See S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 31 (1977) (reporting that definition of foreign intelligence
information "set out standards establishing a nexus between the information sought and
the desired end"; for U.S. persons, government must demonstrate "a significant degree of
need" for surveillance); H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 47 (1978) ("Where the term
,necessary' is used, the committee intends to require.., a showing that the information is
both important and required. The use of this standard is intended to mandate that a
significant need be demonstrated by those seeking the surveillance.").
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(A) [4] the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B) [5] the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
478
When the purpose provision is read in light of this definition, it
requires the government to certify that the purpose of proposed
surveillance is to obtain information that is necessary to the
government's achievement of one or more of the five foreign
intelligence purposes identified in the definition. In effect, then, the
purpose provision requires the government to certify two things: (1)
the government's purpose is to obtain particular information; and (2)
that information is necessary to the government's achievement of a
statutorily specified foreign intelligence purpose.
So understood, the original FISA's purpose provision should be
read to limit the government's intended use of foreign intelligence
sought under a FISA surveillance order. To again reprise the
reasoning by analogy laid out in Part I: if I certify to you that (1) "the
purpose" of my borrowing $20,000 from you is to buy a car; and (2)
the car is "necessary to" my ability to get to work, I am strongly
implying that I intend to use the car to get to work. Furthermore, you
probably required me to make those certifications because you
wanted to require me to have the intention of using the car to get to
work. Likewise, if the government certifies that (1) "the purpose" of
proposed FISA surveillance is to obtain information X; and (2)
information X is "necessary to" the government's ability, say, to
protect against international terrorism by a foreign power, the
government is strongly implying that it intends to use information X
to protect against such international terrorism. Furthermore, by
requiring those certifications, Congress probably meant to require the
government to have that intended use in mind when applying for a
surveillance order. In short, the text of the original FISA's purpose
provision, read in light of the FISA's definition of "foreign
intelligence information," requires the government to intend to use
foreign intelligence information sought under a proposed surveillance
order for one or more of the five foreign intelligence purposes
specified in the definition of "foreign intelligence information."
This interpretation of the original FISA's purpose provision gets
support from the FISA's requirements about the process of
certification. FISA requires the purpose certification to be made by a
high-ranking intelligence official, i.e., "the Assistant to the President
4 8
50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2003).
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for National Security Affairs or an executive branch official or
officials designated by the President from among those executive
officers employed in the area of national security or defense and
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate." 479 Further, that official must designate the type of foreign
intelligence information being sought according to the categories
identified in the definition of foreign intelligence information.&80 In
addition, he or she must state the basis for the certification that the
information sought is the type designated. 48 1 Having imposed those
requirements, Congress presumably would have considered it
dishonest for a high-ranking intelligence official to certify that "the
purpose" of proposed surveillance was to obtain designated
information that was "necessary to" achieving a foreign intelligence
purpose, if the government had no intention of using the information
for that purpose.
The FISA Court of Review therefore erred in holding that the
purpose provision "clearly did not preclude or limit the government's
. . . proposed use of foreign intelligence information . . . in a.. ,,482
prosecution. The government could not seek a FISA surveillance
order if its proposed purpose was solely to pursue prosecution as an
end in itself. If the government sought a FISA surveillance order for
the sole purpose of getting evidence for a prosecution, the
government had to intend that the anticipated prosecution be
instrumental to a statutorily specified foreign intelligence goal.
iii. The Requirement that Achievement of a Foreign Intelligence
Purpose be the Primary Purpose for Seeking a
FISA Surveillance Order
The analysis so far interprets the original FISA as requiring the
government, when seeking a FISA surveillance order, to intend to use
the information sought under the order for one or more of the five
foreign intelligence purposes identified in the definition of foreign
intelligence information. The FISA can also be read to impose a
further requirement: that the government's "primary purpose" for
seeking the order be to achieve a foreign intelligence purpose. This
reading, however, does not vindicate the judicial "primary purpose"
479 Id. § 1804(a)(7).
480 Id. § 1804(a)(7)(D).
411 Id. § 1804(a)(7)(E)(i).
4821n re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 727 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
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test, because that test incorrectly assumes incompatibility between
foreign intelligence purposes and law enforcement purposes.
In general, a person can intend to obtain a thing that is necessary to
achieve some purpose without having the achievement of that purpose
be his or her primary motivation for obtaining the thing. 483 To repeat
the analogy proposed in Part I: Suppose a teenager certifies to her
parent that (1) "the purpose" of her borrowing money from the parent
is to buy a car; and (2) the car is "necessary to" her fulfillment of
work and school obligations. By making these certifications, the
teenager implies that she intends to use the car to get to work. That
intended use, however, ma not be her primary motivation for seeking
the loan or getting the car.
Likewise, you might first think, the government can satisfy the
original FISA's purpose provision if it intends to use the foreign
intelligence information sought under a proposed surveillance order
for a foreign intelligence purpose, even if that is not the government's
primary purpose for seeking the information-even if, more
specifically, the government's primary purpose is simply to put a
criminal in prison, regardless of the foreign intelligence benefits of
doing so. As long as the government intends the prosecution to
advance a foreign intelligence purpose, it does not matter that this
intended effect of the prosecution is not the government's primary
motivation for the surveillance.
485
This reasoning, however, ignores the FISA provisions specifying
who has to make the required certification about the purpose of
proposed surveillance and how the certification must be made. FISA
requires the purpose certification to be made by an official
"designated by the President from among those executive officers
employed in the area of national security or defense and appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate."'486 Thus,
483 See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (elaborating on this point).
484 See supra section l.B.3.a.
485 Professor Banks argues that, under both the original FISA and FISA as amended by
the Patriot Act, "the FISA mechanisms are available only when the purpose (or, after
enactment of the Patriot Act, a 'significant purpose') of the surveillance ... is to gather
foreign intelligence, even though the information collected may include evidence of a
crime and that such evidence could be used later in a criminal prosecution." Banks, supra
note 30, at 1178. As I understand this argument, it does not accept the analysis offered in
this article, which asserts that having a purpose of gathering foreign intelligence
information is equivalent to having a purpose of getting evidence for a prosecution if the
prosecution is thought necessary to serve one or more of the foreign intelligence purposes
identified in the FISA's definition of "foreign intelligence information." Thus, the issue is
joined.
48650 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7) (2003).
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someone whose job is to protect national security or defense must
certify that the purpose of proposed surveillance is to obtain
information that (if it concerns a U.S. person) is "necessary" to
protect the country from one or more of three kinds of foreign threats
to national security, 487the national defense, 488 or to the conduct of
foreign affairs. 489 Congress presumably required such a person to
make the certification to ensure that the primary purpose of the
proposed surveillance was to achieve one of these foreign intelligence
goals. 490 To use the analogy described in Part I, suppose the director
of information technology for a large company certifies to the
company's chief financial officer that (1) the director needs $2
million dollars to upgrade company computers; and (2) the upgrade is
necessary for the company to protect the company computer system
from viruses and computer hackers. The chief financial officer can
reasonably infer that the director's primary purpose for seeking the
money is to protect the company's computer system from the
specified outside threats. The connection between the certifier's
official responsibilities and the purpose to be achieved by the thing
sought supports the inference that the primary purpose of obtaining
the thing is to achieve that purpose.
Thus, the FISA's purpose provision can be read to require the
government to use FISA surveillance for the primary purpose of
achieving one or more of the five foreign intelligence purposes
specified in FISA's definition of "foreign intelligence information."
This reading does not resolve whether the government can use FISA
surveillance to get evidence for a prosecution if its primary purpose
for doing so is its determination that the prosecution will advance a
foreign intelligence purpose-for example, by preventing an attack by
487 See id. § 1801(e)(1) (defining "foreign intelligence information" to include
information that, if it concerns a U.S. person, is "necessary to ... the ability of the United
States to protect against" three kinds of foreign threats).
488 See id. § 1801(e)(2)(A) (defining "foreign intelligence information" to include
information that, if it concerns a U.S. person, is "necessary to ... the national defense or
the security of the United States").
489 See id. § 1801(e)(2)(B) (defining "foreign intelligence information" to include
information that, if it concerns a U.S. person, is "necessary to ... the conduct of the
foreign affairs of the United States").
490 This conclusion is reinforced by two additional requirements in FISA. FISA requires
the certifier to designate which of the five foreign intelligence purposes identified in the
definition of foreign intelligence information will be served by the information sought. See
id. § 1804(a)(7)(D) (requiring certification "that designates the type of foreign intelligence
information being sought according to the categories described in section 1801(e) of this
title [which defines "foreign intelligence information]"). Beyond that, FISA requires the
person to include "a statement of the basis for the certification that ... the information
sought is the type of foreign intelligence information designated." Id. § 1804(a)(7)(E)(i).
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international terrorists inside the United States. Thus, while FISA
may be read to impose a "primary purpose" requirement, that
requirement, as elucidated so far, differs in a critical way from the
judicially created "primary purpose" test discussed above. The
"judicial primary purpose test" (as it will be referred to hereafter)
assumes incompatibility between foreign intelligence purposes and
law enforcement purposes. Thus, it implicitly rejects the notion that
the government can use law enforcement means to further a foreign
intelligence purpose. This rejection can be seen in both the case law
that derives the primary purpose test from the original FISA's purpose
provision and the FISA Trial Court's decision, which derived the
primary purpose test from the FISA's provisions on minimization
procedures. This leads to an examination of whether FISA allows
the government to seek FISA surveillance for prosecutions intended
to advance a foreign intelligence purpose.
iv. The Permissibility, Under the Original FISA, of the
Government's Using FISA Surveillance for the Primary (or Even the
Sole) Purpose of Investigating and Prosecuting Crime of any Type
When the Government Intended the Prosecution to Serve a Foreign
Intelligence Purpose
Two questions remain: Can arrest and prosecution serve a foreign
intelligence purpose? And if so, did Congress in the original FISA
accept that fact, thereby authorizing the government to get a FISA
surveillance order for the purpose of prosecutions that served a
foreign intelligence purpose? These questions have particular salience
because, before In re Sealed Case, the government had never argued
that prosecutions can serve foreign intelligence purposes. 492 The
argument's recent vintage raises doubts about the validity of the
argument. It seems useful to examine those doubts from two
491 United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 78 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding FISA
surveillance on the ground that its purpose "was to secure foreign intelligence information
and was not ... directed towards criminal investigation or ... criminal prosecution."')
(quoting United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1190 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)); In re All
Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611,
623 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 2002) (holding that Attorney General's March 2002
information sharing procedures were invalid because, and to the extent that, they were
"designed to enhance the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of evidence for law
enforcement purposes, instead of being consistent with the need of the United States to
'obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information.") (quoting 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801(h), 1821(4)) (emphasis added by the FISA Trial Court).
492 See Oral Argument Transcript at 51-62, In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign
Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (No. 02-001).
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perspectives: first, whether, as a factual matter, a prosecution based
on FISA-acquired evidence can advance a foreign intelligence
purpose; and, second, whether even if that theory is true, it should
inform the interpretation of the original FISA.
The first question has become easy to answer, at least since the
United States began responding to "the new terrorism."4 9 3 Certainly,
prosecution can serve foreign intelligence purposes by protecting the
country from foreign threats.4 94 The foreign intelligence purposes
identified in the FISA's definition of "foreign intelligence
information" include three protective purposes: protection against
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence servige5 or
network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power.
Each threat arises from the conduct of foreign powers or their
agents. Prosecutors cannot ordinarily reach foreign powers, but they
often can indict foreign agents and bring them to trial. The arrest and
jailing of a foreign agent can disable that agent from contributing to
the foreign threat. 496 The prospect of prosecution can convince the
agent to assist government investigators by roviding information or
assisting the United States in other ways. Actual prosecution, if
493 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 47 (chapter entitled "The Foundation of the
New Terrorism").
494 See, e.g., id., at 72 (describing arrests that "disrupt[ed]" international terrorists'
"landmarks plot" to bomb New York landmarks including Holland and Lincoln tunnels);
see also 2003 Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations,
supra note 316, at 2 (including "arresting and prosecuting the perpetrators" among "a
variety of measures to deal with threats to the national security"); Scheppele, supra note 3,
at 1024-25 (describing Clinton Administration's antiterrorism efforts as reflecting the
belief that "the ordinary criminal justice system was an effective tool" against terrorism).
49'50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1) (2003).
496 Two recent examples are the arrest and prosecution of Ahmed Ressam, who was
detained at the Canadian border carrying explosives that he intended to use in the United
States at the millennium, and Richard Reid, who was detained in December 2001 after he
attempted, while on a flight from Paris to Miami, to ignite a shoe bomb. 9/11 COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 2, at 176-79 (describing Ressam's plot and its failure); Joint Inquiry,
supra note 3, at 126 (pagination of unclassified version) (summarizing Reid's plot and its
failure).
491 See, e.g., H.R. REP. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 43-44 (1978) ("One might wonder why the
Government would not immediately arrest [known international terrorists]. In some cases.
. . it may be more fruitful in terms of combating international terrorism to identify
otherwise unknown terrorists here, their international support structure, and the location of
their weapons or explosives."); Senate Intelligence Hearing on Patriot Act, supra note
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successful, can take the agent off the street for a long time (or
permanently). 498 In addition, news of the arrest and prosecution can
derail the threat in which the agent is involved and deter other
threats.
499
Furthermore, this potential for prosecution to serve a protective
function exists whether or not the prosecution is for a crime arising
out of the threatening foreign activity or, instead, an unrelated crime
such as rape of a domestic partner.50 0 Thus, the FISA Court of
Review erred in concluding that the government cannot use FISA
surveillance to prosecute "non-foreign intelligence crimes."
50 1
Significantly, the FISA does not use the terms "foreign intelligence
crimes" and "non-foreign intelligence crimes." Instead, the FISA
authorizes the government to use FISA to obtain any information that
is "necessary to" one of five purposes, three of which concern
protecting the United States from specified foreign threats. If the
government can legitimately certify that it needs to get evidence of
crime by a foreign agent to take that agent off the street and thereby
thwart a foreign threat, that evidence is "foreign intelligence
information" regardless of the type of crime that it concerns. The
Court of Review accepted this reasoning only up to a point. The court
291, at 33 (testimony of David Kris, Associate Deputy Attorney General, United States
Department of Justice) (describing argument that "prosecution of spies and terrorists is just
one more counterintelligence tool .. .[and] [b]y surveilling them we can recruit them,
double them [i.e., turn them into a double agent], we can cut them off from access to
classified information, we can PNG [i.e., throw them out of the country as a "persona non
grata"], or possibly prosecute them."); Oral Argument Transcript at 7-9, In re Sealed
Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (argument of Theodore Olson,
Solicitor General of United States) (describing ways that government can use FISA-
acquired information, including prosecution).
498 For example, Ahmed Ressam, convicted of smuggling explosives from Canada into
the United States right before the millennium (see supra note 496), faces up to 130 years
of imprisonment, but, as of this writing, his sentencing has been delayed to determine
whether the potential sentence should be reduced because of his cooperation with
investigators. See, e.g., Wendy Kaufman, Convicted terrorist Ahmed Ressam could receive
lighter sentence after cooperating with the government in other terrorist cases, National
Pub. Radio, Mar. 27, 2002, available at 2002 WL 3187574. Richard Reid, the convicted
"shoe bomber" (see supra note 496), got life in prison. See John Berman, Richard Reid
Sentenced Shoe Bomber Gets in Confrontation with Judge, ABC News: World News This
Morning (Jan. 31, 2003), available at 2003 WL 5025736.
See, e.g., 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 272 (observing that if government
had detained two of the 9/11 hijackers that various officials were in fact trying to track
down before 9/11, "[t]he simple fact of their detention could have derailed the plan").
500 See infra notes 682-684 and accompanying text (elaborating on the point that
prosecution of foreign agents for "ordinary crime" can serve foreign intelligence
purposes).
501In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 735-36 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002). By "non-
foreign intelligence crimes," the court meant "ordinary crimes" such as bank robbery,
which, at the time of their commission, are "wholly unrelated" to "foreign intelligence
crimes."; see also id at 723 & n.10.
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recognized that "arresting and prosecuting [foreign agents] may well
be the best technique to prevent them from successfully continuing
their terrorist or espionage activity." 50 2 The court nonetheless thought
it would "transgress[] the original FISA" if the government used
FISA surveillance to prosecute a foreign agent for a "non-foreign
intelligence crime." 50 3 To the contrary-if one accepts that the arrest
and prosecution of foreign agents can serve the protective foreign
intelligence purposes identified in the FISA-the Court of Review's
decision transgressed the original FISA by restricting the
government's ability to get foreign intelligence information based on
a distinction, i.e., between "foreign intelligence crimes" and "non-
foreign intelligence crimes," that the FISA does not contain.
504
Assuming that arrest and prosecution can serve a protective foreign
intelligence purpose, the question remains whether this potential
protective function of prosecution can inform interpretation of the
original FISA, so as to allow the government to seek a FISA
surveillance order for the purpose of prosecuting crimes that serve a
foreign intelligence purpose. This question is easy to answer
affirmatively if one accepts the legislative history specifically
endorsing this theory. Some of the relevant history is reproduced in•• 505
the FISA Court of Review's opinion. Additional relevant history is
discussed in the next subsection of this article. 506 The same answer
emerges from the text of the original FISA, which shows that
ordinarily it is up to the executive branch to decide whether a
prosecution with FISA-acquired information would advance a foreign
intelligence purpose. The FISA required a high-ranking intelligence
official to certify that he or she "(A) deems the information sought to
be foreign intelligence information; [and] (B) that the purpose of the
surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information." 50 7 The
official could "deem" the information sought to be foreign
intelligence information if she determined it was necessary to a
prosecution that would protect the country against an act of
international terrorism. The FISA judge reviewing the application in
502 Id. at 724.
503 Id. at 735-36.
504 The Court of Review carved out an exception for "non-foreign intelligence crimes"
partly because of its understanding of legislative history. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d
at 736. For the relevant legislative history, see infra notes 554-57 & 571-76 and
accompanying text.505 See supra notes 354--60 and accompanying text.
5 0 6 See infra notes 559-60 and accompanying text.
507 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(A), (B) (2003).
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which these certifications were made would apply a "clearly
erroneous" standard of review if the target of the proposed
surveillance was a U.S. person. That standard gives deference to
the official's certification that the intended prosecution would serve a
foreign intelligence purpose. Given this standard of judicial review,
the nature of the certifications, and the position of the official who
makes the certifications, it does not matter that the government has
only recently articulated the protective foreign intelligence purposes
served by prosecution in litigation over the "primary purpose" test,
especially considering the government's long acquiescence in the
primary purpose test.50 9 All that matters is that in a particular
application for proposed surveillance the government can establish, in
a way that is not clearly erroneous, its purpose to obtain "foreign
intelligence information."
The legislative history discussed below suggests that, when
Congress enacted the original FISA, the executive branch seldom
used prosecution to protect against foreign threats. 51 This in turn
suggests that when the government did prosecute crimes such as
espionage and sabotage, it was pursuing prosecution as an end in
itself, and not because of its instrumental value for achieving foreign
intelligence purposes. 511 The analysis of FISA proposed in this article
prohibits FISA from being used for such noninstrumental
prosecutions. Thus, today, as in 1978, if the government wants to
conduct surveillance for the primary purpose of getting evidence for a
prosecution that is not intended to serve foreign intelligence purposes,
it must meet the requirements of Title 111.
512
5°81d. § 1805(a)(5).
509 See supra notes 229-86 and accompanying text.510 See infra notes 542-53 and accompanying text; see also E-Mail from William F.
Funk, Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School, to Richard H. Seamon (Oct. 8, 2004)
(on file with author) (explaining that because major acts of international terrorism had not
been directed at the United States when FISA was enacted, it was "unanticipated" that
government would seek to use foreign intelligence surveillance techniques for law
enforcement purposes).
5" See Church Committee Hearing on the FBI, supra note 64, at 347 (hearing exhibit
entitled "FBI Functional Organization Chart," reflecting that FBI had an "Intelligence
Division" separate from its "General Investigative Division" and "Special Investigative
Division"); id. at 348 (hearing exhibit reflecting that a "counterintelligence" unit exists
within the Intelligence Division); see also id. at 8 (testimony of Frederick A.O. Schwarz,
Chief Counsel to Committee) (explaining that counterintelligence unit "involves primarily
the FBI's efforts to deal with the activities of unfriendly foreign governments in the United
States, largely counterespionage").
512 See Pub. L. No. 90-351, Title Ill, § 802, 82 Stat. 216 (original provision of Title III
authorizing electronic surveillance for evidence of espionage and sabotage) (current
version codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(a)); see also 124 CONG. REC. 28, 124 (1978)
(statement of Rep. Rudd ) (stating that, under then existing practice, if FBI detected
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Nonetheless, the government is not estopped by the former
infrequency with which it used prosecution for foreign intelligence
purposes. The variety and nature of foreign threats has changed since
Congress enacted the original FISA. In particular, the United States
faces a much greater threat of terrorist attacks inside the United States
today than it faced in 1978.513 FISA does not restrict how information
acquired through FISA surveillance is used to achieve foreign
intelligence purposes. Rather, FISA simply requires that the
information, if it concerns a U.S. person, be "necessary" for those
purposes. Newly discovered means of protection are not prohibited
on the grounds of novelty alone. Thus, for example, FISA allows the
government to use technology invented since 1978 to store and
analyze the information obtained through FISA surveillance.
Furthermore, the advent of that technology may cause certain
information to be "necessary" to a foreign intelligence purpose today
even if that same information would not have been necessary in
1978.514 Similarly, the FISA allows the government to use
prosecution to achieve foreign intelligence purposes even if the
government rarely so used it in the past.515 The judicial primary
criminal activity while conducting warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence information, "a warrant would be sought for further authority to collect
evidence by electronic surveillance"); E-mail from William F. Funk, Professor of Law,
Lewis & Clark Law School, to Richard H. Seamon, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Idaho College of Law (Oct. 2, 2004) (on file with author) (stating that Justice
Department personnel involved in drafting predecessor bill, S. 3197, 94th Cong. (1976),
"never imagined that the government would use FISA to obtain a surveillance for the
primary purpose of prosecuting someone" but instead believed that, if prosecution was the
primary purpose, "then Title III was required"); cf Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. 125
(1978) (requiring Attorney General to approve and find that target of proposed electronic
surveillance is an agent of a foreign power whenever electronic surveillance is such that "a
warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement rather than intelligence
purposes").
513 See, e.g., 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 96-107 (describing history of
terrorist attacks on U.S. interests beginning in 1970s, almost all of which, until the 1990s,
occurred outside the United States); see also E-Mail from W. Funk to R. Seamon, supra
note 510 (explaining that, when FISA was enacted, all of the major international terrorism
attacks had been directed at countries other than the United States, and that this
contributed to "the lack of foresight of the need to use criminal prosecution to stop
international terrorists in the United States").
514 For example, highly detailed map coordinates for a terrorist training camp may be
necessary to launching a sophisticated missile against the camp, even though such detailed
coordinates would have had little usefulness in 1978.
515 A history of government non-use of FISA surveillance for prosecutorial purposes
would not be entitled to Chevron deference, because courts do not grant Chevron
deference to the Justice Department's interpretation of criminal statutes. See, e.g., Dan M.
Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REv. 469, 490
n. 115 (1996) (citing cases). Professor Kahan, however, argues that they should. Id. at 489-
506. His argument would not seem to apply here because the Department has never, based
on deliberation, officially articulated the view that it cannot use FISA surveillance to get
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purpose test errs in denying the government's power to do so under
the original FISA.
5 16
v. Summary of Textual Analysis of the Original FISA's Purpose
Provision
The original FISA's purpose provision allows the government to
obtain a FISA surveillance order for the sole or primary purpose of
getting evidence for a prosecution of any crime, as long as the
government intends the prosecution to serve one or more of the five
foreign intelligence purposes identified in the FISA's definition of
"foreign intelligence information." Prosecution (and the events
leading up to it, including arrest, custodial interrogation, charge and
plea bargaining, etc.) 517 can serve the protective foreign intelligence
purposes identified in the FISA's definition of "foreign intelligence
information." 51 Thus, the primary purpose case law is wrong in
interpreting the purpose provision to prohibit the government from
getting a FISA surveillance order if its primary purpose is to get
evidence for a prosecution. On the other hand, the FISA Court of
Review was also wrong in interpreting the provision not to limit the
government's intended use of FISA-acquired foreign intelligence
information for prosecution. 519 The Court of Review erred, as well, in
construing the FISA to bar the government from using FISA
surveillance to prosecute "non-foreign intelligence crimes."
' 520
evidence for a prosecution that would serve a foreign intelligence purpose. See id. at
493-504.
116 This flaw in the judicial primary purpose test will make a big difference if the Patriot
Act's "significant purpose" amendment sunsets, and the original FISA's purpose provision
comes back into force. In that event, the judicial primary purpose test will (in some
circuits) bar the government from using FISA surveillance for the primary purpose of
getting evidence for a prosecution. In contrast, the analysis proposed in this article would
allow such use as long as the government intended the anticipated prosecution to serve a
foreign intelligence purpose.
117 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-1720, at 23 (1978) (defining "law enforcement
purposes" to include "arrest, prosecution, and other law enforcement measures taken for
the purpose of preventing the crime").
"' 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(l).
519
1n re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 727 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (concluding
that the original FISA "clearly did not limit the government's ... proposed use of foreign
intelligence information . . . in a criminal prosecution"). Rather than interpreting the
original FISA to restrict the government's intended use of FISA-acquired information, the
Court of Review interpreted the original FISA to impose a restriction based on whether the
government actually used FISA-acquired information to prosecute a "foreign intelligence
crime" or a "non-foreign intelligence crime." See id. at 731, 734-36.
52 Id. at 735-36.
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b. Legislative History of the Original FISA's Purpose Provision
The textual analysis above interprets the original FISA's purpose
provision to put two kinds of limits on the government's purpose for
seeking a FISA surveillance order, but not to impose the judicial
primary purpose test. First, "the purpose" of the proposed surveillance
must be to obtain "foreign intelligence information," and not some
other type of information.5 2' Second, the government must intend to
use that information for one or more of the five foreign intelligence
purposes identified in the definition of "foreign intelligence
information."'522 Textual analysis adds that the use of the information
for a foreign intelligence purpose probably must be the government's
primary purpose for seeking the surveillance order. But this "primary
purpose" requirement, unlike the judicial primary purpose test,
recognizes that the prosecutorial use of FISA-acquired information
can be necessary to achieving a foreign intelligence 
purpose.523
Finally, the textual analysis finds that prosecution of any type of
crime by a foreign agent-not just "foreign intelligence crimes 
524-
can potentially advance a foreign intelligence purpose by protecting
the country from a foreign threat.
525
Each aspect of the textual analysis finds support in the legislative
history, though some of the history is equivocal. Specifically, the
legislative history confirms that the original FISA's purpose provision
was meant to restrict both (1) the type of information that the
government could use FISA surveillance to obtain as well as (2) the
purposes for which it could obtain the information. Some legislative
history on the second restriction supports the judicial primary purpose
test as the specific restriction that Congress intended to impose.
Nonetheless, the legislative history is better understood as merely
reflecting that the government cannot use FISA surveillance to pursue
prosecution as an end in itself. That understanding gets strong support
from the legislative history recognizing that the use of foreign
intelligence information for prosecution can further foreign
intelligence purposes by protecting the country from foreign threats.
Each aspect of the legislative history is discussed below.
521 See supra notes 472-73 and accompanying text.
522 See supra notes 476-82 and accompanying text.
523 See supra notes 483-99 and accompanying text.
524In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 723 & n.10 (defining "foreign intelligence crimes").
But cf id. at 736 (apparently redefining "foreign intelligence crimes" to include "ordinary
crimes ... inextricably intertwined with foreign intelligence crimes").525 See supra notes 500-04 and accompanying text.
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i. Legislative History Showing that the FISA Purpose Provision
Limits the Type of Information That can be Sought as Well as the
Intended Use of That Information
The legislative history confirms the two types of limits that
Congress intended the FISA's purpose provision to impose. The
House report on the bill that became the FISA said that the purpose
provision served to
prevent the practice of targeting, for example, a foreign power for
electronic surveillance when the true purpose of the surveillance is
to gather information about an individual for other than foreign
intelligence purposes. It is also designed to make explicit that the
sole purpose of such surveillance is to secure "foreign intelligence
information," es defined, and not to obtain some other type of
information.
52
This passage identifies two functions of the purpose provision: (1)
preventing the acquisition of information "for other than foreign
intelligence purposes"; and (2) preventing the acquisition of
information other than foreign intelligence information. The first
function concerns the intended use of foreign intelligence
information; the second concerns the type of information that can be
obtained.
Significantly, the FISA Court of Review quoted the very same
passage from the House report that is reproduced above, but referred
only to the function described in the passage's second sentence-
namely, the purpose provision's restriction on the type of information
that the government can seek through FISA surveillance. 527 In
introducing the passage, the court said it showed Congress's
"concern[] about the government's use of FISA surveillance to obtain
information not truly intertwined with the government's efforts to
protect against threats from foreign powers." 528 The court makes the
same point later when it says, "Congress intended section
1804(a)(7)(B) [the purpose provision] to prevent the government from
targeting a foreign agent when its 'true purpose' was to gain
non-foreign intelligence information, such as evidence of ordinary
crimes or scandals." 52 9 Thus, the Court of Review recognized that the
purpose provision limited the type of information that the government
526 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 725 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 76
(1978)).
127See id. at 725, 736, discussed supra notes 367-71 and accompanying text.52
81d. at 725 (emphasis added).
5 29 1d. at 736 (emphasis added).
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can use FISA surveillance to obtain; however, the court did not
acknowledge that the purpose provision also restricted the
government's intended use even of foreign intelligence information.
To the contrary, the court interpreted the original FISA as "not
preclud[ing] or limit[ing] the government's proposed use of foreign
intelligence information ... in a prosecution." 530 This interpretation
ignores the first sentence of the passage quoted above, which evinces
congressional intent to limit the purposes for which the government
can seek foreign intelligence information, as well as the type of
information that could be sought.
The legislative history shows why Congress wanted to limit both
the type and the intended uses of information obtained through FISA
surveillance. Specifically, Congress wanted to prevent the abusive
surveillance practices documented in the Church Committee
reports. 531 As discussed in Part I, the abusive practices concerned
both the type of information that government officials collected and
the uses to which the officials put that information. 532  The
information included "personal" and "political" information that was
"unrelated to any legitimate government interest."533 The uses
included embarrassing, harassing, and undermining various officials'
political opponents and critics of the government. The legislative
history of the FISA reflected Congress's awareness that even foreign
intelligence information can be misused. 535 Accordingly, as argued
530 Id. at 727; see also id. at 724 (stating that language of FISA "suggests that" the FISA
court reviewing an application for FISA surveillance should decide only "whether the
information sought is actually foreign intelligence information-not the government's
proposed use of that information").
See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
532 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
... See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-604, at 8 (1978) (quoting Church Committee report).
534 Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 42, at 278-79, 296-97 (reproducing
portions of Church Committee report summarizing instances in which Pres. Kennedy used
wiretap information for political purposes).
535 See, e.g., Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 42, at 133 (prepared
statement of Steven Rosenfeld, Comm. on Fed. Legislation, Ass'n of Bar of NYC)
("Misuse of intelligence information has been an abuse at least as serious and as far
reaching as those involved in the gathering of such information. Legislation which
regulates the intelligence-gathering process, but is practically silent on the permissible
uses of intelligence, accomplishes only half the job."); id. at 199 (statement of Sen. Bayh)
(stating, in discussion of committee amendment to provision requiring compliance with
minimization procedures, that compliance with use restrictions is "one of the most
important aspects of this bill. You talk about how you collect, what you collect, and
against whom do you collect, but the really critical question is what do you do with that
information when you get it."); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-1720, at 23 (1978)
(expressing conferees' judgment that "the standard for dissemination should be higher than
for acquisition and retention"); Philip A. Lacovara, Presidential Power to Gather
Intelligence: The Tension Between Article H and Amendment IV, 40 LAW & CONTEMP.
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above, the original FISA's purpose provision prevents the
government from seeking even information that fits the definition of
foreign intelligence information if the government's "true purpose" is
something "other than foreign intelligence purposes." 536 Thus, the
government could seek information solely to prosecute a crime only if
the government intended the anticipated prosecution to serve a
foreign intelligence purpose. By the same token, seeking information
for prosecution as an end in itself would be just as improper as
seeking the information for the purpose of, say, squelching political
dissent.
53 7
ii. Legislative History Seemingly Supporting the
"Primary Purpose" Test
The legislative history discussed above shows that Congress
designed the original FISA's purpose provision to restrict not only the
type of information that the government could use FISA surveillance
to obtain but also the purpose for which the government could seek
that information. Of course, legislative history showing that the
purpose provision restricted the purposes for which the government
could use FISA surveillance is consistent with the judicial primary
PROBS. 106, 106 (Summer 1976) ("The collection of intelligence has no moral dimension
as such. It takes on its coloration from the purposes for which the process is pursued, the
manner in which the collection proceeds, and the uses to which the information is put.").
536 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 725 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, at 76 (1978)).
537 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. As discussed supra in notes 527-30,
the FISA Court of Review recognized only one of the two functions of the original FISA's
purpose provision. Specifically, the court recognized only that it served to limit the type of
information that the government could seek; the government could not seek "non-foreign
intelligence information." In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736. The court gave two
examples of what it considered to be "non-foreign intelligence information": information
about "ordinary crimes" and "scandals." Because the court considered evidence of
"ordinary crime" not to be "foreign intelligence information," the court interpreted the
FISA to bar the government from using FISA surveillance to obtain evidence of "ordinary
crime"-such as bank robbery-unless it was "inextricably intertwined with foreign
intelligence crimes." Id. at 736. The court was wrong to construe the term "foreign
intelligence information" categorically to exclude evidence of "ordinary crime." As
discussed above, evidence of ordinary crime can be foreign intelligence information
because its use for prosecutorial purposes can serve the protective foreign intelligence
purposes identified in the definition of "foreign intelligence information." In concluding
otherwise, the court had to create a distinction that the FISA does not recognize and that,
indeed, conflicts with the FISA. The court tried to distinguish "foreign intelligence
crimes" from "non-foreign intelligence crimes," with the latter excluding "ordinary
crimes" that are "inextricably intertwined with foreign intelligence crimes." The FISA
does not use any of those terms. More fundamentally, the use of those terms conflicts with
Congress's decision in the FISA to authorize the government to obtain "foreign
intelligence information" and to define that term to include both criminal and non-criminal
conduct. See infra note 575-76 and accompanying text.
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purpose test. Indeed, it supports the test to the extent of establishing
that at least some purposes are improper.
Furthermore, the legislative history contains some statements that
seemingly support the judicial primary purpose test even more
directly. The FISA Court of Review quoted one such statement. The
House report stated that surveillance authorized by the bill that
became the FISA "are not primarily for the purpose of gathering
evidence of a crime. They are to obtain foreign intelligence
information. ' 538  Other legislative history contains statements
similarly indicating that the primary purpose of the surveillance that
would be authorized by the FISA was not to get evidence of crime but
instead to obtain foreign intelligence information.539 To similar effect
are statements that prosecutions arising from FISA surveillance would
be rare. 540 Read in isolation, such statements support the primary
purpose test. Understood in context, however, they provide only scant
support. As the FISA Court of Review said, these statements reflect
"an observation, not a proscription."
5 4 1
Understood in context, such statements reflect congressional
awareness that most surveillance for foreign intelligence at the time of
FISA's enactment did not produce evidence of crime and was not
meant to.542 Congress heard evidence that most surveillance for
538 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 725 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, at 36 (1978)).
139 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-604, at 55 (1978) ("Although the primary purpose of
electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to this chapter will not be the gathering of
criminal evidence, it is contemplated that such evidence will be acquired and [provisions
codified in 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b)-(g)] establish the procedural mechanisms by which such
information may be used in formal proceedings."); H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, Pt. 1, at 89
(1978) (same).
540 See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 10897 (1978) (statement of Sen. Wallop) (distinguishing
Title III surveillance orders from FISA surveillance orders on the ground that, in the latter
context, "We are not trying to catch criminals but to gather information to protect the
national interest of the country."); S. REP. No. 95-604, at 24 n.20 (1978) (stating that bill
did not provide for notification of targets of surveillance and commenting, "Such notice is
particularly inappropriate in the area of foreign intelligence surveillances, where
prosecution is rarely the objective or result."); id. at 39 ("Although there may be cases in
which information acquired from a foreign intelligence surveillance will be used as
evidence of a crime, these cases are expected to be relatively few in number."); S.REP. No.
95-701, at 41 (1978) (same); H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, Pt. 1, at 60 (same); see also S. REP.
No. 95-701, at 67 (1978) ("It is not contemplated that most electronic surveillance
conducted pursuant to this chapter will result in criminal prosecution."); id. at 94
(additional views of Sen. Malcolm Wallop) ("Only incidentally some [orders approving
electronic surveillance] would result in real trials.").541 1n re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 725.
542 See, e.g., Church Committee Hearing on the FBI, supra note 64, at 286 (testimony of
FBI Director Clarence Kelley) ("[l]ntelligence work involves the gathering of information,
not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be not to prosecute, but to thwart crime or
to insure that the Government has enough information to meet any future crisis or
emergency."); Lacovara, supra note 535, at 124 ("All students of foreign intelligence
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foreign intelligence was targeted at foreign powers and official agents
of foreign powers, rather than at U.S. persons. 543 Those targets, unlike
U.S. persons, were not feasible targets for prosecution. For example,
they would have at least colorable claims of sovereign or diplomatic
immunity. 544 Furthermore, evidence before Congress also indicated
that most intelligence gathering involved plain intelligence rather than
counterintelligence ("protective" intelligence). 545  Unlike
counterintelligence, which concerns specific foreign threats, plain
intelligence usually concerns information that is useful in a more
generalized way to the United States' conduct of foreign affairs.
546
Thus, the FISA defined plain intelligence in terms of its relationship
to "(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States" 547 rather
agree that much critical information has nothing whatsoever to do with actual or potential
crime."); see also Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that
national security surveillance "often would not be used for prosecutorial purposes"); id. at
648 ("Foreign security wiretaps, even more than domestic security wiretaps, are likely to
be aimed at collecting and maintaining 'strategic' intelligence information on a continuing
basis rather than at obtaining evidence for use in criminal prosecutions.").
141 See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 28133 (1978) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (stating that
"the principal targets" of FISA surveillance were likely to be "not U.S. citizens, but...
foreign powers, agencies of foreign powers, and others who are not so protected"); S. REP.
No. 95-701, at 9 (1978) ("The primary targets for electronic surveillance to collect foreign
intelligence are 'official' foreign powers: (1) foreign governments or their components; (2)
factions of foreign nations . . . ; [and] (3) entities which are openly acknowledged by
foreign governments to be under their direction and control."); see also Lacovara, supra
note 535, at 122 ("In an intelligence operation . . . information is sought for reasons of
state ordinarily unrelated to any criminal investigation.").
544 See Senate Judiciary Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 31 (testimony of James
Adams, Assistant Director, FBI) (stating that most foreign intelligence agencies "have
diplomatic status which prevents any prosecution action whatsoever"); House Intelligence
Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 29 (reproducing Letter from Justice Department to
Chairman of Committee) ("In most cases the target of the proposed surveillance may not
be subject to prosecution in the United States, and so the [FISA] proceeding could not in
these instances be justified as in aid of the court's jurisdiction over a forthcoming criminal
case."); House Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 55 (prepared statement of
Daniel Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) ("Nearly all, if not all of
this information [sought in electronic surveillance conducted or initiated by Department of
Defense] would have nothing to do with Americans. It would be sought from electronic
surveillance of foreign powers and foreigners who are agents of foreign powers and it
would not contain any information concerning Americans.").
545 See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 63 (testimony of Adm.
Stansfield Turner, Director of CIA) (stating as a "guess" that electronic surveillance by
CIA "is predominantly for the purposes of collecting foreign intelligence, collecting
information that will assist us in establishing our political, our military, and our economic
policies and assist us in understanding the activities of foreign powers in all three of those
fields").
'46 See S. REP. No. 95-604, at 33 (1978) (observing that the portions of definition of
"foreign intelligence information" that encompassed positive intelligence bring into the
definition "a broader range of material").
547 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2) (2003).
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than its relationship to specific foreign threats.548 Because of the more
generalized nature of plain intelligence, surveillance for plain
intelligence, as distinguished from surveillance for
counterintelligence, seldom produced evidence of crime. 54 9 Finally,
evidence before Congress showed that even relatively few
surveillances for counterintelligence led to prosecutions. 5 5  Targets
involved in crime often escaped prosecution because the United
States decided that prosecution would threaten national security
interests, such as by risking the disclosure of U.S. intelligence sources
or methods, or that some other approach-such as continued
monitoring of the target or an attempt to turn the target into a double
agent-would be more productive than prosecution.5 5 1  For this
reason, intelligence officials testifying before Congress emphasized
that the decision to prosecute targets of counterintelligence should be
made by the Attorney General, rather than subordinate prosecutors,
after weighing the benefits of prosecution against its possible risks to
national security.552 In short, statements in the legislative history to
54
8Id. § 1801(e)(l).
549 See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 62 (testimony of
Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense) (stating that the issue of "requiring a noncriminal
standard for electronic surveillance" is "primarily a counterintelligence problem"); see
also Hill, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, supra note 3, at 23 ("As the 1980s began, the law
enforcement and intelligence communities worked together most often in the context of
counterintelligence investigations and counternarcotics programs.").
550 See, e.g, Senate Judiciary Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 31 (testimony of
James Adams, Assistant Director, FBI) ("The primary purpose of counterintelligence work
is to neutralize the activities of these groups [of alien intelligence agents] to prevent their
intelligence-gathering activities, and hardly any of them wind up in prosecutive action.");
id. at 92-93 (reproducing article by Morton Halperin) (describing two types of electronic
surveillance: in surveillance "to gather information about the activities of foreign
governments," "[t]here is no suggestion that illegal activity is underway"; in surveillance
that tracks an alien foreign agent to an American suspected of being a foreign agent, as
well, "arrest and conviction are not usually the objectives").
'51 See H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, Pt. 1, at 36-37 (1978) ("Combating the espionage and
covert actions of other nations in this country is an extremely important national concern.
Prosecution is one way, but only one way and not always the best way, to combat such
activities. 'Doubling' an agent or feeding him false or useless information are other ways.
Monitoring him to discover other spies, their tradecraft and equipment can be vitally
useful. Prosecution, while disabling one known agent, may only mean that the foreign
power replaces him with one whom it may take years to find or who may never be
found."); Senate Judiciary Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 32 (testimony of James
Adams, Assistant Director, FBI) (explaining his agreement with Sen. Hatch that it is not
"always propitious to bust a spy" because, for example, of concerns about disclosure of
intelligence sources, methods, and information); House Intelligence Hearing on FISA,
supra note 70, at 119 (statement of Rep. Mazzoli) ("[T]he Department of Defense and the
Justice Department have said they are really not trying to nail these people [i.e., the targets
of electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence] with a criminal charge anyway. They
could care less about scienter. What they are really trying to do is to end the threat or to
eliminate these people as foreign agents.").
552 See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text (discussing requirement for Attorney
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the effect that foreign intelligence surveillance was not "primarily"
for law enforcement purposes and would only rarely result in
prosecution merely reflect the evidence before Congress on existing
intelligence practices. The statements do not reflect Congress's
intention to impose the judicial primary purpose test.
553
iii. Legislative History on the "Noncriminal" Standard for FISA
Surveillance
Much of the legislative history explained why the bill that became
the FISA adopted a so-called "noncriminal standard" to define U.S.
persons who were subject to surveillance as "agents of a foreign
power." For example, the House report explained the definition of
"agent of a foreign power," as applied to U.S. persons, in the passage
below. Though lengthy, it provides context for understanding
statements about the "primary" purpose of foreign intelligence
surveillance:
Under H.R. 7308 [the House version of the bill signed into law as
the FISA], as introduced, there were four categories under the
definition of "agent of a foreign power" which could apply to any
person, e.g., a United States citizen. One of these categories did not
require any showing of possible criminal activity. Another
category was a conspiracy provision which, because it referred to
the non-criminal standard, could have authorized surveillance of
one "conspiring" with someone not engaged in criminal activity.
While the witnesses before the [subcommittee that held hearings
on the bill] acknowledged that the activity described in the non-
criminal standard was "tantamount to a crime," there was
apprehension by some that the bill was authorizing electronic
surveillance of United States citizens without any explicit showing
of criminal activity.
New language was, therefore, developed by the Administration and
congressional leaders, with the participation of interested outside
parties, including the ACLU.
General approval).
553 Apparently reflecting Congress's expectation that FISA surveillance would focus on
gathering foreign intelligence information for uses other than prosecution, Congress
ultimately provided that the bill that became the FISA would be codified in Title 50 of the
U.S. Code, which concerns War and National Defense, instead of Title 18 (relating to
Crimes and Criminal Procedure). See H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, Pt. 1, at 28 (1978); see also
H.R. CONF. REP. 95-1720, at 19 (1978) (stating that the conference rejected the Senate's
proposal to put the bill in Title 18 and accepted the House's "uncodified title" so that the
bill's provisions would be codified in the part of Title 50 "which most directly relates to its
subject matter").
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As a matter of principle, this Committee agrees that no United
States Citizen in the United States should be targeted for electronic
surveillance by his government absent some showing that he at
least may violate the laws of our society. A citizen in the United
States should be able to know that his government cannot invade
his privacy with the most intrusive techniques if he conducts
himself lawfully.
On the other hand, this committee recognizes full well that the
surveillance[s] under this bill are not primarily for the purpose of
gathering evidence of a crime. They are to obtain foreign
intelligence information, which when it concerns United States
persons must be necessary to important national concerns.
Combating the espionage and covert actions of other nations in this
country is an extremely important national concern. Prosecution is
one way, but oF one way and not always the best way, to combat
such activities.
This passage reflects the dilemma that consumed most of the
debate on the bills in the 95th Congress that led to FISA.555 On the
one hand, many in Congress believed that U.S. persons should not be
subjected to the intrusiveness of electronic surveillance unless they
were likely to be involved in criminal conduct.556 On the other hand,
114 H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 36-37 (1978).
.. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 10887-88 (1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (stating that
"a major stumbling block" to enactment of legislation in 94th Congress was its inclusion
of a non-criminal standard, and that "the major breakthrough" of S. 1566, 95th Cong.
(1977) was its resolution of "the issue of the so-called noncriminal standard"); id. at 10890
(statement of Sen. Bayh) (stating that the criminal standard was "probably the most
controversial, the most sensitive, and yet probably the most important aspect of this
legislation"); id. at 28142 (statement of Rep. Drinan) ("H.R. 7308 does not uniformly
require a criminal standard. That is its major deficiency... "); S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 17
(1978) ("A difficult issue posed during committee deliberations was whether foreign
intelligence electronic surveillance should be limited to situations involving the
commission of a crime."); id at 83 (minority views of Sen. James Abourezk) (stating that
"noncriminal standard" for identifying permissible U.S. person-targets of FISA
surveillance makes bill "fatally defective"). Indeed, legislation similar to the FISA died in
the 94th Congress largely because it prescribed a "noncriminal" standard for surveillance.
Legislation in the 94th Congress defined an "agent of a foreign power," the term that
identifies a proper target of surveillance, to include a U.S. person who, under certain
circumstances, covertly gives information to foreign intelligence officials. S. 3197, 94th
Cong. (1977). Opponents of that provision criticized it as allowing a "noncriminal"
standard for surveillance that raised Fourth Amendment concerns. See, e.g., Senate
Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 5 (statement of Sen. Morgan) (saying that
he had voted against S. 3197, 94th Cong. (1977) partly because he was "disturbed about
the lack of criminal standards" for surveillance); id. at 14 (prepared statement of Attorney
General Griffin Bell) ("In response to last year's bill, a concern was expressed involving
the so-called non-criminal standard for the definition of an agent of a foreign power.");
Senate Judiciary Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 80 ("The absence of a crime standard
was one of the principal issues on which S. 3197 foundered.").
556 Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 8 (reproducing Additional
Views of Sen. Biden on S. 3197, 94th Cong. (1977)) ("The scheme the founding fathers
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a pure criminal standard for targeting U.S. persons ignored that
evidence of criminal conduct does not identify every U.S. person
who, from a foreign intelligence perspective, should be targeted for
surveillance; U.S. persons could warrant surveillance for conduct that
was totally innocent or, at least, not a crime.
557
This and similar passages show that Congress and groups interested
in the legislation understood that some foreign intelligence
surveillance would reveal evidence of crime that would be used for
prosecution.5 58 Prosecution became all the more likely as Congress
developed, in the Fourth Amendment, to police invasions of privacy has two basic parts.
First, an American's privacy cannot be invaded unless a judicial officer issues a warrant
authorizing the search, and second, the judge must have probable cause to believe that the
search will seize particular evidence of specific criminal activity."); id. at 14 (prepared
statement of Attorney General Griffin Bell) (stating his belief that objections to narrowly
drawn noncriminal standard were based on view that "as a matter of principle a United
States person should not be made a target of an electronic surveillance unless there is
probable cause to believe he has violated the law."); id. at 55 (statement of Sen. Morgan)
(stating as a general matter, "I am inclined to believe ... that there ought to be a criminal
standard,... either the person is committing a crime or is about to commit a crime.").
557 For example, when FISA was enacted it was not a crime for someone in this country
to plan a terrorist attack overseas, yet the government wanted to be able to conduct
surveillance of such a person, partly to fulfill international obligations. See H.R. REP. No.
95-1283, Pt. 1, at 43 (1978) (citing the terrorist "Carlos" as an example of someone who
"may not have violated U.S. law, even though they may have murdered hundreds of
persons abroad."); id. at 45 ("The committee intends that terrorists and saboteurs acting for
foreign powers should be subject to surveillance under this bill when they are in the United
States, even if the target of their violent acts has been within a foreign country and
therefore outside actual Federal or State jurisdiction. This departure from a strict criminal
standard is justified by the international responsibility of governments to prevent their
territory from being used as a base for launching terrorist attacks against other countries as
well as to aid in the apprehension of those who commit such crimes of violence.").
... See, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. 10887 (1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (stating that
bill "mandates that before any information obtained can be used at a subsequent criminal
trial, the trial court must... find that all statutory wiretap procedures have been met."); S.
REP. No. 95-701, at 10-11 (1978) ("U.S. persons may be authorized targets, and the
surveillance is part of an investigative process often designed to protect against the
commission of serious crimes . . . . Intelligence and criminal law enforcement tend to
merge in this area.") (footnote omitted); id. at 14 ("Foreign counterintelligence
surveillance may target U.S. persons and may involve detection of crimes, even though
criminal prosecution may not result."); H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, Pt. 1, at 49 (1978)
(observing that information "about a spy's espionage activities" falls within the definition
of "foreign intelligence information" "and it is most likely at the same time evidence of
criminal activities"); Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 42 (statement
of Sen. Gain) (observing that ex parte nature of proceeding for judicial authorization of
electronic surveillance under FISA was justified by need to avoid disclosure that would
"make prosecution impossible"); id. at 128 (testimony of Morton Halperin, Center for
National Security Studies) (stating that bill violates the principle that "if a criminal
defendant would be entitled to information which the Government declines to release on
national security grounds, the Government faces the choice of making the information
available or dropping the prosecution" because the bill "suggests that even if the
Government intends to use the fruits of a national security electronic surveillance in a
criminal case, it need not turn over the [judicial] authorization to the defendant unless the
court finds that that is necessary"); id. at 133 (prepared statement of Steven Rosenfeld,
Comm. on Fed. Legislation, Ass'n of Bar of NYC) (citing among the Committee's "major
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refined the definition of "agent of a foreign power" so that it mostly
applied to U.S. persons only if they were involved in crime. Indeed,
the legislative history shows Congress approved prosecution as one
way "to combat" the "espionage and other covert actions of other
nations in this country." 559 To Congress, it was "[o]bvious[]" that
"use of 'foreign intelligence information' as evidence in a criminal
trial is one way the Government can lawfully protect against
clandestine intelligence activities, sabotage, and international
terrorism." 560 Accordingly, Congress clearly would have approved of
FISA surveillance conducted for the "primary purpose" of getting
evidence of crime if the government reasonably believed that
prosecution was the best way to combat the foreign threat that the
government wanted to surveil. As discussed above, it does not matter
that, at the time of the original FISA's enactment, the government
rarely determined that prosecution was the best way to achieve
foreign intelligence purposes.561
Indeed, opponents of a non-criminal standard for FISA surveillance
of U.S. persons did not use the prospect of criminal prosecution as an
argument for imposing the judicial primary purpose test. They used
the prospect of prosecution as an argument for adopting a criminal
standard for U.S. persons and putting other restrictions on such
surveillance.562 Furthermore, they did not cite the risk of prosecution
concerns" "[t]he possibility that the bill may be read to sanction the use of evidence
obtained by foreign intelligence surveillance in criminal and other proceedings based only
upon ex parte determinations"); id. at 234-36 (appendix to letter from Attorney General
Griffin Bell prescribing guidelines for dissemination of evidence of crime collected during
intelligence and counterintelligence investigations); Senate Judiciary Hearing on FISA,
supra note 70, at 65 (statement of Sen. Abourezk) ("The evidence gathered under the
noncriminal standard of this proposed legislation can be used for prosecution in criminal
cases.").
"9 H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 36 (1978).560
1d. at 49.
561 See supra notes 550-51 and accompanying text.
562 See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 34-35 (statement of
Sen. Abourezk) (arguing that it violated Fourth Amendment to use in a criminal
proceeding information obtained through surveillance authorized under a noncriminal
standard); House Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 130 (prepared statement
of Robert Sheehan, Comm. on Federal Legislation, Ass'n of Bar of NYC) (citing among
the Committee's "major concerns" "[t]he possibility that the bill may be read to sanction
the use of evidence obtained by foreign intelligence surveillance in criminal and other
proceedings based only upon ex parte determinations, without any adversary hearing of
any kind"); id. at 145 (testimony of Morton Halperin, Project on National Security)
(arguing that because foreign intelligence surveillance could lead to evidence of crime to
be used in criminal prosecutions, the Constitution required disclosure to the defendant of
the warrant and fi-uits of the search); Electronic Surveillance Within the United States for
Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Hearings on S. 3197 before the Subcomm. on Intelligence
and the Rights of Americans of Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
95 (1976) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (expressing concern that, under predecessor bill "we
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as their main argument for a criminal standard. Their main argument
for the criminal standard was that electronic surveillance itself was
burdensome quite apart from the danger of prosecution i.e., it is or
can be hurtful, intrusive, and fraught with dangers such as revelation
of embarrassing personal information or the threat of such revelation
as a means of harassment. 563  The intrusiveness of electronic
surveillance was often cited by supporters of a criminal standard to
distinguish electronic surveillance from cases in which the Supreme
Court had upheld against Fourth Amendment attack administrative
inspections and other searches conducted under noncriminal
standards. 564  Supporters of a criminal standard for electronic
surveillance thus argued that a citizen should be subject to the
are establishing a standard ...which not only permits surveillance be logged for the
collection of information which may be necessary for the protection of this country, but
also ...to be used subsequently for criminal prosecution without the probable cause
standard which is now required.").
161 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-604, at 84 (1978) (minority views of Sen. James Abourezk)
(referring to "the pervasive type of search which electronic surveillance entails" to explain
his view that a U.S. person should not be targeted for such surveillance without probable
cause to believe he or she was committing a crime); Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA,
supra note 70, at 92 (prepared statement of Prof. Christopher Pyle) (arguing that same
Fourth Amendment requirements should apply to surveillance for law enforcement
purposes and surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes because "[b]oth are equally
intrusive"); id. at 112 (prepared statement of John Shattuck and Jerry Berman, ACLU)
("Why is it so important to limit the wiretapping authorized by H.R. 7308 to a 'criminal
standard'? A wiretap is probably the most intrusive and inherently unreasonable form of
search and seizure. Even when a tap is placed on a person suspected of engaging in
criminal activity, it offends the Fourth Amendment because it necessarily results in a
'general search'); id. at 78 (prepared statement of John Shattuck, ACLU) ("Since
electronic surveillance is inherently so intrusive, the ACLU has long maintained that it
cannot be conducted at all without violating the Fourth Amendment. If this violation is to
be minimized, at the very least no surveillance should be authorized unless there is
probable cause to believe that the person to be tapped is engaged in crime."); House
Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 81 (prepared statement of John Shattuck
and Jerry Berman, ACLU) (substantially identical to prepared statement, quoted supra this
note, submitted at Senate hearings); id. at 233 (testimony of Ambassador Laurence
Silberman) (argument for criminal standard "is based on the notion that surveillance is a
punishment, and therefore it should only apply to people who commit crimes"); see also
Cinquegrana, supra note 58, 137 U. PA. L. REV. at 809-10 (stating that proponents of
criminal standard "argued that electronic surveillance should be limited to cases involving
violations of criminal law since it is generally intrusive and inherently results in the
acquisition of many irrelevant communications") (footnote omitted).
56 See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 79 (prepared statement
of John Shattuck, ACLU) (distinguishing administrative searches from electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence information on the ground that the latter involve "a
deliberate search for information unrelated to criminal activity" (emphasis added), and
that cases on administrative searches "deal with a much less intrusive invasion of
privacy"); House Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 108 (testimony of John
Shattuck, ACLU) ("The distinction between the OSHA case [involving administrative
searches] and the wiretaps before us in this bill is that the degree of intrusion is far less
serious and the Supreme Court has generally upheld administrative searches, sometimes
with a warrant, but always pegged on the degree of intrusion.").
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extraordinary intrusion of electronic surveillance only if their conduct
created probable cause of crime. 565 By the same token, "A citizen...
should be able to know that his government cannot invade his privacy
with the most intrusive techniques if he conducts himself
lawfully."
'566
True, some opponents of the FISA worried that prosecutors would
use it to avoid the traditional requirements for warrants to obtain
evidence of crime. 567 They expressed this worry, however, to explain
why Congress should impose stringent requirements for the
government to get judicial authorization for surveillance under the
FISA. 568 The idea was that the government would not use FISA to
avoid the traditional requirements for law-enforcement surveillance if
FISA's requirements for foreign intelligence surveillance were
565 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-604, at 84 (1978) (minority views of Sen. James Abourezk)
("I believe, as the Church committee found, that 'as a matter of principle... an American
ought not to be targeted for surveillance unless there is probable cause to believe that he
may violate the law."') (quoting Church Committee Final Report, supra note 62, at 325).
566 H.R. REP. 95-1283, Pt. 1, at 36 (1978).
567 Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 139 (prepared statement of
Steven Rosenfeld, Comm. on Fed. Legislation, Ass'n of Bar of NYC) ("We are concerned
that [the provision in the bill] which provides that minimization procedures shall not be
deemed to preclude retention and disclosure of information incidentally acquired which is
evidence of a crime might permit law enforcement agencies to conduct illegal domestic
surveillance under the guise of foreign intelligence surveillance, where they cannot meet a
'probable cause' standard to obtain warrants for surveillance."); Senate Judiciary Hearing
on FISA, supra note 70, at 34-35 (statement of Sen. Abourezk) (distinguishing
surveillance under Title IIl from surveillance under proposed legislation on the ground that
Title III imposes a criminal standard); House Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 70,
at 147 (testimony of Robert Sheehan, Comm. on Fed. Legislation, Ass'n of Bar of NYC)
(expressing Committee's "fear that in the future a law enforcement purpose might be
attempted to be served in a case where there is no probable cause showing of criminal
activity under the normal standards for obtaining a warrant").
568 Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 42, (prepared statement of Steven
Rosenfeld, Comm. on Fed. Legislation, Ass'n of Bar of NYC) (stating that, to prevent use
of FISA for law enforcement purposes when traditional probable cause standard cannot be
met:
[T]he bill should contain an additional proviso that information or evidence
incidentally obtained in the course of foreign intelligence surveillance, while it
may be disclosed to the appropriate domestic law enforcement agencies, would
remain subject to all of the established statutory and Fourth and Fifth
Amendment protections and restrictions upon admission into evidence or other
use in the criminal law enforcement process.)
Senate Judiciary Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 34-35 (statement of Sen. Abourezk)
(expressing concern about the noncriminal standard for electronic surveillance under
proposed legislation, and distinguishing it from Title III's criminal standard for
surveillance, in discussing what standard and safeguards Congress should ultimately
prescribe for surveillance under the proposed legislation); House Intelligence Hearing on
FISA, supra note 70, at 147 (testimony of Robert Shaheen, Comm. on Fed. Legislation,
Ass'n of Bar of NYC) (arguing that the requirement for judicial approval under proposed
legislation should be made stricter, based on the committee's fear that government might
use surveillance authority under proposed legislation for "a law enforcement purpose").
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comparably stringent. Concern about circumvention of the traditional
requirements for law-enforcement surveillance was generally not used
to argue that Congress should bar the government from using FISA
surveillance for law enforcement purposes. 569 Maybe this is because
the Church Committee did not reveal, among the significant abuses of
the past, the use of "national security" surveillance as a pretext for
surveillance, the "primary purpose" of which was really to get
evidence of crime.
570
By the same token, people appearing before the 95th Congress who
favored a noncriminal standard for FISA surveillance did not claim
that the government would never conduct FISA surveillance for the
primary purpose of getting evidence of crime. Instead, they argued
that tying FISA surveillance to a criminal standard was too restrictive
to accommodate legitimate government intelligence interests.
571
569 For the only exception to the statement in the text that this author discovered, see 124
CONG. REC. 28142 (1978) (statement of Rep. Drinan):
When Government agents obtain incriminating evidence through electronic
surveillance not intended for that purpose and which may be totally unrelated to
the alleged criminal activity, they should not be allowed to use it for
prosecutorial purposes. Such 'fruit of the forbidden tree' should not be available
to prosecute the party for conduct which may not be even remotely connected to
the object of the surveillance. This is especially true when it is considered that
the criminal standard, where it does appear in these bills, is not uniformly
required for obtaining a surveillance warrant in the first instance.
House Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 196 (prepared statement of Rep.
Drinan) (essentially identical to statement on floor of Congress). Two features of this
statement deserve attention. First, it objects to the use of information to prosecute only
crimes that are "totally unrelated" to the object of the surveillance. Second, it bases this
objection in part on the absence of a uniform "criminal" standard for surveillance, an
objection that Congress considered and rejected. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(3). In addition to
Representative Drinan's statement, some case law involving pre-FISA surveillance
expressed concern that the government would invoke "national security" to avoid the
traditional probable cause requirement for electronic surveillance. See, e.g., Zweibon v.
Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 609 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (noting "the potential for abuse of
[warrantless electronic surveillance conducted in the name of national security] as a means
for circumventing the warrant requirement in normal criminal investigations").
570 See generally Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 42, at 261-87 and
288-315 (reproducing portions of Church Committee report addressing "excessive use of
intrusive techniques" and "political abuse of intelligence information"); see also Zweibon,
516 F.2d at 612 n.39 (noting that wiretap authorizations in that case "ordered that evidence
derived therefrom not be used for prosecutorial purposes"); cf. Church Committee Final
Report, supra note 64, book 11, at 161-62, 189-90 & n.30 (reporting instance in which a
federal law enforcement agency, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, asked the
National Security Administration to monitor telephone calls between New York City and a
city in South America because of the Bureau's doubt that it could itself legally tap the
telephones).
571 See 124 CONG. REC. 10889 (1978) (statement of Sen. Gan) (stating that he
supported a noncriminal standard because, among other reasons, "the desire to use
surveillance-obtained information to uncover a wider network of foreign agents often
prevents prosecution; and ... the Government may not desire prosecution since to do so
would require them to reveal even more sensitive information in a court proceeding"); id.
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There were circumstances when surveillance was justified-of an
"innocent dupe," for example-even though the target was not
involved in crime. 572 Supporters of the noncriminal standard for
at 28166 (statement of Rep. McClory) (arguing that criminal standard was too narrow
because it ignored that "most intelligence relates not to criminal activities, but solely to the
subject of gathering information which may be useful to our Nation"); S. REP. No. 95-604,
at 25 (1978) ("Although the [Carter] Administration is committed to using the criminal
standard [for electronic surveillance] wherever possible, there are several situations"
where that is not possible); id. ("Because of this range of cases, which may or may not fall
within the ambit of the espionage laws, but do involve Americans working for a foreign
intelligence service under circumstances dangerous to national security, the Committee has
chosen to include this limited noncriminal standard for Americans."); Senate Intelligence
Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 15 (statement of Attorney General Griffin Bell)
(discussing situations in which foreign intelligence surveillance of Americans' activity
was justified "whether or not that activity is today a violation of our criminal statutes");
Senate Judiciary Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 11 (statement of Sen. Thurmond)
(stating: "There is no requirement in this bill . . . that the target of the surveillance be
actually engaged in the commission of a crime. Nor should there be such a requirement.";
and giving example of when surveillance was justified of activity that "is generally not
illegal"); id. at 37 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (identifying "certain acts that do not rise to the
nature of a crime under our present criminal laws but necessarily become essential to our
security interests"); House Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 3 (prepared
statement of Rep. McClory) (advocating legislation that would not require prior judicial
approval for foreign intelligence surveillance because of "the differences in the
circumstances which necessitate 'searches and seizures' for law enforcement and those
necessary for foreign intelligence gathering"); id. at 208 (prepared statement of Philip
Lacovara) (stating that requiring a pure criminal standard for surveillance would cause
"much of the rationale" for the proposed legislation to "evaporate"; and explaining that
"[tjhe whole point" of the proposed legislation is gathering foreign intelligence and is
premised on the principle that "the government has a legitimate need for information
relating to our foreign relations and national defense even though the sources of that
information may not be personally involved in criminal conduct").
572 See S. REP. No. 95-701, at 95-96 (1978) (additional views of Sen. Malcolm Wallop):
In cases where the defense of foreign relations of the United States are
concerned, the subject's [i.e., surveillance target's] culpability or responsibility is
arguably beside the point. The information gained by surveilling him may not
relate to him at all, but may save countless lives .... Consider ... the case of a
thoroughly innocent American who may have knowledge which, unbeknownst to
him, would shed light on foreign military or intelligence plans, and who would
be placed in danger if contacted [directly by government officials]. Under this
bill this American could not be surveilled.
Id; House Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 213 (testimony of Philip
Lacovara) ("I think there may be a number of situations in which American citizens,
perhaps acting in good faith, or at least acting short of the criminal culpability line, may be
the permissible subjects of intelligence gathering by the Government."); id. at 233
(testimony of Ambassador Laurence Silberman) ("[T]here are certain hypotheticals . . .
where perfectly innocent people may have to be surveilled, and where I think it is
justifiable."); see also Senate Judiciary Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 8-10
(reproducing appendix to letter from Attorney General Griffin Bell to Sen. Abourezk
describing six hypothetical situations in which electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence was warranted even though target of surveillance may not be involved in
criminal conduct); cf S. REP. No. 95-604, Pt. 2, at 1-4 (1978) (appendix to the minority
views of Sen. James Abourezk) (discussing hypothetical situations submitted by the
Department of Justice to Congress to demonstrate need for "noncriminal" standard for
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence); Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA,
supra note 70, at 93-97 (prepared statement of Prof. Christopher Pyle) (same); id. at 119-
21 (prepared statement of John Shattuck and Jerry Berman, ACLU) (same).
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surveillance believed that national security interests sometimes573
justified surveillance of even innocent U.S. persons. At the same
time, they emphasized that the noncriminal standard proposed in the
bills that became the FISA were very narrow. In almost all cases a
U.S. person could be targeted for FISA surveillance only for violating
the law.574 Congress ultimately sided with national security interests
to the extent that it defined "agent of a foreign power," as applied to
U.S. persons, by reference to some noncriminal conduct. 575 Congress
also, however, acknowledged civil liberty concerns by making the
definition come as close as possible to requiring a finding of criminal
conduct without sacrificing national security.
576-
573H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, Pt. 1, at 118 (dissenting views on H.R. 7308) (1978):
When the Government seeks evidence to support a prosecution, it may be reasonable to
require that the probable cause standard apply to the issue of criminality itself. Where,
however, the object of the government is to gather intelligence related to national security
or defense of the country, the situation is very different.
Whether the activities which the President may wish to scrutinize are illegal or not is not
of primary importance, for the government does not seek the information to prosecute.
While prosecution may prove to be a viable option, the main thrust of our efforts in this
area are to protect against foreign intelligence activities which threaten our security.
Prosecution may be, as most often has been the case, inappropriate or harmful to that
effort. To impose a criminal standard, therefore, adds a requirement, not mandated by the
Constitution, which could in fact inhibit powers reserved to the Executive.
574 See, e.g., Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 17 (prepared
statement of Attorney General Griffin Bell) ("Under S. 1566 in almost all cases an
American will have to be violating Federal law to be targeted for electronic
surveillance."); Senate Judiciary Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 66 (reproducing letter
from Justice Department to Sen. Kennedy's staff, stating that "[t]he non-criminal standard
is a very narrow exemption").
...See S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 12-13 (1978):
The essential point is that, if electronic surveillance is to make an effective
contribution to foreign counterintelligence, it must be available for use when
necessary for the investigative process. The criminal laws are enacted to establish
standards for arrest and conviction; and they supply guidance for investigations
conducted to collect evidence for prosecution. Foreign counterintelligence
investigations have different objectives. They succeed when the United States
can insure that an intelligence network is not obtaining vital information, that a
suspected agent's future access to such information is controlled effectively, and
that security precautions are strengthened in areas of top priority for the foreign
intelligence service. Prosecution is a useful deterrent, but only where the
advantages outweigh the sacrifice of other interests. Therefore, procedures
appropriate in regular criminal investigations need modification to fit the
counterintelligence context.
Id. (defending the noncriminal standard).
576 Early versions of the bills that became the FISA authorized electronic surveillance of
U.S. persons in two situations that were not defined necessarily to involve criminal
conduct. One was for a U.S. person who:
pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or intelligence network of a
foreign power, knowingly collects or transmits information or material to an
intelligence service or intelligence network of a foreign power in a manner
intended to conceal the nature of such information or material or the fact of such
transmission or collection, under circumstances which indicate the transmission
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iv. Scarcity of Legislative History Citing Primary Purpose Case Law
The last aspect of the legislative history that is relevant to the
validity of the judicial primary purpose test as a gloss on FISA is the
legislative history's almost complete failure to mention the primary
purpose test then extant in the case law. 577 As discussed above, the
primary purpose test began as a judicially conceived Fourth
Amendment limit on warrantless electronic surveillance by the
government. The leading cases are Brown and Butenko. Only after
FISA's enactment did courts transform this Fourth Amendment test
of such information or material would be harmful to the security of the United
States, or that the lack of knowledge by the United States of such collection or
transmission would be harmful to the security of the United States.
S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 17 (1978). "This standard was also present in S. 3197, [94th CONG.
(1976)] except for the addition of collection to the activities which would justify
surveillance." Id. The other situation allowed surveillance of a U.S. person who conspired
with or aided or abetted someone who engaged in the conduct described in the first
situation; or someone who "knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence activities for or
on behalf of a foreign power under circumstances which indicate that such activities would
be harmful to the security of the United States." S. REP. No. 95-604, at 17 (1978). The
committees refined the definition of "agent of a foreign power," as applied to U.S. persons
generally to minimize the situations in which the definition would apply without reference
to actual or potential criminal conduct. See S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 21-26 (1978)
(discussing extent to which criminal conduct would be involved in situations covered by
portion of definition of "agent of a foreign power" that dealt with certain clandestine
intelligence gathering and other clandestine intelligence activities ); H.R. REP. NO. 95-
1283, Pt. 1, at 36 (1978) (defining agent of a foreign power through compromise language
that "requires that whenever a United States person is to be the target of a surveillance
there must be a showing that his activities at least may involve a violation of law"); id. at
39 (explaining that the inclusion of conduct that "may involve" a crime in the definition of
"agent of a foreign power" reflected committee's judgment "that it is necessary in order to
permit the Government to investigate adequately" in certain cases where crime could not
be proven); see also 124 CONG. REC. 10900 (1978) (statement of Sen. Church) ("In the
case of this bill, we have established a criminal standard as in ordinary criminal cases.");
id. (statement of Sen. Bayh) ("In structuring the criminal standard, we have used words
which we feel are as close to the words of art as we can, to give flexibility to those who
need to get involved in the use of some of this technology which is now available to
protect our country but to nevertheless apply that perhaps a bit broader standard to the
criminal test which I think is basic to our system in this country."); Senate Intelligence
Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 9 (additional views of Sen. Biden on S. 3197, 94th
Cong. (1976)) (observing that in negotiations Attorney General had agreed to changes "so
that before authorizing electronic surveillance the judge must be satisfied that the
American is engaged in specific acts, with very limited exceptions, criminal acts"); id. at
190-92 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (discussing committee amendment that would narrow
"noncriminal" standard for identifying U.S. person-agents of foreign powers who could be
targeted for surveillance); House Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 37-38
(testimony of Attorney General Griffin Bell) (stating that one portion of proposed
definition of "agent of a foreign power" was "as near to a criminal standard as anything
could be" and that activity covered is "tantamount to a crime"); House Intelligence
Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 207 (prepared statement of Philip Lacovara)
(expressing the view that the proposed definition of "agent of a foreign power" as applied
to U.S. persons is constitutional because it "comes quite close to requiring a showing of
criminal involvement").577 See infra notes 579-81.
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into a restriction imposed by the FISA's purpose provision.
578
Butenko, like Brown, is cited in the legislative history of the
original FISA. Indeed, the legislative history often cites them
together.57 9 In only a couple of instances, however, are those citations
accompanied by an explicit mention of the primary purpose test. For
example, a senate committee report describes Butenko as holding that
"electronic surveillance conducted without a warrant would be lawful
so long as the primary purpose was to obtain foreign intelligence
information." 580 The same report, however, found that "[n]either
Brown nor Butenko provide a systematic analysis" of the
constitutionality of warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence. 58 1  Furthermore, none of the legislative history's
references to Brown and Butenko cite them to suggest that the bills
that would become FISA imposed the judicial primary purpose test.
The legislative history's failure to do so suggests that Congress did
not intend the FISA to impose that test.
Indeed, Congress may well have believed that Butenko and Brown
did not support imposing the judicial primary test on surveillance
authorized by the FISA because that test was designed for warrantless
surveillance, i.e., surveillance conducted without prior judicial
approval. 582 Although the orders approving surveillance under the
bills that became the FISA were not called "warrants," that did not
reflect a judgment that they were not "warrants" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. 583 It reflected, instead, that the drafters of
the FISA used Title III as a model, and Title III did not use the term
"warrants."'5 84  Even so, Congress considered FISA surveillance
578 See supra notes 171-223 and accompanying text.
... S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 14-15 (1978); S. REP. No. 95-701, at 9 n.3 (1978); H.R. REP.
No. 95-1283, Pt. 1, at 114-15 & n.13 (1978) (dissenting views on H.R. 7308); cf S. REP.
No. 95-604, at 58 (1978) (citing Butenko for its discussion of whether information
underlying electronic surveillance needs to be disclosed to a defendant against whom the
government seeks to use evidence obtained through the surveillance); S. REP. No. 95-701,
at 64 (1978) (same); Senate Judiciary Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 10-11
(statement of Sen. Thurmond).
58oS. REP. No. 95-604, at 14-15 (1978).
58 S. REP. No. 95-604, at 15 n.26 (1977).
582 See supra notes 171-209 and accompanying text.
... See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-604, at 5 (1978) ("The purpose of the bill is to provide a
procedure under which the Attorney General can obtain a judicial warrant authorizing the
use of electronic surveillance in the United States for foreign intelligence purposes.");
H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, Pt. 1, at 27 (1978) (referring to the bill's "warrant requirement").
584 Electronic Surveillance Within the United States for Foreign Intelligence Purposes:
Hearings on S. 3197 Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of
Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th CONG., 2d Sess. 77 (1976) (statement of
Attorney General Edward Levi) (saying, of predecessor bill, that its standards and
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orders tantamount to warrants requiring a criminal standard for
issuance, 585 which made surveillance conducted under them quite
different from the warrantless surveillance at issue in the case law
interpreting the Fourth Amendment to impose the primary purpose
test. By the same token, congressional debate on the FISA contains
few or no references to surveillance under the FISA as equivalent to
warrantless surveillance. 586 Indeed, a big selling point of the FISA
was that it required prior judicial approval for electronic surveillance
under legislative standards.
58 7
2. Provisions on Minimization Procedures
The FISA Trial Court relied on the FISA provisions on
procedures, "particularly its provision for prior judicial approval, draw upon the traditional
criminal law enforcement search warrant model, the pattern followed in Title III").
... See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 10887 (1978) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("The bill
would require that all foreign intelligence electronic surveillance in the United States...
be subject to a judicial warrant requirement based on probable cause."); id. at 10897
(statement of Sen. Abourezk):
For the first time, warrants will be required in the area of foreign intelligence
electronic surveillance .... In every instance in which a warrant can be issued
against an American citizen . . . the Government must demonstrate . . . that a
nexus exists between the activities of the citizen and a violation of the criminal
laws.
Id; id. at 28125-26 (1978) (statement of Rep. Murphy) (stating that, with limited
exceptions, "[t]he bill would require a prior judicial warrant for all electronic surveillance
for foreign intelligence purposes" and that the criminal standard was required to get the
warrant); Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 42, at 111 (prepared statement
of John Shattuck and Jerry Berman, ACLU) (stating preference for H.R. 7308, which was
the House version of bill that became the FISA, because, unlike a competing bill, H.R.
7308 contained the "requirement that all such wiretaps be conducted pursuant to a judicial
warrant" and because of H.R. 7308's "specificity as to the showing the Government must
make to obtain a warrant"); id. at 132 (prepared statement of Steven Rosenfeld, Comm. on
Fed. Legislation, Ass'n of Bar of NYC) ("The judicial warrant procedure established by S.
1566 is certainly a major step in th[e] direction" of legislation "needed to protect
individuals . . . from intrusion upon their fundamental rights and liberties."); Senate
Judiciary Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 57 (prepared statement of Adm. Stansfield
Turner, Director of CIA) ("I accept ... the warrant requirement that is the central feature
of the bill.").
586 Cf Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 42, at 88-89 (prepared statement
of Prof. Christopher Pyle) (arguing that because of deviance from traditional probable
cause, the bill provided for "pseudo-warrants").587 See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 10888 (1978) (statement of Sen. Gain) (stating that the bill
"for the first time brings all electronic surveillance conducted within the United States
under judicial review"); S. REP. No. 95-604, at 6 (1978) (stating that S. 1566, 95th Cong.
(1977), increased protection for U.S. persons compared to S. 3197, 94th Cong. (1976), by
authorizing limited judicial review); id. at 15 (stating that S. 1566 "would relegate to the
past the wire-tapping abuses brought to light during the committee hearings by providing,
for the first time, effective substantive and procedural statutory controls over foreign
intelligence electronic surveillance."); Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note
42, at 2-3 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (citing S. 1566's provision for "judicial review of the
executive certification that surveillance of an American is necessary to obtain foreign
intelligence information" as one "significant change[]" from S. 3197).
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minimization procedures, rather than on the original FISA's purpose
provision, to reject a large portion of the March 2002 information-
sharing procedures adopted by the Attorney General. 588 The FISA
Court of Review reversed the FISA Trial Court, holding, with little
analysis, that the minimization procedures provided "no basis" for the
trial court's decision. 589 This subsection offers an analysis that, it is
hoped, clarifies why the trial court erred in relying on the
minimization procedures.
a. Text of FISA Provisions on Minimization Procedures
The FISA Trial Court rejected the Attorney General's 2002
procedures because, and to the extent that, they were "designed to
enhance the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of evidence for
law enforcement purposes, instead of being consistent with the need
of the United States to 'obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign
intelligence information."'590 The court found this design "consistent
with the government's interpretation of the recent amendments that
FISA may now be 'used primarily for a law enforcement
purpose." '591 For that very reason, in the court's view, the procedures
were not "'consistent' with the need to obtain, produce, and
disseminate foreign intelligence information. The court's own
italics show that it forcefully (and forcibly) distinguished (1)
procedures designed to facilitate the gathering and processing of
criminal evidence from (2) procedures designed to facilitate the
gathering and processing of foreign intelligence information. The
court rejected the March 2002 procedures to the extent that they
served the first function "instead of' the second. 593 The FISA Court
of Review faulted this reasoning as resting on the same false
dichotomy between foreign intelligence and law enforcement as
underlay earlier primary purpose case law. 594 But the flaw goes
588 See In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 616-25 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 2002); see also supra notes 330-40 and
accompanying text (discussing FISA Trial Court's opinion).
5891n re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 731 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
590 In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp.
2d at 623 (emphasis in original).
591 Id.
592 /d at 622 (emphasis in original).593 Id. at 624 (emphasis in original).
594 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 721 (stating that FISA Trial Court opinion
"appears to proceed from the assumption that FISA constructed a barrier between
counterintelligence/intelligence officials and law enforcement officers" and that "[t]he
[FISA Trial Court] apparently believes it can approve applications for electronic
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deeper. The FISA Trial Court's reasoning ignores the whole point of
the minimization procedures.
The minimization procedures do not balance the gathering of
foreign intelligence information, on the one hand, against the
gathering of evidence of crime, on the other hand. Rather, the
minimization procedures balance the government's need to gather
foreign intelligence information and use it for foreign intelligence
purposes, on one side of the scales, against the privacy interests of
U.S. persons, on the other side. The definition of minimization
procedures reflects this balancing when it provides for procedures to
minimize the acquisition and retention of information about U.S.
persons, and to prohibit its dissemination, only to the extent
"consistent with" the government's "need ... to obtain, produce, and
disseminate foreign intelligence information."5 95 The government's
"need" is a given, and minimization procedures must be designed to
accommodate it.
This raises the question of why the government needs foreign
intelligence information. The answer comes from the FISA's
definition of "foreign intelligence information." 596 The definition of
"foreign intelligence information" says the government needs this
information because, if it concerns a U.S. person, it is necessary for
five purposes. It is
(1) ...necessary to, the ability of the United States to protect
against-
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a
foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power;
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service
or network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign
power; or
(2)... necessary to-
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
surveillance only if the government's objective is not primarily directed toward criminal
prosecution of the foreign agents for their foreign intelligence activity.").
'9' 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (2003).59 6
1d. § 1801(e).
The Patriot Act
The definition of minimization procedures refers to the
government's "need" to "obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign
intelligence information." 597 That "need" exists, however, only
because that information is "necessary to" the five foreign
intelligence purposes identified in the definition of foreign
intelligence information. 598 If those purposes can be served by the use
of FISA-acquired information for prosecutorial purposes, then
minimization procedures must be consistent with the government's
need to make such prosecutorial use of the information. Therefore, a
set of proposed minimization procedures cannot be invalidated merely
because they facilitate prosecutorial use. Yet that is the ground on
which the FISA Trial Court rejected the Attorney General's 2002
procedures for consultation between intelligence officials and
prosecutors. 599 The Court's decision conflicts with the definitions of
"minimization procedures" and "foreign intelligence information,"
which require minimization procedures to accommodate foreign
intelligence purposes.
600
More broadly, these definitions reflect that the government can
obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information-
597Id. § 1801(h)(1).
598 Cf. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 727 (rejecting the notion that "the government
seeks foreign intelligence information (counterintelligence) [merely] for its own sake-to
expand its pool of knowledge").
99 See In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 623 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 2002) (finding Attorney General's 2002
procedures invalid because, and to the extent that, they "are designed to enhance the
acquisition, retention, and dissemination of evidence for law enforcement purposes,
instead of being consistent with the need of the United States to 'obtain, produce, and
disseminateforeign intelligence information').
600 Professor Swire appears to endorse the FISA Trial Court's reliance on the portion of
the FISA's text referring to "the need to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign
intelligence information." Swire, supra note 3, at 1337-38). Professor Swire, like the
Trial Court, appears to treat the fulfillment of that need as the ultimate and the only
legitimate purpose for FISA surveillance. See id. If I understand his view correctly, I
respectfully disagree with it. For reasons explained in the text, the need to obtain produce,
and disseminate foreign intelligence surveillance is not the ultimate purpose of FISA
surveillance. To the contrary, that need exists only because of the government's need to
achieve the five foreign intelligence purposes identified in the FISA's definition of
"foreign intelligence information," which include purposes relating to protecting the
United States from foreign attacks and other threats. Those are, in my view, the ultimate
purposes for FISA surveillance. Based on that view, this article has argued that the three
protective foreign intelligence purposes can, and under the original FISA may, be
furthered by the prosecutorial use of FISA-acquired evidence. Neither Professor Swire nor
the FISA Trial Court addresses this argument, apparently because they fail to identify the
significance of the foreign intelligence purposes identified in the FISA's definition of
foreign intelligence information. See also infra note 676 (explaining that Professor Swire's
proposed amendment of FISA apparently loosens standard for FISA surveillance of U.S.
persons).
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and, of course, can use the information for foreign intelligence
purposes-even though those activities disturb the privacy interests of
U.S. persons. The activities merely must take place "in accordance
with" procedures that minimize the disturbance. 60 Those activities
include, but are not limited to, the use of information about U.S.
persons to investigate and prosecute crime, when doing so serves
foreign intelligence purposes. As explained in Part I, the government
can make two other uses of information about U.S. persons, even
though those uses may impinge on privacy interests. First, the
government can temporarily acquire and retain information about
U.S. persons, and disseminate it on a limited basis, to evaluate that
information or other information that may be foreign intelligence
information. 6 02 The government can use information for this
evaluative purpose even though that use may not, strictly speaking, be
directly "necessary to" a foreign intelligence purpose. In addition,
the government can use information about U.S. persons "that is
evidence of a crime . . . for law enforcement purposes," whether or
not that use serves a foreign intelligence purpose. 6 04 Thus, the
government can use FISA-acquired information about U.S. persons,
despite the use's intrusion on those persons' privacy interests, not
only for foreign intelligence purposes but also for closely related
evaluative purposes and purely for law enforcement purposes. All
such uses simply must be carried out in ways that reasonably
minimize their intrusiveness.
The FISA Trial Court would have had a statutory leg to stand on if
it had invalidated the Attorney General's 2002 procedures because
they were not "reasonably designed ... to minimize the acquisition
and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available
information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent
with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate
601 See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(a) (2003) ("Information acquired from an electronic
surveillance conducted pursuant to this subchapter concerning any United States person
may be used and disclosed by Federal officers and employees without the consent of the
United States person only in accordance with the minimization procedures required by this
subchapter.").
602 See id. §§ 1801(h)(1)-(2), discussed supra notes 139-59 and accompanying text.
603 See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
604 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(3) (2003) (providing for minimization procedures that
"allow for the retention and dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime which
has been, is being, or is about to be committed and that is to be retained or disseminated
for law enforcement purposes"), discussed supra notes 143, 157-59 and accompanying
text.
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foreign intelligence information."'60 5 Instead, the court invalidated the
procedures because, in its view, they favored the use of FISA-
acquired information for law enforcement purposes over the gathering
and processing of foreign intelligence. That view fundamentally
misconceived the balancing of interests that Congress intended to
strike with minimization procedures.
60 6
b. Legislative History of Minimization Procedures
The legislative history of the minimization procedures confirms
that the government can use information that has been obtained
through FISA surveillance and that concerns U.S. persons for three
sets of purposes: (1) for one or more of the foreign intelligence
purposes identified in the definition of "foreign intelligence
information"; (2) for the limited purpose of evaluating the
information itself or other information that may be foreign
intelligence information; and (3) for prosecutions even of crimes that
do not relate to a foreign threat and even if the prosecutions
themselves are not intended to advance any foreign intelligence
purposes.
(1) The permissibility of using FISA-acquired information for one
of the five foreign intelligence purposes identified in the definition of
"foreign intelligence information" may be less obvious in the text of
the FISA, as enacted, than it was in the bills that became the FISA. As
enacted, Section 1806 of the original FISA said (and continues to say)
that information obtained in FISA surveillance "may be used and
disclosed by Federal officers and employees without the consent of
the United States person only in accordance with the minimization





606 This analysis does not deny differences between procedures designed to facilitate the
use of information for law enforcement purposes and procedures designed to facilitate the
use of information for advancing foreign intelligence purposes in other ways. See, e.g., S.
REP. No. 95-701, at 14 (1978) (referring to "[t]he differences between ordinary criminal
investigations to gather evidence of specific crimes and foreign counterintelligence
investigations to uncover and monitor clandestine activities"). For example, procedures to
facilitate the gathering of evidence of crime should address matters, such as the chain of
custody for physical evidence and the hearsay nature of statements, that do not bear
directly on the gathering or processing foreign intelligence. Conversely, procedures to
facilitate the gathering and processing of foreign intelligence should emphasize matters,
such as protecting the identity of intelligence sources and methods, that do not bear
directly on the concerns of the prosecutor. None of these concerns-neither the facilitation
of prosecution nor the facilitation of foreign intelligence gathering and processing-
underlie the provisions in the FISA on minimization procedures.
607 FISA § 1806(a) (1978); 50 U.S.C. § 1806(a) (2003) (emphasis added).
Issue 2]
444 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Volume 28
expressly authorize (or prohibit) the use of FISA-acquired
information to achieve the foreign intelligence purposes identified in
the definition of "foreign intelligence information." That is because
neither Section 1806 nor the definition of "minimization procedures"
in Section 1801(h) mentions the foreign intelligence purposes that are
identified in Section 1801(e)'s definition of "foreign intelligence
information."' 608 In contrast, as introduced, Section 1806 of the House
and Senate bills that became the FISA expressly allowed information
that had been obtained through FISA surveillance to be used for
foreign intelligence purposes. The bills said that FISA-acquired
information could be used "only for purposes specified in [the
provision of the bill that defined 'minimization procedures'] or for the
enforcement of the criminal law if its use outweighs the possible harm
to the national security." 60 9 The bill's definition of "minimization
procedures" articulated foreign intelligence purposes that were
essentially identical to the foreign intelligence purposes specified in
the bill's definition of "foreign intelligence information. Thus, the
bills articulated a set of foreign intelligence purposes in both the
definition of minimization procedures and the definition of foreign
intelligence information. By that redundancy, the version of Section
1806 in those bills expressly authorized the use of FISA-acquired
information for foreign intelligence purposes.
As enacted, however, the FISA eliminated this redundancy by
eliminating the specification of foreign intelligence purposes from the
definition of minimization procedures. The legislative history does
not explain why the reference was eliminated, but the reason does not
seem to bear directly on the issues addressed here. 6 11 Unfortunately,
60850 U.S.C. § 1801(e)-(h) (2003).
609 S. 1566, 95th Cong. § 2526(a) (1977), reproduced in Senate Judiciary Hearing on
FISA, supra note 70, at 151; S. REP. No. 95-604 (1978) ("The bill would limit the use of
information concerning United States citizens and lawful resident aliens acquired from
electronic surveillances to matters properly related to foreign intelligence and the
enforcement of criminal law."). The provision permitting FISA-acquired information to be
used for law enforcement purposes was later taken out of § 1806, the provision addressing
permissible uses, and put into the definition of minimization procedures in § 1801. See
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-1720, at 4, 22-23 (1978). At the same time, Congress removed
the explicit requirement that the use of information "for the enforcement of the criminal
law . . . outweigh[] the possible harm to the national security." The conference report
explained that, "even without a statutory requirement, there will be an appropriate
weighing of criminal law enforcement needs against a possible harm to the national
security." Id. at 30.
610S. 1566, supra note 609, § 2521(b)(5), reproduced in FISA of 1977: Hearings Before
the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong. at 135-36.
611 Early versions of the bills did not expressly allow information that had been obtained
through FISA surveillance and that concerned U.S. persons to be retained and
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however, the revision prevents the FISA, as enacted, from explicitly
authorizing FISA-acquired information actually to be used for foreign
intelligence purposes. That is nonetheless a permissible use of FISA-
acquired information for reasons already discussed: The "need of the
United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign
intelligence," to which the FISA's definition of "minimization
procedures" refers, exists only because such intelligence is (if it
concerns a U.S. person) "necessary to" one or more of the five foreign
intelligence purposes identified in the FISA's definition of foreign
intelligence information.
6 12
(2) The second category of permissible uses of FISA-acquired
information encompasses temporary acquisition and retention, and
limited dissemination, of information for the purpose of evaluating it
and other information that might be foreign intelligence information;
this category is discussed primarily in the committee reports. The
relevant discussions were noted in Part 1.613 Most importantly, the
reports clarify that the acquisition, retention, and limited
dissemination of even some information that is not itself "foreign
intelligence information" may be "consistent with" the United States'
need to gather and process foreign intelligence information.6 14 That is
because electronic surveillance cannot identify foreign intelligence
information perfectly and instantaneously, as Congress knew.
615
Rather, it may take time for the government to learn whether
information is "foreign intelligence information" or not.616 This
process often requires consideration of one piece of information in
relation to other pieces. A piece of information may not be
disseminated for the limited purposes of determining whether it or other information was
foreign intelligence information and, if so, understanding and assessing its importance. See
S. REP. No. 95-701, at 59 (1978) ("[T]he lawful uses of foreign intelligence information
concerning U.S. citizens and resident aliens gathered pursuant to this chapter are restricted
carefully to actual foreign intelligence purposes and the enforcement of the criminal
law."); S. REP. No. 95-604, at 37-39 (1978) (explaining that, as reported by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, S. 1566 allowed information obtained through FISA surveillance to
be used only for "one of the approved purposes" i.e., the foreign intelligence purposes
specified in the definition of "foreign intelligence information" or "for enforcement of the
criminal law"); id. at 53 (same). Congress may have amended the bills to clarify that the
FISA permits temporary retention and evaluation of information that is not foreign
intelligence information.
612 See supra notes 596-600 and accompanying text.
613 See supra notes 147-50.
614 See supra notes 148-49.
615 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-701, at 39 (1978) ("It is obvious that no electronic
surveillance can be conducted so that innocent conversations can be totally eliminated.")
(internal quotation marks omitted; footnote omitted).
616 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 58-59 (1978) (explaining that it may take
time for relevance of information to become apparent).
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"necessary" to a foreign intelligence purpose but may still be needed
to identify, understand, or evaluate the importance of other
information that is necessary to a foreign intelligence purpose.
(3) The third category of permissible uses of FISA-acquired
information encompasses the use of FISA-acquired information "for
law enforcement purposes" and is at once the trickiest and most
relevant. As discussed above, the legislative history contains evidence
of Congress's understanding that prosecutions can serve a foreign
intelligence purpose. 6 17 That evidence is not found, however, in the
legislative history on the minimization procedures. To the contrary,
the legislative history on the minimization procedures contains at
least one passage implying that Congress distinguished foreign
intelligence purposes from law enforcement purposes. The passage
concerns the FISA provision that is codified as § 1801(h)(3) and that
requires minimization procedures to include procedures for the
retention of information "that is evidence of a crime" for "law
enforcement purposes":
Paragraph (3) of the definition [of minimization procedures] relates
to information which is evidence of a crime .... The committee
felt . . . that it should be recognized in the definition of
minimization procedures and the procedures themselves that the
procedures do not bar retention and dissemination of evidence of a
crime. As noted above, [in the report's discussion of the definition
of "foreign intelligence information,"] evidence of certain crimes
like espionage would itself constitute "foreign intelligence
information, as defined, because it is necessary to protect against
clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers or their
agents. Similarly, much information concerning international
terrorism would likewise constitute evidence of crimes and also be
"foreign intelligence information," as defined. This paragraph does
not relate to information, even though it constitutes evidence of a
crime, which is also needed by the United States in order to obtain,
produce, or disseminate foreign intelligence information. For
example, in the course of a surveillance evidence of a serious
crime totally unrelated to intelligence matters might be incidentally
acquired. Such evidence should not be required to be destroyed.
Where the information is not foreign intelligence information,
however, retention and dissemination of such evidence is allowed
only to prevent the crime or to enforce the criminal law. Thus, this
paragraph is not a loophole by which the Government can
generally keep and disseminate derogatory information about
individuals which may be a technical violation of law, where there
is no intent actually to enforce the criminal law. On the other hand,
617 See supra notes 358-60 & 559-60 and accompanying text.
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where the evidence also constitutes "foreign intelligence
information," as defined, this paragraph does not apply, and the
information may be dissempsted and used for purposes other than
enforcing the criminal law.
This passage's last sentence, and especially the last sentence's use
of the phrase "other than" (instead of "in addition to"), implies that
the purposes for which foreign intelligence information is used are
purposes "other than enforcing the criminal law."
The passage ultimately resists understanding because it does not
indicate what those "other" purposes for obtaining foreign
intelligence might be.6 19 Instead, it observes that evidence of
espionage is "necessary to protect" against clandestine intelligence
activities without identifying how that protection will come about and
without acknowledging that the government's mere possession of the
evidence has little protective effect. 620 The passage also refers to
information that is both evidence of crime and "is also needed by the
United States in order to obtain, produce, or disseminate foreign
intelligence information." 62 1 This reference presumably means that
some information can be collected, retained, and disseminated for the
purpose of evaluating it or other information that may be foreign
intelligence information, and then used for prosecution. Such
information would meet the "consistent with" standard in the first part
of the definition of "minimization procedures"'622 and would be fit
"for law enforcement purposes" under the third part of that
definition.623 But the passage does not recognize that information can
fit the definition of "foreign intelligence information" because its use
for investigation and prosecution serves a foreign intelligence
purpose. For that reason, read in isolation, the passage arguably
supports the judicial primary purpose test, which assumes an
61 H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 62 (1978).619 1d
620 Id.; see also 2003 Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security
Investigations, supra note 316, at 2 (redacted version) (describing "a variety of measures
to deal with threats to the national security," including "arresting and prosecuting the
perpetrators," as well as "recruitment of double agents and other assets; excluding or
removing persons involved in terrorism or espionage from the United States; freezing
assets of organizations that engage in or support terrorism; securing targets of terrorism or
espionage; providing threat information and warnings to other federal agencies and
officials, state and local governments, and private entities; diplomatic or military actions;
and actions by other intelligence agencies to counter international terrorism or other
national security threats").
62 H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 62 (1978).
622 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(l) (2003).623 Id. § 1801(h)(3).
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incompatibility between foreign intelligence purposes and law
enforcement purposes.
Unlike the passage quoted above, other passages of committee
reports on the FISA do expressly recognize that the prosecutorial use
of FISA-acquired information can further foreign intelligence
purposes. One such passage was already quoted above; it comes from
a House report's discussion of the protective foreign intelligence
purposes identified in the FISA's definition of foreign intelligence
624
purposes.
Another passage comes from a Senate committee report. It
emphasizes that the foreign threats against which the government
seeks to protect the country can include "serious crimes." 62 5 The
report then discusses ways in which the bill "departs from ordinary
criminal law enforcement procedures."62 6 First, unlike an ordinary
search or arrest warrant, a FISA surveillance order can issue without
evidence of actual crime-even if, for example, a person's conduct
only "may involve" a crime. 627 The report continues, "Additionally,
surveillances conducted under [the bill] need not stop once conclusive
evidence of a crime is obtained, but instead may be extended longer
where protective measures other than arrest and prosecution are more•• ,,628
appropriate.
The passage's reference to "protective measures other than arrest
and prosecution" implies that "arrest and prosecution" are among the
measures that can protect the country from foreign threats and thereby
advance foreign intelligence purposes. In light of this passage and
others recognizing that law enforcement uses of FISA-acquired
624In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 724-25 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 49 (1978)) (ellipses and alteration in original) (emphasis
removed):
How this information may be used "to protect" against clandestine intelligence
activities is not prescribed by the definition of foreign intelligence information,
although, of course, how it is used may be affected by minimization procedures.
... And no information acquired pursuant to this bill could be used for other than
lawful purposes . . . .Obviously, use of "foreign intelligence information" as
evidence in a criminal trial is one way the Government can lawfully protect
against clandestine intelligence activities, sabotage, and international terrorism.
The bill, therefore, explicitly recognizes that information which is evidence of
crimes involving [these activities] can be sought, retained, and used pursuant to
this bill.





information can serve foreign intelligence purposes, 629 the murky
passage from the House report quoted above is not strong evidence
that Congress intended to prevent the government from using FISA
surveillance to investigate and prosecute crime.
630
C. Statutory Analysis of the Patriot Act
The FISA Court of Review put two limits on the government's use
of FISA surveillance for prosecution. First, the government cannot
use FISA surveillance for the primary (much less the sole) purpose of
prosecuting non-foreign intelligence crimes.63 1 The court traced that
limit to the original FISA and rejected the argument that the Patriot
Act removed the limit.6 32 As discussed above, the Court of Review
erred in construing the original FISA to impose that limit.633 The
Court of Review traced the second limit on the government's• • • 634
prosecutorial use of FISA surveillance to the Patriot Act. The court
held that under that Act the government cannot use FISA surveillance
for the sole purpose of prosecuting foreign intelligence crimes.
635
This supposed restriction stems from the provision in Patriot Act that
amends the original FISA's purpose provision to change the phrase
"the purpose" to "a significant purpose."
63 6
The court interpreted the "significant purpose" amendment,
coupled with the coordination provision added by the Patriot Act,
"clearly [to] disapprove the primary purpose test." 637 It then reasoned:
[I]f a FISA application can be granted even if "foreign
intelligence" is only a significant-not a primary-purpose,
another purpose can be primary. One other legitimate purpose that
could exist is to prosecute a target for a foreign intelligence crime.
We therefore believe the Patriot Act amply supports the
629 See supra notes 358-60, 559-60 and accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-
1283, pt. 1, at 43 (1978) ("One might wonder why the Government would not immediately
arrest [known international terrorists]. In some cases.., it may be more fruitful in terms of
combating international terrorism to identify otherwise unknown terrorists here, their
international support structure, and the location of their weapons or explosives.").
630 Cf Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 691 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Wilkey, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (concluding that "the State Department viewed criminal
prosecutions as one potentially effective means of achieving its overriding goal of
maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union").
631 Seeln re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 735-36 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).631 See id. at 736.633 See supra notes 500-04 and accompanying text.
634 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 734-36.
635 See id. at 735.636 See id
637 Id. at 734; see also id. at 722 (describing government's alternative argument).
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government's alternative argument [i.e., that the Patriot Act
eliminated the primary purpose test] but, paradoxically, the Patriot
Act would seem to conflict with the government's first argument
[i.e., that the distinction between foreign intelligence purposes and
law enforcement purposes underlying the primary purpose test is
"an illusion"] because by using the term "significant purpose," the
Act now implies that anothe~gurpose is to be distinguished from a
foreign intelligence purpose.
The court found that Congress intended to "distinguish[] from a
foreign intelligence purpose" the purpose of obtaining evidence for a
prosecution. Accordingly, the Court of Review concluded: "The
addition of the word 'significant' to [the original FISA's purpose
provision] imposed a requirement that the government have a
measurable foreign intelligence purpose, other than just criminal
prosecution of even foreign intelligence crimes." 639 Thus, the
government cannot use FISA surveillance if its purpose is "just
criminal prosecution of... foreign intelligence crimes. The Court
of Review's analysis is correct up to a point but wrong in the end.
The Court of Review correctly concluded that the legislative
history of the Patriot Act expresses Congress's intent to strike a
compromise. 64 1 On the one hand, Congress wanted to grant the
government's request to eliminate the primary purpose test. On the
other hand, Congress did not make the precise change to the original
FISA's purpose provision that the government proposed because
Congress wanted to give something to supporters of the primary
purpose test. The big question is, what was the "something" that
Congress gave supporters of the primary purpose test when it added
the word "significant" to the original FISA's purpose provision? The
Court of Review concluded that the addition ratified what would
otherwise be a false distinction between foreign intelligence and law
enforcement. 64 2 The court may well have been correct in believing
that to be Congress's intent.643 Even so, the Patriot Act should not be
638 Id.; see also id. at 721-22 (describing government's first argument).
6391d. at 735.
64 0id.
641 See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
642 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735 ("[E]ven though we agree that the original
FISA did not contemplate the 'false dichotomy,' the Patriot Act did-which makes it no
longer false. The addition of the word 'significant' . . . imposed a requirement that the
government have a measurable foreign intelligence purpose, other than just criminal
prosecution of even foreign intelligence crimes .... Congress accepted the dichotomy
between foreign intelligence and law enforcement by adopting the significant purpose
test.").
643 See 147 CONG. REC. S10593 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (colloquy between Sen.
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interpreted as establishing that intent for three reasons.
First, it conflicts with the text of the FISA. Contrary to the Court of
Review's description, the FISA's purpose provision, as amended by
the Patriot Act, does not say that "a FISA application can be granted
even if 'foreign intelligence' is only a significant-not a primary-
purpose." 644 It says that a FISA application can be granted if
"obtain[ing] foreign intelligence information" is only a significant,
not a primary, purpose. The statute recognizes-whereas the Court of
Review ignored-that "foreign intelligence" is not a purpose;
obtaining foreign intelligence information, in contrast, is a purpose.
More specifically, it is the purpose of obtaining a particular type of
information (i.e., foreign intelligence information), rather than some
other type of information. Thus, the FISA's purpose provision, as
amended by the Patriot Act, continues to specify the type of
information that the government must intend to obtain, and it does not
explicitly address the government's intended use of that information.
In isolation, the provision might be interpreted to allow the
government to seek FISA surveillance for foreign intelligence
information, as well as other types of information, as long as
obtaining foreign intelligence information was a significant purpose
of the proposed surveillance. The provision is not, however,
grammatically susceptible of an interpretation that would cause it to
distinguish between, on the one hand, the government's intended use
of the information for law enforcement purposes and, on the other
hand, the government's intended use of the information for "a
measurable foreign intelligence purpose, other than just criminal• ,, 645
prosecution of even foreign intelligence crimes.
Nor is the provision susceptible of such an interpretation in the
context of the FISA as a whole. As discussed above, although the
original FISA's purpose provision did not explicitly address the
government's intended use of the information sought under proposed.. . .. . . . 646
FISA surveillance, the provision did address this issue implicitly. It
implied that the government must intend to use the information for
one or more of the five foreign intelligence purposes identified in the
FISA's definition of "foreign intelligence information."64 7 It implied,
further, that the achievement of foreign intelligence purposes had to
Cantwell and Sen. Leahy demonstrating that both senators distinguished surveillance for
gathering foreign intelligence from surveillance for evidence of crime).
6'AIn re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 734.
" 5 1d. at 735.
646See supra notes 132-38 & 474-91 and accompanying text.
647 See supra notes 476-82 and accompanying text.
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be the government's "primary purpose" for seeking the information.
Thus, the government could not seek a FISA surveillance order to
pursue prosecution as an end in itself. But nothing in the text of the
original FISA prevented the government from seeking FISA
information for a prosecution that was intended to serve (and believed
necessary to achieve) a foreign intelligence purpose. The original
FISA did not prescribe the means by which the government had to use
FISA-acquired information for a foreign intelligence purpose (other
than to require that the use of such information, if it concerned U.S.
persons, be "necessary" to achieving a foreign intelligence purpose
and that the process of obtaining and using the information intrude on
privacy concerns as little as reasonably possible). As amended by the
Patriot Act, the FISA continues to leave largely to the executive
branch the determination of how FISA-acquired information is to be
used to achieve foreign intelligence purposes. In enacting the original
FISA, Congress recognized that prosecutions could serve protective
foreign intelligence purposes. Nothing in the text or legislative history
of the Patriot Act suggests that, in the wake of 9/11, Congress forgot
about the potential protective function of prosecution. Accordingly,
the government can satisfy the current purpose provision of the FISA
(just as it could satisfy the original FISA's purpose provision) if the
government intends to use the information sought for a prosecution
that the government intends to serve (and believes necessary to) a
foreign intelligence purpose. That is true even if the government's
sole purpose is to get evidence for that prosecution. 648 The FISA
Court of Review's contrary conclusion conflicts with the text of the
FISA.
The Court of Review's conclusion also conflicts with the purpose
of the Patriot Act. The court recognized this when it described its
conclusion as "paradoxical[]." '649 The paradox is that, under the
court's interpretation, the Patriot Act creates, for the first time, a
statutory basis for distinguishing, in the context of FISA surveillance,
between foreign intelligence purposes and law enforcement purposes.
This is the very distinction upon which the wall rested. 6 5 The Court
of Review found no basis for the distinction in the original FISA and
concluded that it was introduced by the Patriot Act. 65 1 Yet the
648 See supra notes 492-516 and accompanying text.
649In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 734.
65°See supra notes 171-262 and accompanying text.
651In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735 ("The addition of the word 'significant' to section
1804(a)(7)(B) [of the FISA] imposed a requirement that the government have a
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original FISA was enacted to restrict the government's surveillance
powers while the Patriot Act was designed to expand them.652 Under
the Court of Review's interpretation of the purpose provision, the
original FISA's version was less restrictive of government
surveillance power than the post-Patriot Act version. The
counterintuitiveness of the court's interpretation does not, standing
alone, justify rejecting it; it is not an absurd result. But the
counterintuitiveness of the interpretation is relevant when coupled
with the analysis above showing that the court's interpretation
conflicts with statutory text.
For the same reason, it matters that the FISA Court of Review
attributed logical precision to Congress that seems unwarranted
considering the circumstances of the Patriot Act's passage. The Court
of Review interpreted the FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, to
distinguish among (1) FISA surveillance undertaken with the "sole
objective" of prosecuting "foreign intelligence crimes" ;653 (2) FISA
surveillance for the "primary" purpose of prosecuting "foreign
intelligence crimes"; 654 (3) FISA surveillance for the primary purpose
of prosecuting "ordinary crimes . . . inextricably intertwined with
foreign intelligence crimes";655 and (4) FISA surveillance for the
primary or sole purpose of prosecuting all other "ordinary crimes."
656
Those distinctions lack any anchor in the text of the FISA, which does
not define "foreign intelligence crimes," and the scant legislative
history of the Patriot Act's hurried enactment does not evince
congressional appreciation of those distinctions.
65 7
measurable foreign intelligence purpose other than just criminal prosecution of even
foreign intelligence crimes.").
652 See supra notes 60-71 & 287-304 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Senate
Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 70, at 141 (reproducing letter to Sen. Inouye
from George Hasen, Chairman, Comm. on Civil Rights, Ass'n of Bar of NYC) ("We think
it is important to remember why this legislation is needed. Clearly it is not needed to
empower government agencies to carry on electronic surveillance. Rather, the need is for
legislation which will limit and control electronic surveillance.").653 1n re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735-36; see also id. at 723 & n.10 (defining "foreign
intelligence crime"); but cf id. at 736 (apparently amending definition of "foreign
intelligence crime" to include "ordinary crimes ... inextricably intertwined with foreign
intelligence crimes").
654 See id. at 734 (stating that a "legitimate purpose" for surveillance under FISA, as
amended by the Patriot Act, is "to prosecute a target for a foreign intelligence crime," and
that this purpose "can be primary"); see also id. at 723 & n.10 (defining "foreign
intelligence crime"); but cf id. at 736 (apparently amending definition of "foreign
intelligence crime" to include "ordinary crimes ... inextricably intertwined with foreign
intelligence crimes").
655 Id. at 736.
656 See id. at 734-36; see also supra notes 350-409 and accompanying text.
657 Congress enacted the Patriot Act six weeks after the 9/11 attacks; the legislation
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Finally, there is a better alternative to the Court of Review's
interpretation of the Patriot Act's amendments of the FISA. The
alternative interpretation begins with the same understanding of the
congressional intent behind the amendment as the Court of Review
had: Congress wanted to scrap the primary purpose test, as the
administration requested, while giving something to the supporters of
the primary purpose test. More particularly, as the Court of Review
recognized, Congress apparently wanted to "giv[e] the FISA court the
authority [when reviewing a government application for a FISA
surveillance order] to review the government's purpose in seeking the
information."'658 This article has argued that the original FISA already
gave courts that authority but did so only implicitly.659 The Patriot
Act's amendment of the purpose provision, coupled with the Patriot•• 660
Act's addition of the coordination provision, can be interpreted as
making that authority explicit in the FISA for the first time. This
change plainly favors supporters of the primary purpose test, which
rests on the existence of judicial authority to review the government's
purpose for seeking information under the FISA. Congress's use of
the word "significant" instead of "primary," however, reflects an
intent to allow less searching judicial review of the 6overnment's
purpose than permitted under the primary purpose test. Overall, the
Patriot Act did achieve a compromise, though one much rougher than
the intricate one suggested by the FISA Court of Review's
interpretation.
The remaining substantive question is what purposes for FISA
surveillance are impermissible? (There must be some impermissible
purposes, or else it was pointless for Congress in the Patriot Act
explicitly to authorize judicial review of the government's purpose.)
This article has argued that the original FISA did not permit the
government to use FISA surveillance for prosecution as an end in
produced no committee reports. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 732 (noting absence of
committee reports); 115 Stat. 272 (reflecting enactment date of Oct. 26, 2001).
6581n re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735.
659See supra notes 132-38 & 474-91 and accompanying text.
660 See supra notes 302-03 and accompanying text (discussing "coordination" provision
in 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k) (2003)).
661 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S10591 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein) ("The effect of this provision will be to make it easier for law enforcement to
obtain a FISA search or surveillance warrant for those cases where the subject of the
surveillance is both a potential source of valuable intelligence and the potential target of a
criminal prosecution."); id. at S10593 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (amendment would
"make it easier for the FBI to use a wiretap where the Government's most important
motivation for the wiretap is for use in a criminal prosecution").
itself.66 2 That remains an impermissible purpose under the Patriot Act
since, as was discussed above, the applicable analysis does not
change. 663 Other impermissible purposes exist, under both the
original FISA and the FISA as amended by the Patriot Act, but they
do not involve prosecutorial use. Rather, they reflect Congress's
intent in the original FISA to prohibit the abuses revealed by the
Church Committee, which consisted of "national security"
surveillance being conducted, and information obtained through such
surveillance being used, for "political" and "personal" purposes that
had no relationship to any legitimate government objective.
664
Although the original FISA implicitly authorized judicial review to
ferret out such improper purposes, the Patriot Act amendments made
the authority explicit (while relaxing it).
665
D. Summary of Statutory Analysis
This Part concludes that the original and current versions of the
FISA allow the government to use FISA surveillance to obtain
evidence for prosecuting any type of crime if the government intends
the anticipated prosecution to serve (and believes the anticipated
prosecution to be necessary to) a foreign intelligence purpose. (The
FISA identifies five eligible foreign intelligence purposes in defining
"foreign intelligence information," the first three of which concern
"protective" or "counter" intelligence and are therefore usually the
purposes that will potentially be advanced by a prosecution.) Thus,
lower federal courts have erred in interpreting the original FISA to
impose the primary purpose test, and the FISA Trial Court erred in
662 See supra notes 465 & 482 and accompanying text.
663 See supra notes 644-48 and accompanying text.
664 See supra notes 64-6 and accompanying text.
661 United States v. Truong Dinh Hung illustrates the problem caused by judicial review
under the judicial primary purpose test. In that case the court decided that as of a certain
date the Department's investigation was "primarily" for prosecution purposes rather than
foreign intelligence purposes. See 629 F.2d 908, 916 (4th Cir. 1980). This was easy for the
court to say, with the benefit of hindsight and based on reviewing all of the relevant
internal Justice Department memoranda. In the midst of the investigation, however,
officials may often cross the invisible line without knowing or intending to do so, and only
later have a prosecution crumble because of a court's post hoc determination of when they
crossed the line. See William F. Brown and Americo R. Cinquegrana, Warrantless
Physical Searches for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Executive Order 12,333 and the
Fourth Amendment, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 97, 144 (1985). On the other hand, as Professor
Peter Raven-Hansen observed in commenting on a draft of this article, the Fourth
Amendment could be understood to require the government to get a warrant based on
traditional probable cause, once it has developed probable cause of crime and an intention
to prosecute that crime. On that understanding, the showing that FISA requires for a
surveillance order does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
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interpreting the current FISA to do so. Contrary to that case law, the
government may use FISA surveillance for the primary, and even the
sole purpose of getting evidence for prosecution. The government
must, however, intend the anticipated prosecution to serve a foreign
intelligence purpose. The executive branch's judgment that a
prosecution will serve such a purpose should receive great deference
from reviewing courts.
Although the case law imposing the judicial primary purpose test
misread the original and current FISA, so did the FISA Court of
Review, in two ways. First, the Court of Review erred in construing
the original and current FISA to prevent the government from using
FISA surveillance for the primary (or sole) purpose of prosecuting
"non-foreign intelligence crimes." Under the original and current
FISA, the government can use foreign intelligence information sought
in a proposed FISA surveillance order for the primary purpose of
prosecuting any crime as long as the government intends the
prosecution or some other intended use of the information to serve a
foreign intelligence purpose. Second, the FISA Court of Review erred
in construing the FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, to prevent the
government from using FISA surveillance for the sole purpose of
prosecuting "foreign intelligence crimes."'666 The government may do
so if it intends the prosecutions to serve a foreign intelligence
purpose.
The analysis of the FISA offered in this Part puts one limit on the
government's intended use of FISA surveillance solely for
prosecution purposes: the government must intend the prosecution to
serve a foreign intelligence purpose identified in the definition of
"foreign intelligence information." That limit is not unique to
prosecutorial uses of FISA-acquired information. Rather, it inheres in
FISA's requirement that a high-ranking intelligence official certify
that "the purpose" (under the original FISA) or "a significant
purpose" (under the FISA as amended by the Patriot Act) of the
proposed surveillance is to "obtain foreign intelligence,,667
information. The FISA defines "foreign intelligence information,"
when it concerns U.S. persons, as information that is "necessary to"
five foreign intelligence purposes.668 Because of that instrumentaldefinition, when the government certifies that it has a purpose of
666In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 735 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
667 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2003).
668 Id. § 1801(e); see also supra notes 98-102, 136-38, 477-82, 596-600 and
accompanying text.
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obtaining information "necessary" to a particular purpose, it implies
that it intends to use the information for that purpose. When the
government intends to use information for prosecution, it must intend
that prosecution to serve a foreign intelligence purpose. The same is
true for whatever use the government intends to make of the
information sought through proposed FISA surveillance; the use must
be intended to serve a foreign intelligence purpose. This conclusion
flows from the purpose provision coupled with the definition of
foreign intelligence information.
The statutory analysis offered here distinguishes the government's
intended use of the information sought under a proposed FISA
surveillance order from the government's actual use of the
information so obtained. The government must intend to use the
information for a foreign intelligence purpose. Electronic surveillance
for foreign intelligence, however, does not operate perfectly and
instantaneously. As a result, while the government may intend
surveillance to produce only foreign intelligence information, actual
surveillance may produce information that is hard to classify.
Accordingly, the FISA allows the government temporarily to retain
and disseminate on a limited basis information acquired under the
FISA for the limited purposes of evaluating it and other information
that may turn out to be foreign intelligence information. In addition,
the FISA allows the government to use information that is evidence of
a crime "for law enforcement purposes," even if that information is
not foreign intelligence information, i.e., even if its use would not
serve a foreign intelligence purpose.669
The statutory analysis offered here gives the government broad
power to use foreign intelligence information obtained through FISA
surveillance, but the government's purpose must be to obtain
information that is indeed "foreign intelligence information."
Accordingly, if the information sought concerns U.S. persons, courts
can review the government's determination that the information
sought is foreign intelligence information because its intended use
(for prosecution or other purposes) serves one of the foreign
intelligence purposes identified in the definition of "foreign
intelligence information." Specifically, FISA empowers a FISA judge
to review for clear error the government's certifications "(A) that the
certifying official deems the information sought to be foreign
intelligence information; [and] (B) that the purpose of the surveillance
669
1d §§ 1801(h)(3), 1806(a).
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is to obtain foreign intelligence information.' 6 70 Further judicial
review can occur if the government seeks to use information obtained
through FISA surveillance in a criminal proceeding. 67 1 Based on
experience under the FISA, this review will seldom, if ever, lead to
judicial invalidation of FISA surveillance. 672 The review does,
however, limit the government's ability to use FISA surveillance for
the improper purposes that were revealed by the Church Committee
and that influenced the original passage of the FISA.
67 3
The proposed statutory analysis treats the Patriot Act amendments
of the FISA as benefiting both supporters of the primary purpose test
and the government, which sought elimination of the test. The Patriot
Act benefited supporters of the test by making explicit in the FISA,
for the first time, the courts' authority to review the government's
intended use of information sought through FISA surveillance. The
Patriot Act benefited the government by eliminating the primary
purpose test except insofar as the test reflected the existence of
judicial power to review the government's intended use of
information sought through FISA surveillance.
IV. AN ARGUMENT FOR A STATUTORY CLARIFICATION THAT
ARGUABLY MAKES A SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE TO THE FISA
The first three parts of this article explain what the original and
current versions of the FISA mean. It is hoped that the article both
clarifies the meaning of the relevant statutory provisions and also
(through the article's length if nothing else) proves the need for
congressional clarification. As to how the statutes should be clarified,
this article offers a suggestion, while recognizing (without lengthily
defending) its arguably substantive effect.
674
6701d. § 1804(a)(7); see also id. § 1805(a)(5).
671 See id §§ 1806(b)-(g) (prescribing procedures for use of FISA-acquired information
in a criminal proceeding).
672 See supra note 225 and accompanying text (observing that courts have not, in any
published decision, used the "primary purpose" test to suppress FISA-acquired or FISA-
derived evidence from a criminal proceeding).
673 See Senate Intelligence Hearing on FISA, supra note 42, at 197-98 (discussing
amendment to certification procedures that would require judicial review of whether
information sought under proposed surveillance order actually is foreign intelligence
information, rather than merely reviewing whether certifying official deemed it such); id.
at 222-23 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (similar description).
674 I recognize, as well, that the proposed clarification would not solve systemic
problems. Senators Patrick Leahy, Charles Grassley, and Arlen Specter, Interim Report on
FBI Oversight in the 107th Cong. by the Sen. Judiciary Comm. at § Ill.C.3.b.ii (Feb. 2003)
(observing, with reference to FBI's implementation of the FISA, that changes to
legislation often cannot solve problems in an agency's implementation of existing
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Congress should amend the FISA's definition of "foreign
intelligence information" to add the language italicized below:
(e) "Foreign intelligence information" means-,
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States
person is necessary to, the ability of the United States, by law-
enforcement or other lawful means, to protect against-,
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or
network of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory
that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is
necessary to-,
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
This amendment would clarify that the government can use
investigation, arrest, prosecution and other law-enforcement means to
achieve the three protective foreign intelligence purposes identified in
the portion of the definition of foreign intelligence information that
concerns "protective" or "counter" intelligence.
6 75
The amendment would not amend the portion of the definition that
concerns "positive" (also known as "affirmative" or just plain)
intelligence. That is because prosecution is not a usual method of
maintaining "the national defense or the security of the United States"
or of "conduct[ing] . . . foreign affairs." The amendment would not
prevent the government from arguing in a particular situation,
however, that an intended prosecution was necessary to national
defense or national security or was necessary to the United States's
conduct of foreign affairs. Usually, however, prosecutions will either
serve one or more of the three protective foreign intelligence purposes
or they will have no "necessary" relationship to any foreign
statutes), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress.2003_rpt/fisa.html; see also 9/11
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 416-19 (calling for "unity of effort in sharing
information" across the government).
675 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 95-1720, at 23 (1978) (defining "law enforcement
purposes" to include "arrest, prosecution, and other law enforcement measures taken for
the purpose of preventing the crime").
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intelligence purpose.
676
Although the amendment proposed above confirms the
interpretation of existing statutes offered in this article, this
amendment would change the FISA substantively, if one disagrees
with the interpretation offered here. In particular, the amendment
would strip away the restrictions imposed by (1) case law interpreting
the original FISA's purpose provision to impose a "primary purpose"
test; (2) the FISA Trial Court decision interpreting the FISA's
provisions on minimization procedures to empower the court to
require procedures that, in effect, impose the primary purpose test;
and (3) the FISA Court of Review's decision, which prohibits the
government from (a) using FISA surveillance for the primary or sole
purpose of prosecuting "non-foreign intelligence crimes"; and (b)
using FISA surveillance for the sole purpose of prosecuting "foreign
intelligence crimes." This article will not rehearse the pros and cons
of the primary purpose test, for those are well catalogued in the case
law, the legislative history, and prior commentary. The article will
instead briefly explain why Congress should eliminate the limits on
government power imposed under the FISA Court of Review's
decision.
One limit imposed by the Court of Review's decision requires
government officials and the courts to draw a line between "foreign
intelligence crimes" and "non-foreign intelligence crimes."677 The
executive and judicial branches must draw this line because Congress
has not done so. The FISA does not use the terms "foreign
intelligence crimes" or "non-foreign intelligence crimes"; they come
solely from the FISA Court of Review's opinion. FISA's definitions
of 'foreign intelligence information' and "agent of a foreign power'
do usually implicate criminal activity, but they also may implicate
676 Professor Swire proposes amending the FISA's purpose provision to require a
certification that "the information sought is expected to be sufficiently important for
foreign intelligence purposes to justify" the issuance of a FISA surveillance order. Swire,
supra note 3, at 1364. This proposed amendment, as applied to surveillance targeting U.S.
persons, could have the effect of broadening the government's power to conduct FISA
surveillance. Currently, the FISA defines "foreign intelligence information" as information
that, if it concerns U.S. persons, is "necessary" to one or more of five specific foreign
intelligence purposes. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2003). A standard allowing the government to
conduct FISA surveillance to obtain information that is "sufficiently important for foreign
intelligence purposes" seems more lenient than a standard that allows the government to
conduct FISA surveillance to obtain only that information which is "necessary" to specific
foreign intelligence purposes. I would not favor Professor Swire's proposed amendment
for that reason and because it appears to invite federal judges to second-guess executive
branch judgments about the intelligence value of information sought under a FISA order.6 7 7
1In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 735-36 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
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conduct that is not always a crime, such as entering the country
"under a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign
power."'678 The FISA Court of Review classified this false or
fraudulent conduct as a "foreign intelligence crime," even though the
statute does not.679 The court likewise fudged on the meaning of
"non-foreign intelligence crimes," leaving unclear whether that term
means (1) any crime that is not a "foreign intelligence crime," as
defined by the court, 68  or (2) any crime that is not a "foreign
intelligence crime," as defined by the court, plus otherwise "ordinary
crimes" that, in particular instances, are "inextricably intertwined with
foreign intelligence crimes."
681
The court's own trouble drawing the line between "foreign
intelligence crimes" and "non-foreign intelligence crimes"
demonstrates the weakness of the distinction. For one thing, the
distinction conflicts with congressional intent in the FISA. By
defining foreign intelligence information to include some noncriminal
conduct, Congress judged some noncriminal conduct worthy of
government surveillance and perhaps further response. Second, the
distinction is unjustified, because the prosecution of any crime can
serve a foreign intelligence purpose when that crime is committed by
a foreign power or its agent. Indeed, the 9/11 Commission's Report
describes instances in which actual or suspected international
terrorists committed crimes with no immediately obvious connection
to their terrorist activities.6 82 The government should be able to use
FISA surveillance to investigate and prosecute those crimes, and
thereby take terrorists off the street and in government custody. The
arrest and news of their arrest can disrupt ongoing plans of
violence. 683 Furthermore, in custody the government can do further
678 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(C) & (e); see also supra notes 89, 98-100, 111-116, 129,
554-576 and accompanying text.6 7 9 
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 723 n.10.
680 Id. at 723 ("For purposes of clarity in this opinion we will refer to the crimes referred
to in section 1801(a)-(e) as foreign intelligence crimes."); but cf id. at 723 n.10 (noting
that the court's definition of "foreign intelligence crimes" also includes conduct described
in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(D), "which will almost always involve a crime").
681 Compare In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 723 & n. 10 with id. at 736.
682 See 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 176-77 (discussing crimes, including
"petty crime," that Ahmed Ressam committed while moving to, and living in Canada,
before entering the United States with explosives for the planned millennium bombing);
id. at 230 (reporting that Jordanian suspected of aiding two of the 9/11 hijackers while
they were in the United States was deported to Jordan after 9/11, having been convicted of
"a fraudulent driver's license scheme"); see also id. at 424 ("Counterterrorism
investigations often overlap or are cued by other criminal investigations, such as money
laundering or the smuggling of contraband.").
683 See, e.g., 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 276 (observing that publicity about
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investigation (e.g., interrogation) that may uncover more foreign
intelligence information, including evidence of what the Court of
Review called "foreign intelligence crimes."
684
The other limit imposed by the Court of Review prevents the use of
FISA surveillance for the sole purpose of prosecuting even foreign
intelligence crimes.6 85 The court minimized the importance of this
limit, emphasizing that the government could meet this restriction as
long as, when applying for a FISA surveillance order, it "entertains a
realistic option of dealing with the [United States person-foreign].- ,686
agent other than through criminal prosecution." This restriction
may turn out to be trivial, since virtually all prosecutions are meant
either generally or specifically to deter future misconduct. Yet to the
same extent that the restriction is trivial, it is also arbitrary. The court
adopted the restriction because it felt obliged to interpret the Patriot
Act's "significant purpose" amendment in some way that
distinguishes law enforcement objectives from foreign intelligence
objectives. 687 As discussed above, however, one can agree with the
Court of Review that Congress in the Patriot Act "accepted the
dichotomy between foreign intelligence and law enforcement"
6 88
without interpreting the Act to incorporate that dichotomy, when such
an interpretation cannot be shoehorned into any available statutory
text and cannot be reconciled with the intent of the Patriot Act or the
circumstances of its enactment.
V. CONCLUSION
The 9/11 attacks demand answers to why the United States did not
prevent them. One factor cited has been "the wall" between foreign
intelligence and law enforcement. The wall is almost as shadowy as
were the forces behind the attacks. The wall resists understanding
the pre-9/ll arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, the suspected "20th hijacker," "might have
derailed the plot").
684 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 723 & n.10. Federal jurisdiction over even petty
crimes could be based on the status of the defendant as an agent of a foreign power and the
government's national security purpose in prosecuting that defendant. Cf Verlinden B.V.
v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491-97 (1983) (holding that Article III "arising
under" clause allowed Congress to give federal courts jurisdiction over certain civil
actions between foreign plaintiffs and foreign sovereigns where rule of decision may be
provided by state law).
685In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735.
686 id
687 See id. ("Congress [in the Patriot Act] accepted the dichotomy between foreign
intelligence and law enforcement by adopting the significant purpose test .... [lIt is our
task to do our best to read the statute to honor congressional intent.").688
id.
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because it arose behind an intricate statutory framework that was
implemented mostly in secret. Moreover, as the public learns more
about the wall, it grows and multiplies beyond the set of barriers
inside the Justice Department that originally were known as the wall.
This article, however, focuses on "the wall" in its original denotation,
as a set of restrictions on information sharing within the Department
of Justice, including the FBI. The article concludes that this wall has
never had a statutory foundation and still lacks one. To dispel the
confusion on that score, Congress should clarify the matter when it
debates reauthorization of the Patriot Act.
